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ABSTRACT 
This report aims to establish a design methodology for meeting basic fire safety 
objectives within single storey industrial buildings using a 'common-sense' 
approach. A wide range of fire safety issues are addressed, ranging from 
environmental protection to life safety and structural performance. The emphasis is 
on meeting the performance requirements of the New Zealand Building Code for 
fire safety and hazard management. Given that industrial buildings are likely to fall 
into a high fire hazard category, alternative fire engineering design methods are 
deemed necessary for Building Code compliance. 
Attention is also given to issues that are not part of Building Code requirements or 
acceptable solutions. A fire safety strategy is recommended for an industrial site, 
with the focus on establishing a level of 'acceptable loss'. A risk assessment 
provides the means to meet loss control objectives. This should form the basis for a 
new buildings' fire protection design, plus the on-going fire safety management 
programme. 
Automatic alarms are considered essential for life safety and property protection, 
with sprinklers being the only method of controlling a fire within a typical 
industrial complex. The Fire Service cannot be expected to attack and suppress a 
fire from receiving an alarm call without sprinlder support. The Fire Service can, 
however, be expected to control the spread of fire to neighbouring property given 
certain conditional events work in their favour. The act of prewetting neighbouring 
combustible surfaces and thereby increasing the critical radiation intensity for pilot 
ignition, is considered very effective in preventing fire spread. 
Increasing fire rating requirements fo_r boundary walls based on withstanding 
equivalent fire severities for the 'design' fire, is considered overly conservative. A 
maximum rating of 4 hours is recommended for any boundary wall. This 
recommendation is based on maximum values used in overseas Codes and assumes 
that boundary walls are connected to primary support structures and adjoining wall 
panels, so that if they fail they collapse inwards as one complete unit. 
The report provides a comprehensive list of conclusions that expand on the above 
overview, plus recommends areas for future research. 
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NOTATION 
Symbol Description Units 
<X.t Power law fire growth co-efficient kW/s2 
~ Co-efficient in critical exhaust rate kg/m3 
equation: 1.3 for a vent near a wall; 1.8 
for a vent distant from a wall. 
e Emissivity (dimensionless) 
<p Angle between the receiver and flame (dimensionless) 
point source. 
e Temp. of gases above ambient K 
9w Temperature difference between upper K 
gas layer and upper walls. 
cr Stephan Boltzmann constant kW/m2K 
[56.7 x 10"12 kW/m2K] 
Po Density of ambient air kg/m3 
PT Density of air at temperature T kg/m3 
<l> Configuration factor (dimensionless) 
't RTI time constant (dimensionless) 
'A Thermal conductivity W/mK 
Aw Area of wall m2 
Ae Area of detector element m2 
Ar Area of vertical window and door m2 
openings 
A~t Area of horizontal openings in roof m2 
AI Area of inlets m2 
Ak Constant(= g/cpoTo) m2/kg 
As Specific surface area of fuel m2 
As Area of receiving surface m2 
xi 
Symbol Description Units 
Ar Internal surface area of compartment m2 
Av Area of vertical window and door m2 
opemngs 
Av Area of vent m2 
Av* Effective area of vents m2 
(Av)crit Critical Vent Size m2 
Aw Area of vertical openings m2 
c Specific heat (of detector element) kJ/(kg.°C) 
c Constant for determining compartment (dimensionless) 
temperatures 
cd Coefficient of discharge (dimensionless) 
Cp Specific heat of air at constant pressure kJ/kgK 
Cp Wind pressure co-efficient (dimensionless) 
d Depth of smoke layer m 
D Distance between flame source and m 
receiving surface 
Dr Width of flame m 
er Fire Load MJ/m2 
E Energy released MJ 
F Opening factor my, 
Fe Froude number (dimensionless) 
g Acceleration due to gravity m/s2 
h Height of compartment m 
ha Calorific value of fuel MJ/kg 
he Convective heat transfer co-efficient kW/m2.°K 
H Height above fire plume source m 
Hr Height of firecell m 
Ho Average height of openings m 
Flame height m 
xu 
Symbol Description Units 
m Lumped mass of detector element kg 
ffiair Burning rate for ventilation controlled kg/s 
fires 
fib Burning rate for wood in a ventilation kg/s 
controlled fire 
ffip Burning rate of fuel kg/s 
ffisF Specific burn rate of fuel kg/s.m2 
M Smoke production rate kg/s 
MF Mass of fuel kg 
Merit Critical exhaust rate kg/s 
Me Mass extraction rate of venting, per unit kg/m2s 
area of ceiling 
Mw Mass flow of water from sprinklers kg/s 
N Number of exhaust points (dimensionless) 
p Perimeter of fire m 
PB Buoyancy pressure Pa 
PF Fan back pressure Pa 
PI Pressure drop across inlet Pa 
PR Resultant pressure Pa 
Pw Wind pressure Pa 
Qc Convective heat output of fire kW 
Qcrit Heat value of fire that determines kW 
whether the fire is 'large' or 'small' 
QcL Wall convection heat losses kW 
Qr Heat output of fire kW 
Qpo Minimum heat release rate for flashover kW 
QL Heat loss out of compartment kW 
Qmax Maximum heat output of a fire before kW 
failure conditions occur 
QR Radiant heat flux received kW 
xiii 
Symbol Description Units 
QRL Radiative heat losses kW 
QT Total design heat load kW 
Qv Ventilation controlled rate of heat MW 
release 
QvL Convective heat losses kW 
Qw Heat absorbed by water kW 
r Radial distance from fire axis m 
rF Stoichiometric air/fuel ratio (dimensionless) 
R Distance between point flame source m 
and receiving surface 
RTI Response Time Index (mls)Yz 
t Time from fire initiation s or hrs - as noted 
t1 Detection time s 
t2 Fire Service notification time s 
t3 Fire Service travel time to incident s 
t4 Fire Service access and search time s 
t5 Fire Service attack commences s 
ta Avoidance time s 
Ta Absolute temperature of ambient air K 
Tae Total evacuation time s 
Tc Temperature of fire compartment K 
td Detection time s 
te Equivalent fire severity mm. 
tE Escape time s 
Tg Gas temperature K 
tg Standard fire growth time s 
ti 'intervention' time s 
tl Transport time lag s 
XlV 
Symbol Description Units 
tp Preparation time s 
Tr Rated temperature of detector K 
tr Response time s 
tr Fire resistance rating min. 
ts Time in which the heat output is 1 MW s 
Ts Absolute temperature of smoke plume K 
tr Total burn time s 
Tu Time to untenability s 
LlTs·a Smoke layer temperature above ambient oc 
Tv Compartment temperature for a oc 
ventilation fire 
LlTv.'a Vented smoke temperature above oc 
ambient 
u Heat transfer coefficient W/m2K 
u Gas velocity m/s 
VF Volumetric exhaust rate m3/s 
Vv Volume flowrate through single orifice m 
Vw Velocity of free wind stream m/s 
w Factor for alarm device (no unit) 
w Width of flaming source m 
Wetr Response time factor - evacuation (no unit) 
wr Ventilation factor m·0.3 
y Distance between floor and bottom of m 
smoke layer under ceiling 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Fire design for single storey industrial buildings has attracted particular interest due 
to the frequency of this type of construction, the high design fire loads, the 
relatively high risk of fire occurring, and the peculiar fire behaviour linked to rapid 
growth and probable roof collapse. 
Industrial fires also present distinct cost problems. NFPA 1420 [1993] provides 
statistics showing that over a five year period in the United States 14.2% of 
reported loss fires occurred in storage facilities with the monetary loss equating to 
38.3% of total costs. The cost also needs to be measured in terms of loss of 
business expectation, staff redeployment, and loss of intellectual property. 
Spread of fire and environmental risk are other potential problems, whereas 
fatalities are reasonably uncommon [I.E. Aust, 1989]. Attention is therefore 
usually given to the physical effects of a fire. Given the potential outcomes and the 
likelihood of a serious fire, an owner needs to compare the costs against the 
benefits of enhanced protection. Again cost considerations need to include 
intangible factors such as intellectual property and business goodwill. 
1.1 N.Z. Building Code 
The New Zealand Building Code [BIA, 1991] has clear performance requirements 
for maintaining fire safety depending on the building use and fire hazard category, 
although it does not consider protection for the owner's property. The main fire 
safety objectives within the Code are: 
1. Safeguarding people from injury or illness from a fire. 
2. Facilitating Fire Service operations. 
3. Protecting adjacent property from the effects of a fire. 
4. Safeguarding the environment from adverse effects of fire. 
For industrial buildings the minimum acceptable design solution in the Approved 
Documents is usually quite stringent due to the high combustible loading. Design 
for boundary walls requires specific fire engineering design if the fire hazard 
category is '4' (ie. the fire load energy density is greater than 1500 MJ/m2). 
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1.2 Specific Fire Engineering Design 
The basis of specific fire engineering design is scenario analysis, where a large 
number of possible fire scenarios must be investigated. Such design must be carried 
out (and subsequently be reviewed) by suitably qualified professional fire 
engineers. Numerical calculations are available for individual components of the 
process, but the final assessment of safety is by opinion, not calculation, because 
the performance requirements of the code are not quantified (Cosgrove & 
Buchanan, 1996). This results in a number of different design strategies and 
solutions, without a quantifiable level of safety. 
1.3 Design Methodology 
The purpose of this document is to not only provide a design methodology for a 
specific fire engineering design, but also to investigate common problems with the 
fire design and management of single storey industrial buildings. The main issues 
addressed are: 
a) Reasons why fires m industrial buildings occur, and methods for 
minimising the loss. 
b) Identifying the responsibilities of a building owner for environmental 
protection, and establishing a risk assessment procedure. 
c) Developing a design methodology for possible fire scenarios, including an 
analysis of the effects of the fire in terms of occupant safety, structural 
performance and spread of fire. 
d) Providing an alternative design method for means of escape that includes 
behavioural response factors. 
e) Establishing the effect that active fire protection systems such as 
sprinklers and roof vents can have on fire, and looking at the interface 
options with support systems (ie. alarms, fire service callout, automatic 
doors, plant shutdown etc.). 
f) Reviewing the expected structural performance of primary support 
systems and boundary walls, with particular emphasis on what is a 
reasonable level of fire severity. 
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g) Determining whether fire spread to neighbouring property will occur due 
to radiant heat transfer, especially given roof collapse and the effects of 
flames above boundary walls. 
h) Evaluating the minimum expected level of Fire Service performance, 
quantifying the effectiveness of water application on a fire, and assessing 
whether Fire Service intervention is a valid design tool. 
i) Introducing risk assessment as a design method. 
j) Promotion of loss control programmes on industrial sites, to minimise the 
possibility of a serious fire and the potential consequences. This includes 
promotion of pre-incident and contingency plans. 
k) Developing the concept of a complete fire safety design strategy where 
each fire design feature does not act independently but combines to create 
an overall site fire safety package. 
1.4 Design Fire 
The most important aspect in a fire safety strategy development is the design fire. 
This needs to reflect the contained product and processes, and also allow for the 
following variables [Buchanan, 1994]: 
• combustible load and distribution 
• building configuration and construction 
• fire detection, suppression and control equipment 
• fuel growth rates, maximum heat release rates, smoke development and 
compartment temperature profiles 
• building behaviour under fire conditions 
• Fire Service response 
1.5 Risk Assessment 
The tools available to model the interaction of these variables are relatively crude. 
Single storey industrial buildings may appear to be relatively simple to model since 
they are only one (large) compartment, but due to the size and the complexity of 
the fuel types and the unpredictable nature of a post-flashover fire (with probable 
roof collapse), accurate simulation is considered very difficult. 
Risk assessment can be introduced as a method of predicting outcomes and it is 
expected that this will become more common in the future. Currently, however, 
there is inadequate guidance on what are acceptable levels of risk. One reference 
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even labelled the methods to quantify and verify fire safety levels as being 'deeply 
unsatisfactory and even chaotic'[Magnusson et al, 1995]. 
This document aims to establish a design methodology for meeting basic fire safety 
objectives using a 'common-sense' approach. It is recognised that further research 
is required to substantiate design factors used, and that fire engineering design for 
single storey industrial buildings needs to be treated apart from other building 
types. 
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2.0 STATISTICAL RESEARCH 
2.1 Statistical Analysis : Fire Incidents 1988 -1994 
The following analysis is based on data sourced from the New Zealand Fire 
Service, through their Fire Information Recording System (FIRS). The information 
provided relates to the frequency of manufacturing and warehouse fires in New 
Zealand between January 1988 and November 1994 only. The objective of the 
analysis is: 
• to understand the likely trends of fires m manufacturing or warehouse 
buildings, including: 
industries most susceptible to fires 
likely time of event 
location and cause of fire 
extent of damage expected 
• to assess the high and low risk factors associated with this form of incident 
• to study the trends associated with those fires which result in damage to the 
complete structure 
• to estimate the probability of a manufacturing or warehouse fire occurring, 
2.2 Fire Incident Reporting System 
The New Zealand Fire Service maintain a Fire Incident Reporting System (NZFS, 
1994), that records key information on every incident that they attend. Input fields 
include: 
• incident date and time 
• type of building and its use 
• where and how the fire started 
• extent of damage (flame, smoke and water) 
• performance of automatic detection and suppression systems 
The following discussion analyses data collected under this system, from January 
1988 to November 1994. The data has been selected according to the following 
criteria: 
1. Single storey industrial and warehouse complexes only (this therefore 
excludes complexes such as schools, hospitals, offices, residences etc.). 
2. Exclusion of buildings less than 100 m2 in floor area. 
3. Exclusion of incidents caused by a false alarm. 
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A total of 626 industrial fire incidents have occurred throughout New Zealand in 
the 7 year period. Of this total number, 121 relate to warehouse facilities, and 505 
to manufacturing complexes. 
While these statistics are the best available, they do have some limitations that need 
to be recognised: 
1. The total population of manufacturing and warehouse facilities in New 
Zealand is unknown, so the probability of a fire incident cannot be 
determined. 
2. The recorded information is very generalised; while some incidents 
would appear to be similar, there are likely to be distinct differences in 
the actual events. 
3. The input information has an undetermined margin of error. 
4. Some incidents are not reported due to control by industry fire brigades. 
While recognising that the data includes an undefined 'margin of error', the results 
do provide trends and a clear indication of the common features that are involved 
in typical manufacturing and warehouse fires. 
2.3 Type of Occupancy 
Figure 2.1 shows in pie graph format the percentage of incidents attended for 
various types of manufacturing occupancies. The outstanding statistic is the 
number of fires occurring at wood and paper products facilities. The total is 212 
incidents, or 42%. This is clearly the highest risk group; the next largest grouping 
is furniture at 54 incidents ( 11% ), which is also related to wood product facilities. 
Pulp & Paper 
Note : General Includes such Industries as 
Petroleum, Textiles, Beverages, and 
Chemicals. 
Figure 2.1: Incidents Attended rm· Manuractut·ing Industries 
7% 
6% 
Pnnllng, Publishing 
2% 
Plastic Producls 
3% 
Sawmill, Wood Plant 
21% 
Number of Incidents= 505 
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Figure 2.2 shows incidents attended for various types of warehouse occupancies. 
This grouping is dominated by incidents occurring in general storage facilities, with 
a total of 33 incidents (27%). Wood and paper products is next with 25 incidents 
(21%). 
Various Classlficallons 
31% 
Note: Various Clas~ncallons 
Includes Pelroteum Producls, 
Chemical storage, Barns and 
Food/Son Drink Slorage. 
Frelghl 
8% 
General Warehouse 
25% 
Figul'e 2.2: Incidents Attended fol' Wal'ehouse Slol'age. 
Wool 
Furnllure , Wood Producls 
3% 
Plastics 
3% 
Number of Incidents •121 
Of note are occupancies that have had very low incident numbers over the last 7 
years. They include: 
Manufacturing: 
• Beverages, Tobacco and Essential Oils (5 incidents) 
• Chemical Manufacturers (8 incidents) 
• Paints, Varnishes ( 4 incidents) 
• Petroleum Refining (1 incident) 
Warehousing: 
• Cloth, Yarn Storage (2 incidents) 
• Petroleum Products (0 incidents) 
• Industrial Chemical Storage (0 incidents) 
• Vehicle Storage (0 incidents) 
Businesses associated with the traditional high risk operations, such as chemicals 
manufacture and petroleum refining, are clearly involved in fewer incidents than 
wood products. This is probably due to the tighter controls on their operations, 
coupled with the clear knowledge of the potential outcome of an incident plus the 
presence of industrial fire brigades. 
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2.4 Extent of Damage 
Figure 2.3 reviews the extent of damage for all incidents, for both manufacturing 
and warehousing. The results indicate that generally either the fire is contained 
within the area of origin, or it will grow and involve the complete structure. 
200 
100 
50 
" I 
0 
z 
j 
0 
z 
Extent of Damage 
I-+- Flame Damage --11-- Water Damage -It- Smo!<e Damage I 
~ c ~ 'il 15 :~ ~ 0 0 0 li: 1l E '0 0 li: 1l' ~ 0 0 0: Extant of Damage 
I-+-Flame Damage --11-- Weier Damage -It- Stnd<e Damage I 
Flgm·e 2.3 : Extent of Drunnge 
In reality it is expected that most industrial buildings contain only one floor, and 
consist of only one fire-cell. If a fire does become out of control, then the whole 
structure would be likely to be damaged in some form. A review of British 
warehouse fires concluded that the degree of fire rated compartmentation is often 
inadequate to prevent large and expensive fires (Ward, 1985). 
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Figure 2.3 shows that if the fire is contained to area of origin then most damage 
will be caused by flames, while fires affecting the whole structure result in a 
combination of water, smoke and flame damage. 
From this information, the subsequent charts are placed into two statistical 
groupings: 
• statistics covering all incidents 
• statistics covering total involvement incidents only. Total involvement 
means incidents resulting in some damage where this does not necessarily 
mean that the building is destroyed. 
The trends associated with total involvement fires are considered more applicable 
to this study. A design procedure for single storey industrial buildings should aim 
to avoid major loss fires. 
2.5 Time of Incident 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 provide a month and time of day comparison for the total 626 
incidents. A yearly analysis was undertaken, but due to the study period being only 
7 years it was considered that the sample period was too small to suggest any 
trends. The study by ABA (Hymes, Flynn 1992) concluded that the number of 
'serious' storage fires in Britain had generally increased over the last 15 years. This 
was attributed to: 
• larger and more modern warehouses with less compartmentation, more pallets 
and increased use of combustible wrappings. 
• a general increase in the incidence of malicious fires ie. for reasons of arson, 
vandalism, fraud etc. 
2.5.1 Month ofYear 
The monthly comparison in Figure 2.4, shows incidents peaking at different times 
of year, for both manufacturing and warehousing. The peak months are shown in 
Table 2.1: 
Industry Ram?;e of Incidents Peal{ Months 
Manufacturing All Incidents March, July November 
Total Involvement March, June, November 
Warehousing All Incidents March, June, October 
Total Involvement February, June , October 
Table 2.1 : Peak Incident Months 
The reasons for the peak months are debatable. A chart was produced to see if 
there was any correlation between these peaks and the cause of ignition. One 
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theory for the March and June peaks is the advent of the end of the financial years. 
and fraudulent fires. The resulting chart showed that incendiary, or suspicious, 
causes are more frequent in these months. However, ignition caused through 
mechanical failure and misuse of ignited material was seen to be also very high. 
~ 
.. 
"' 'ij 
c 
:a 
d 
z 
Note: StatlsUcs for Dec. 1994 are not lnduded 
Figu1·e 2.4: Monthly Analysis 
There does not appear to be any clear indicator as to why these months should 
peak, or why January, April and September are low incidence months. The only 
message from these results is the need for industrial businesses to be more vigilant 
during the peak months. 
2.5.2 Time of Day 
Figure 2.5 records alarm times during a 24 hour day for all incidents and total 
involvement incidents only. The noticeable trends for all incidents, are: 
1. Between 1 am -7 am there is a relatively low number of incidents. 
2. From 7am to 6pm there is a gradual increase in incident numbers, to reach 
a peak between 12-1 pm, and then decline to a relatively constant number 
after 6pm. 
3. Between 6pm-lam the incident numbers range between 2-2.5 times the 
number in the early morning hours (lam-7am). 
These results indicate that incidents are more likely to occur during the daylight 
and evening hours. Given that a high proportion of fires are due to plant failure or 
deficiency factors, the correlation to alarm times support the theory that most fires 
are instigated as a result of occupancy. 
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Figure 2.5 : Alarm Times 
Alarm times for total involvement incidents only, show a peak period between 
7pm and lam. The majority of fires occur between 6pm and 6am (66%); this is in 
close correlation with the results from the ABA study (Hymes, Flynn 1992) which 
showed that 62% of 'serious' warehouse fires occurred within these hours. These 
results indicate that the cause of fire and method of alarm may have a strong 
influence on the extent of damage. 
2.6 Method of Alarm 
Figure 2.6 was created to investigate the possibility of a link between method of 
alarm and extent of damage. 
All Incidents 
Total Involvement Fires Only 
Flgul'e 2.6 : Method of Alnl'ln 
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In reviewing whether fires resulting in major damage were attributable to the lack 
of automatic detection systems, it was found that 83% of these incidents were 
alerted to the NZFS by telephone. This compared to 75% for all incidents. 
Fires occurring during working hours are expected to be detected at an early stage. 
The fact that most Total Involvement fires occur out of hours, shows that without 
some form of early detection (ie. automatic detection systems), a fire can develop 
into a major incident. Automatic detection systems appear to be absent mainly 
because NZ building codes have not required them in single storey industrial 
buildings. 
2. 7 Area of Fire Origin 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the area of fire origin for manufacturing and warehousing 
facilities, with a distinction again made between all incidents and total involvement 
incidents only. The predominant areas are shown in Table 2.2: 
Industry Range of Incidents Most Common Area of Percentage of 
Fire Origin Incidents 
Manufacturing All Incidents Technical Areas 43% 
Service Areas 20% 
Manufacturing Total Involvement Technical Areas 35% 
Service Areas 20% 
Warehousing All Incidents Storage Areas 50% 
Structural Areas 21% 
Warehousing Total Involvement Storage Areas 59% 
Staff Areas 15% 
Table 2.2 Common Areas of Fire Origin 
As expected, most fires started in the technical (or processing) areas in 
manufacturing buildings, and in the storage areas for warehouses. This trend 
continues for those fires causing total damage. The study by AEA (Hymes, Flynn 
1992) determined that for warehouses, the highest risk for fire outbreak by either 
accidental or malicious ignition were ramps and loading bays. Reasons given for 
this outcome were: 
• site of most warehouse operations 
• lower level of control for segregating and handling goods 
• accumulation of general rubbish 
• fire safety control, such as no smoking, difficult to control due to the presence 
of non-company personnel. 
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Total Involvement Fires Only 
Savlce Areas 
Figu•·e 2.7 : Aren of Fire Ol'igin in Manufacturing Fncililies. 
Vehicle Areas Means or Egress 
Service Areas 
SeJVIce Facilities 
Figure 2.8: Area of Fire Ol'igin in Warehousing Fncililies. 
In comparing the data between manufacturing and warehousing, it is interesting to 
note that the service areas and facilities in manufacturing buildings are the source 
area for 30% of incidents, yet only 4% for warehousing. This highlights the distinct 
difference in service requirements between a processing facility and a storage 
building. 
The final point of note is that there is not much variation in the area of fire origin 
between the results for all incidents, and total involvement fires only. 
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2.8 Cause of Ignition 
This information was reviewed in the same manner as the Area of Fire Origin data. 
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the various causes in general classifications, with 
differentiation between manufacturing and warehousing, and all incidents and 
total involvement only. 
The most notable indicator to come from these figures, is that an incendiary is by 
far the predominant cause of ignition for total involvement fires . The definition for 
incendiary given by the Fire Service is fires that are either started unlawfully, or 
deliberately set but deemed 'lawful'. At most incidents the noted cause for the 
incendiary in the FIRS is unlawful or suspicious. 
In terms of a design process, the large range of ignition sources indicates that no 
prediction can be made for how a fire is likely to ignite and spread. 
Summarising the principle causes: 
Industry Range of htcidents 
Manufacturing All Incidents 
Manufacturing Total Involvement 
Warehousing All Incidents 
Warehousing Total Involvement 
Table 2.3 Cause oflgnition 
Operational Deficiency 
Design, lnstallatlon Oeflency 
Cause of Ignition Percentage of 
htcidents 
Mechanical Failure 25% 
Misuse of Heat 16% 
Operational Deficiency 15% 
Incendiary 31% 
Mechanical Failure 22% 
Other Factors 16% 
Incendiary 40% 
Misuse of Heat 23% 
Mechanical Failure 15% 
Incendiary 61% 
Misuse of Heat 15% 
Mechanical Failure 8% 
Total Involvement Fires Only 
llote: lnctndlary means fires either started 
unla'Nfully, or deliberately set but deemed 1avd'ul' 
(le. fireplace) 
Flgw·e 2.9 : Cnuse of Ignition In Mnnufnclul"ing Fncllltles. 
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Mechanical FaHure 
Misuse of Ignited Material 
Figua·e 2.10: Couse oflgultloulu WnrehousiugFncllitlos. 
2.9 Sprinkler Performance 
Total Involvement Fires Only 
NQ1!: Incendiary means fires eHher started 
unlav.futly, or dellberat~y set but deemed 1av.ful' 
(le. fireplace) 
Figure 2.11 records the performance of sprinklers for all the incidents. In most 
cases no sprinklers are present, and where sprinklers are present it is reassuring to 
see that there were no cases of sprinklers failing. The areas of concern involve the 
total involvement fires. 
Fire Too Small 
Sprinklers Failed 
Sprinklers Operated 
No Sprinklers 
Inadequate Info. 
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 
No. or lncldonls 
Figure 2.11: Sprinkler Performance 
In two incidents the Fire Service have reported extensive damage, yet the 
sprinlders did not operate because the 'fire is too small' . In the first case, the 
damage is caused by flames only; it is assumed that this is therefore an input error, 
where the flame damage level should have been recorded as 1 (no damage), instead 
of7 (complete damage). In the second case the damage is recorded as affecting the 
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structure and beyond, yet again the sprinklers did not activate due to the fire being 
too small. Again an input error is assumed to be the problem. These examples are 
reminders of the margin of error in the received data. 
From the results with totally involved fires, there is a record of 13 incidents 
involving damage throughout the building where sprinklers have activated. This 
suggests that the sprinklers have been inadequate to control the fires. Ten ofthese 
cases have flame damage causing damage throughout the building, with 6 of these 
cases showing that the flames have caused more damage than smoke or water. This 
indicates that sprinklers were quite ineffective. The primary purpose of sprinklers is 
to detect and control a fire while it is still small. There could be a number of 
reasons as to why some manufacturing and warehouse fires appear to have 
overcome sprinkler systems. Some are listed below: 
1. Incorrect sprinkler installation, including inadequate protection 
2. Incorrect storage for the sprinkler hazard classification 
3. Failure of spriilkler system (ie. no water, blockage etc.) 
4. Incorrect completion ofFIRS records 
5. Explosion being the cause of fire, either resulting in an excessive number 
of heads to operate or causing critical damage to the sprinlder system. 
Evidence is available in Britain (Ward, 1985) that shows major loss fires resulting 
from inadequate partial sprinkler protection, and from storing above height 
limitations. Ward comments that "current levels of protection provide little margin 
of safety and several factors, such as storage heights being above the 
recommended values, can easily lead to an expensive fire - even if a large measure 
of control of the fire by the sprinklers is achieved.' 
It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate this issue further, although it 
does highlight the need to question aspects that are normally taken for granted, 
such as the reliability of sprinklers, and the control of combustibles in a well 
designed environment. 
2.10 FIRS Summary 
The aim of reviewing NZFS statistics on incidents occurring at manufacturing or 
warehousing facilities, was to identifY high and low risk factors. This enables a fire 
design process for industrial buildings to minimise high risk factors wherever 
possible. 
The FIRS (Fire Incident Reporting System) information received covers incidents 
throughout New Zealand between 1988 and 1994 that involve: 
• manufacturing and warehousing facilities 
• floor area greater than 100 m2 
• call-outs that were not false alarms 
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Key information that was gained includes: 
1. The occupancy type with the highest incidence of fires was wood and paper 
products. This applies to manufacturing (43% of all incidents) and 
warehousing (19% of all incidents; if general storage is ignored). The relative 
probability of fires in this group, in comparison to other groups can not be 
determined due to no other data on total population. 
2. Low risk industries include chemical manufacturing, food production 
(excluding meat processing), and petroleum products. The low level of 
incidents is attributed to tight industry controls, and the knowledge of the 
potential outcome of an incident. 
3. Extent of damage statistics show that in most incidents, damage is either 
limited to the area of origin, or result in complete damage to the structure. 
Damage is measured in terms of either flame, smoke or water damage. Those 
fires limited to the area of origin generally results in minimal smoke and water 
damage, with mainly flame damage. Fires affecting the complete structure 
result in damage from smoke, flames and water. 
4. In analysing the month in which an incident occurs, the results showed three 
distinct peaks in the number of incidents for all groupings. Again there was 
found to be no clear pattern for this result, although two of the peak months 
coincide with the end of financial years. 
5. Time of day analysis showed that most incidents occur during the day and 
evening; relatively few incidents occur in the early morning hours (1am-7am). 
For total involvement fires the predominant alarm time is in the evening (7pm-
1am). It is apparent that relatively few industrial complexes are equipped with 
automatic detection systems - a feature that could reduce property loss, 
especially when most total involvement fires occur during non-occupied 
(assumed) periods. 
6. The most common Area of Fire Origin was found to be in the major use 
areas: technical or process area for manufacturing facilities, and storage areas 
for warehouses. The second most common area for manufacturing was service 
areas. 
7. In reviewing the Cause of Ignition, it is apparent that incendiary, or an 
unlawful/suspicious fire, is the major cause. For total involvement fires in 
warehouses, incendiaries account for 61% of fires. Manufacturing fires show 
mechanical failure (25%) as the predominant cause for all incidents, but again 
incendiaries are the leading cause for total involvement fires (31%). This result 
illustrates that no prediction can be placed on how a manufacturing or 
warehouse fire will initiate, especially as the nature of an incendiary fire is 
unpredictable. 
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8. Automatic alarms, including sprinklers, accounted for 11% of total 
involvement fires. There were also some events where sprinklers operated but 
obviously did not control the fire. This indicates that either: 
• the sprinkler design is inadequate for the risk 
• incorrect storage for the sprinkler classification 
• incorrect FIRS record 
• failure of sprinlder system (ie. no water, blockage etc.) 
• explosion is the cause of fire, either resulting in an excessive number of 
heads to operate or causing critical damage to the sprinkler system. 
2.11 Literature Survey 
Two articles are reviewed to support the results from the FIRS survey. They also 
provide additional information such as probability figures for storage fires, Fire 
Service response, and cost implications. 
2.11.1 'The Probability of Fires in Warehouses and Storage Premises' 
This publication (Hymes, Flynn 1992) was carried out by ABA for the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) in Britain. The aim was to determine from statistical data 
the incidence of fire outbreak in storage premises. Data was obtained from 8 Local 
Authority districts covering two broad categories: 
1. Number of storage premises 
2. Number of fires 
The difficult area with this study was obtaining accurate figures for the number of 
storage premises. The main source for this information was the Rating 
Departments in the Local Authority offices. Due to definition discrepancies the 
results were compared against information held by: 
• The Chartered Institute ofPublic Finance Accountants 
• The Financial Times Business Index 
• The Inland Revenue 
The resulting data, collected for the period 1976 to 1987, was used to determine 
the probability of fire outbreak in storage premises using the general equation: 
p (reportable fire)= number of fires 
number of storage premises 
The two main conclusions were: 
1. A warehouse fire is likely to occur in a particular warehouse once every 
hundred years [p(reportable fire)= 1.2 X 10"2 year "1] 
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2. The probability of a 'serious' warehouse fire occurring in a particular 
warehouse, is between 2.5 x 10"3 and 5.5 x 10"3 year·1. 
Serious Fires 
The area of key interest is fires causing extensive damage. In the review of NZFS 
statistics, these fires were placed under a 'total involvement' category. The ABA 
report defines a 'serious' fire category, while within the report another study is 
referred to that uses another definition for 'serious' fire. Clarifying these 
definitions: 
• FIRS Analysis : 'Total Involvement' incudes fires that result in either fire, 
water, or smoke damage to the complete building. 
• ABA Report : 'Serious' Fires included all fires where roof collapse occurred. 
The NZ FIRS do not include this information. 
• Baldwin Study (referenced in the ABA Report) : 'Serious' Fires included only 
those fires that resulted in significant damage to the fabric of the building. This 
would exclude a number of fires were fire, water or smoke damage occurred 
throughout, or where the roof collapsed, but did not affect the structure. 
The Baldwin study (Hymes, Flynn 1992) concluded that 'serious' fires amounted 
to around 10% of the total 'reportable' fires giving a p(serious fire) of 1 x 1 o·3 
year"1. This equates to a serious fire every 1000 years, for any given warehouse 
building. It should be stressed that this data applies to warehouse/storage facilities 
only, and excludes manufacturing facilities. 
Genera/Information 
Other conclusions to come out of the ABA study (Hymes, Flynn 1992) include: 
1. The likelihood of warehouse fires was considerably higher than fires or other 
potential major hazards in the process and manufacturing industry. This is 
difficult to compare with the NZ results due to the total (population) numbers 
for the respective groupings being unavailable. 
2. The number of serious fires had generally increased over the last 15 years, 
possibly due to: 
• larger warehouses with less compartments, more pallets, and 
increased use of combustible wrappings 
• a general increase in the incidence of malicious fires 1e. arson, 
vandalism, fraud etc. 
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3. Serious warehouse/storage fires not only result in extensive damage to 
structures and contents, but also present a significant risk to the environment. 
Warehouses often store large quantities of products that can release toxic 
fumes and contaminated discharge in a fire situation. 
4. The majority of fires (62%) occur between 6pm and 6am, when the premises 
are presumably unmanned or only a minimal number of staff are present. This 
correlates with the FIRS information- refer Section 2.5. 
5. The main cause of fire outbreak (in order of occurrence): 
• malicious ignition 
• incorrect operation of or faults with electrical appliances and 
installations 
• careless disposal of smoking materials/matches 
6. The warehouse areas with the highest risk for fire outbreak by either 
accidental or malicious ignition are ramps and loading bays. 
7. Alarm systems linked directly to the Fire Service are recommended, to 
overcome the problem of delayed response. 
8. A limited sample of less serious fires (not requiring the turnout of the Fire 
Service) indicated that between 1 and 5 incidents may occur per storage 
premises annually. This seems quite high, and due to the limited sample is not 
considered 'valid' without further research. 
2.11.2 'Some Results from an Analysis of Industrial Fires in Sweden' 
The aim of this analysis (Thor, Sedin 1975) was to study the influence of different 
factors on fire loss, with particular reference to single storey industrial buildings. 
This work is now over 20 years old, but some of the findings are still considered 
pertinent to current fire design issues. 
Fire Loss 
Based on 69 fires in single storey industrial buildings, the fire loss was divided into 
the following proportions: 
• Building Contents : 51% 
• Loss ofProfit : 28% 
• Building Fabric: 21% 
In terms of cost associated with extent of damage, a comparison was made 
between fires contained to one room, and fires affecting more than one room: 
• One Room: 15% 
• More Than One Room : 85% 
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The observation made with the internal fire spread costs, was that partitions in the 
industrial buildings were often found to be deficient. A recommendation was the 
improvement of the integrity of fire rated partitions. 
Fire Load 
It was concluded that the fire load density was probably the single most important 
factor for the fire growth and extent of damage. High fire loads were defined as 
400 MJ/m2 total surface area of the fire compartment. Low fire load was defined as 
less than 50 MJ/m2. It should be noted that the New Zealand Building Code places 
low to medium fire risks below 1000 MJ/m2, and medium to high risks at 1000 
MJ/m2 and above. 
Low fire load incidents accounted for 42 of the 69 analysed fires. In cases where 
the building largely consisted of incombustible structures, the spread of fire and 
amount of loss was generally very small. Low fire load incidents accounted for 
60% of the fires, and only 10% of the loss. High fire load incidents however 
accounted for only 15% of the fires, and 52% of the loss. 
Fire Service Response 
In more than 40% of the analysed fires, flashover occurred before the arrival of the 
Fire Service. The report states that "even at a floor area of only some hundred 
square meters the total energy released is so large that the amount of water 
normally available is inadequate to neutralise the energy. Fire Service capacity is 
then limited to preventing the fire from spreading to adjacent rooms or buildings. 
There is no possibility to extinguish the burning building until all combustible 
materials more or less have been consumed." 
Key design deficiencies (besides inadequate partitioning) were the lack of sprinkler 
protection to control flashover conditions, and roof venting to limit the damage 
caused by smoke. Inclusion of these features would also allow the Fire Service to 
suppress the fire, rather than just perform a containment role. 
2.12 Conclusions 
2.12.1 Literature Survey 
A literature survey was completed to assess fire incident trends from other 
countries. The main conclusions were: 
1. High fire load incidents typically accounted for 15% of fires studied, and 50% 
of the loss. 
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2. Fire load density is probably the most important factor for the fire growth and 
extent of damage. 
3. The likelihood of warehouse fires was considerably higher than fires in the 
process and manufacturing industry. 
4. A warehouse fire is likely to occur in a particular warehouse once every 
hundred years [p(repmiable fire)= 1.2 x 10"2 year "1] 
5. The probability of a 'serious' warehouse fire occurring in a particular 
warehouse, is between 2.5 x 10"3 and 5.5 x 10"3 year"1. A serious fire included 
all fires where roof collapse occurred. 
6. Serious warehouse/storage fires not only result in extensive damage to 
structures and contents, but also present a significant risk to the environment. 
7. The majority of fires ( 62%) occur between 6pm and 6am, when the premises 
are presumably unmanned or only a minimal number of staff are present. 
8. Inclusion of sprinklers and roof vents assists the Fire Service to suppression of 
the fire, rather than just performing a containment role. 
2.12.2 NZFS Incident Records 
A review was carried out on New Zealand Fire Service incident statistics for 
manufacturing and warehousing facilities, between the years 1988 and 1994. The 
aim was to identifY high and low risk factors associated with recent fires, and 
recommend improvements to reduce the incidence of serious fires. 
The main recommendations from this review (and the literature survey) are: 
1. Automatic detection systems should be included in industrial buildings, 
especially businesses associated with wood and paper products. Sprinkler 
systems are the preferred option. 
2. To minimise unlawful entry, security systems should form part of the fire safety 
management programme. 
3. Periodic risk assessments need to be undertaken to ensure that the correct level 
of protection and hazard management is occurring to suit the risk and fire 
safety strategy. 
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3.0 FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Objective 
Fire safety management should take place through all phases of a buildings design, 
use and possible demise. The objective of this section is to highlight appropriate 
fire safety management techniques, and reinforce the need for fire safety to be 
continually reviewed and reinforced. 
The fundamental concept with fire safety management is loss control, or to 
minimise both the chance and consequences of a serious fire. Loss control is not 
only an important consideration during a buildings design phase, but also once the 
business is operational. An on-going programme should be introduced that 
incorporates: 
1. Fire prevention training and audits. 
2. Evacuation systems. 
3. Pre-incident plans. 
This programme aims to ensure: 
• Fire protection systems can still meet hazard demands. 
• Personnel understand fire safety and know how to react during a fire 
incident. 
• Maintenance programmes keep fire protection equipment fully 
functional, escape systems operating as designed, and process equipment 
from becoming possible sources of ignition. 
• In the event of an emergency responding fire service personnel have the 
best opportunity to attack the fire and minimise damage and disruption. 
• Contingency plans are in place for post-fire business continuity. 
The following sections discuss the on-going fire safety management programme in 
detail. Fire design methods for single storey industrial buildings are provided in 
Part 2. 
3.2 Loss Control 
Warehouses and manufacturing buildings present significant fire loss potential. 
Statistics from NFPA 1420 [1993] show that in the USA over the period 1982-
1986, fires in warehouses totalled 14.2% of all reported fires but equated to 38.3% 
of the total cost of fire losses. Some of the contributing reasons for this result are: 
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• large, open compartments. 
• high combustible loading, through high rack storage and the use of high 
hazard materials such as plastics, flammable liquids and wood products. 
• inadequate fire protection systems. 
Davis & Moore [ 1991] concluded that the only proven method of controlling a 
warehouse fire is with a properly designed and maintained automatic sprinkler 
system. Other features that should be carefully considered during the design phase 
are smoke management systems, fire separations, site security and a loss control 
strategy. 
Developing a loss control strategy firstly requires determination of the acceptable 
loss for a given premises, where loss can be measured in terms of property, life, 
environment, and/or business continuity. For issues such as life protection and to a 
lesser extent, environmental protection, legislation establishes a minimum standard 
offire safety [NZ Government, 1991; BIA, 1992]. 
For issues such as property protection and business continuity, an owner needs to 
establish an acceptable level of risk for the operation. As discussed by Keey [1987] 
this decision often narrows to a cost versus benefit question. Budgets are usually 
expected to control the extent of fire safety features, remembering there can be a 
point where extra investment into a facility will not provide the equivalent level of 
benefits. 
Proposed legislation in Britain will introduce the need for fire risk assessments to 
be carried out in some buildings, as well as the preparation of written emergency 
plans [LPC, 1995]. Only the latter currently occurs in New Zealand, where the 
introduction of a risk assessment design procedure is seen as an improvement for 
design options. This approach is already being developed in Australia and Canada 
as a workable fire engineering design tool [BRRTF, 1991]. 
3.3 Fire Prevention 
Fire prevention relies on effective and regular training and audits. The success of a 
fire prevention programme depends on the cooperation of site personnel, which in 
turn relies on their awareness and reaction to hazardous situations. Training and 
audits need to be regular to avoid complacency plus maintain reaction skills. 
Training courses should be held at least once a year, and cover the use of fire 
fighting equipment, evacuation procedures, and basic responsibilities for 
preventing or controlling fires. Company policies on hot work, smoking, use of 
machinery, security, and general housekeeping need to be reinforced. 
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Audits should be undertaken by independent, qualified persons to cover the 
following areas: 
• capability of fire protection equipment for the current hazards. 
Rearranging of stored goods may result in the sprinkler system being 
under-designed, or new processes may require additional hand held fire 
fighting equipment. 
• maintenance of fire protection equipment, including integrity of fire 
separations, and operation of smoke management systems. 
• identification of potential ignition sources, such as heaters, unsafe use of 
electricity, or handling of solvent rags. 
• identification of hazardous goods or operations that could be better 
controlled. This could pertain to handling of flammable paints, storage 
of combustible goods or use of process machinery. 
• general housekeeping, including management of rubbish, smoking, 
security, and material handling. 
Owners of industrial buildings need to develop a culture that accepts fire 
prevention training and audits as part of the business plan. Design documents 
should include this recommendation alongside prescribed maintenance 
requirements. 
3.4 Evacuation Systems 
An important component in a loss control strategy is life safety. A successful life 
safety system ensures that building occupants either escape, are rescued or find a 
place of refuge before untenable conditions occur. The design of an appropriate life 
safety system is discussed further in Section 6. 
For an existing building there is a need to establish and maintain an approved 
evacuation system. This does not only involve the evacuation procedure as 
required under the Fire Safety and Evacuation of Buildings Regulations (1991), 
but also: 
• meeting all annual Building Warrant of Fitness requirements, in 
accordance with the NZ Building Act. This includes ensuring all fire 
protection equipment is properly maintained, all means of escape are 
freely accessible, and combustible risk controlled. 
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• ensuring there is an adequate means of alerting occupants, exit routes 
are clearly marked, a control board is located near the alarm panel, and 
there is a muster point. 
• appointment of building wardens to supervise evacuation, and ensure all 
occupants are safe. 
• conducting trial evacuations on a 6-monthly basis. 
• establishing a contingency plan to minimise disruption to the operation 
of the business in an emergency, including security of records, alternate 
storage facilities and adequate insurance provisions. 
3.5 Pre-Incident Planning 
Unlike fire prevention inspections, pre-incident planning assumes an incident will 
occur. It makes no special effort to prevent a fire or eliminate a hazard, but rather 
to prepare for an incident, regardless of likelihood [NFPA 1420, 1993]. 
The primary purpose of a pre-incident plan is to ensure that responding personnel 
can effectively manage emergency incidents with the available resources. Pre-
incident plans minimise the time fire fighters need for confirming the site fire 
protection capabilities, the hazards and the available site support services. 
The information required for a pre-incident plan can be placed in 5 categories: 
• Building details, including construction, contents and occupancy. This 
should be supported by plans and other records. 
• Fire protection features, including water supply sources. 
• Environmental factors. 
• Area knowledge, including neighbouring occupancies, town water 
supplies, and access. 
• Site support personnel. 
A pre-fire planning session with site and Fire Service personnel is essential in the 
formulation process. Emergency drills should be carried out periodically to test the 
plan, and this should include consultation with the Fire Service to ensure changing 
site conditions have not affected details in the plan [Plaugher & Burns, 1991]. 
Changing site conditions is particularly relevant to sprinkler systems, where they 
are usually designed to meet a minimum standard and any change in conditions 
could leave the system inadequate for the new conditions. 
Other operating features that are variable include: 
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• storage quantity and layout, including storage heights. 
• commodities in use, with respect to combustibility and toxicity. 
• material handling practises. 
• plant layout and use. 
Personnel features that are liable to change include the number of occupants, their 
activities, and familiarity and training with regard to the building operations and 
fire protection features and practices [NFPA 1420, 1993]. Again these details 
should be periodically re-evaluated and the pre-incident plan changed accordingly. 
Figure 3.1 shows a typical pre-incident site data sheet for an industrial location, 
and figure 3.2 provides an example of this data sheet in use. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Design Process 
1. Loss control should be reinforced during the design process. This requires 
determination of acceptable loss, and application of risk assessment and 
cost/benefit techniques. 
2. Current regulatory requirements do not address property and business loss 
control (for the owner); only life safety, spread of fire, and environmental 
protection issues. 
Existing Operation 
3. An on-going fire safety management programme should be introduced that 
incorporates: 
• Fire prevention training and audits. 
• Evacuation systems. 
• Pre-incident plans. 
4. Pre-incident planning should be encouraged to ensure that responding 
personnel can effectively manage incidents with available resources. 
5. Contingency plans need to be in place to minimise disruption to the operation 
of the business in an emergency. 
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Figure 3.1: PRE-INCIDENT SITE DATA SHEET 
Date: 
SECTION A : Company Details : 
Company Name : ........................................................................................................... . 
Premises Name : 
Contact Person & Ph. No. : 
Location: 
Description of Operations : .............................................................................................. . 
No. ofEmployees: 
SECTION B : Protection Systems 
Description of Systems : ................................................................................................. . 
In-rack Sprinlders Provided : D Yes 0No 
Sprinkler Design : ............................ . lpm kPa 
Fire Pump : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lpm kPa 
Site Reservoir : ........................ 1 capacity 
Venting: Natural Vents: DYes D No 
Automatic Vents : DYes 0 No 
Control Panel Location : 
System Description : ......................................................................................... . 
Alarm Panel Location : 
Fire Service Connection : D Yes 0No 
SECTION C : Fire Service RestJOnse 
Site Access : ..................................................................................................................... . 
Door Locations I Forcible Entry Notes : ............................................................................... . 
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Towns Main : Flow lpm RP SP 
Hose Stream Supply : On Site : ....................................................................................... . 
Public: 
SECTION D : Construction Details 
Storage Configuration and Hazards : 
Critical Exposures : Side 1 ...................................... . Side 2 
Side 3 ..................................... . Side4 
Dimensions : Width Depth .............. . Height .......................................... . 
Wall Construction: 
Support Structure : ........................................................................................................... . 
Roof Construction : 
Fire Walls and Doors : 
SECTION E: General Details 
Assen1bly Points : ........................................................................................................... . 
Building Warden : Day . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... After Hrs .............................................. . 
Site Services & Shut Off : 
SECTION F : Blocl{ Sl{etch : 
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Figure 3.2: PRE-INCIDENT SITE DATA SHEET (Example) 
Date: 16.7.95 
SECTION A : COIDJ)any Details : 
Company Name : .. . ~C?.~~f:!. f.'/f:!.~~!<?. .f?C?.f!~f!.~ .. ~~~!: ..... ............................................................. . 
Premises Name : . .T.fJ~.~rC?.Wr!.~.9!!!~ .............................................................................. . 
Contact Person & Ph. No. : .. "!!!. F'.: ~:. !'!.f!.C!.C!. -~ .'Y'!.f:!F!.f:!f!~r.. : .. -~-~~~: ~~~ ................................. . 
Location: .;}!!.~!!..~~C?.~!~.~X~:(.~Y.~~I!.~'!I.'!! ..................................................................... . 
Description of Operations : .. -~~?!'!l.f!.f! .. ~! f.'_'{q .f?C?.t!/f!.~ ........................................................ . 
No. ofEmployees: J~ ............................ . 
SECTION B : Protection Systems 
Description of Systems : .~'!'.C?.~.~- ~~~~~P?F! .. '!c. .'!'.~.'!.l!.f:!!. ~f!i.l!. p~[l}.~~!. !!I!.~~.C!. -~~- ~C?.~I!.C!.f!.~~ .f:!.'!.C! ... 
the Fire Service 
In-rack Sprinklers Provided : D Yes [!] No 
Sprinkler Design: JY!~ .................... . lpm 
Fire Pump : ... N!A.......... lpm kPa 
Site Reservoir: .. !Y/~ ................ 1 capacity 
Venting: Natural Vents: W Yes D No 
Automatic Vents: DYes [RJ No 
Control Panel Location : None 
kPa 
Alarm Panel Location: .. ~~~C!~~'!.~.~C?..C?.'!!~~ ...................................................................... . 
Fire Service Connection : [iJ Yes 0 No 
SECTION C : Fire Service ReSJ)OllSe 
Site Access: 2 entrances off Sir Rhosis Ave. 
····················-································································································· 
Door Locations I Forcible Entry Notes : . 4. qQQ(~ }f).(Q . .WW~t!QIA$.~, .. ~i(~ .Q~(~$. /Q9./s.~.c!. t:Jft~r. ..... . 
. ./J.Q.L!f$,. !5~Y.$.lJ.f!!q_ P.r. .f.ir~. $.~1Y(C?.€! .................................................................................... .. 
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Towns Main: Flow .. ;?QQ9. ...... lpm ...... ~;?[? ..... RP ........ 4;?Q...... SP 
Hose Stream Supply: On Site: .F.fr.~ .. ~Y.~~~~~-~r..~.C?.l!!~.f"I~~~---··········································· 
Public : . !"!.re!r.~!!.~ ~!!. -~ ~~-~~ .~£!~'!!. -~~- ~. ~~'!~. ~r ~/~~- ................. . 
SECTION D : Construction Details 
Storage Configuration and Hazards : PVC bottles stacked 5 m high. Racks = 8 m x 1. 6 m 
.1.1!! -~~P~r.E!t!~tJ. .1?.~~~~~1} r~~l:<.~i. r!~:. ~u~~l:<.~ .. =:= .. 1.~ ........................................................... . 
Critical Exposures : Side 1 --~~-!!?J~.~~~~---··············· Side 2 .. J9..'!!J?..?!~~~~'Jf!..'!!.~!!!-!f:. ... 
Side 3 .. .1.m.tRJ!tJJll.fJ!Y9rg________ Side 4 _1q_I}?}~-~IJ.9.· .. ~C?[.~~/}~P. ...... . 
Dimensions : Width .~9..~....... Depth --~~-'!!..... Height .~.!!?.~~-~~I?..?.U?.C!L ............ . 
Wall Construction: Concrete tilt panel on 3 sides, steel sheeting on road side 
Roof Constmction : Steel long-run roofing with skylight translucent panels 
Fire Walls and Doors : None 
SECTION E : General Details 
Assembly Points : .. ~r.?!!!. ~!. ~!-!!~cf_l!!f"I. ~~ .fl.~l}_~~--~r.~.~-- ........................................................ . 
Building Warden: Day ... !'!~P.L!!?!-!!~................ After Hrs ... ~r.E'.·§:.'i.f!.~~---···················· 
Site Services & Shut Off : . .!!!!~£!~~~ ~~~~~~~ /'!. ~l}_~~~?.l!.~.~- ~- -~~~~l}?.~ 1!~!!?~!-!~f"I!-!l}~~-- .......... . 
Site power: 400V, 150A - SIB by Office. Isolating valve for stormwater by south gate. 
SECTION F : Blocl{ SI{etch : 
160 mm Water Main r----------------------------------------5 
FH 
10m 
1m 
_j_ 
SlrRhotlaAve. 
'Tile Bruwn Bottle' Warehouse 
TlmberYIIIII 
Clothing 
ManufaO!urer 
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4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
4.1 Environmental Effect of Fires 
The design of industrial buildings should not only consider the effects of fire 
within the immediate site area, but also the possible effects to the greater 
environment. 
In a fire situation the introduction of high temperatures and large quantities of 
water can result in chemical cocktails that freely disperse to the environment, 
causing toxic or acid air emissions plus ground and surface water 
contamination. Serious damage can result to the ecosystem and seriously affect 
life forms ranging from terrestrial flora to native animals. 
The local concentration of air pollutants in smoke is usually reduced 
significantly due to dilution and distribution, and in most cases there is only 
minor danger of people being directly poisoned [Miles et al 1994]. The 
principal environmental concern is either soil or water contamination. 
The major focus at a fireground involving toxic substances is therefore 
containment of solid and liquid waste, and proper handling of plant residue. 
The first priority after controlling the fire, is to retain any polluted run-off 
water before soil seepage or leakage into sewer systems can occur. Once 
collected, the contaminated waste must be correctly disposed of within an 
approved hazardous waste dump and the site thoroughly cleaned. 
4.2 Case History 
The following environmental incidents were all due to fire. It is important to 
note that other major environmental incidents at industrial plants have occurred 
due to non-fire related causes. The usual cause is release of toxic vapours as 
occurred at Bhopal, India, or Seveso, Italy [Keey 1987]. 
4.2.1 Chemical Fire, Mount Wellington, NZ (1984) [Keey 1987] 
At approximately Spm, Friday 21 December 1984, a series of explosions 
occurred at one of the chemical warehouses ofl.C.I. New Zealand Ltd. in the 
Mount Wellington suburb of Auckland. The resulting fire engulfed the 
warehouse, which housed a variety of pesticides, herbicides, health-care 
products and swimming pool chemicals. 
The emergency response involved 86 firemen and 18 appliances. Houses and 
businesses within a 1km radius were evacuated. The fire was contained after 4 
hours, but resulted in 50 tonnes of chemicals being burnt, and 5 to 10 tonnes 
being diluted by fire fighting water and discharged into the local estuary via 
stormwater drains. 
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The Health Department arranged tests of soil and debris, to monitor the effects 
of chlorine and dioxin released products. Thirty four firefighters needed 
hospital treatment for rashes from contamination. Eight were still in hospital a 
fortnight later, and a small number of firefighters had continuing skin problems 
six months after the fire. The long term effects to both firefighters and the 
environment appeared to be minimal. 
4.2.2 Vapour-Cloud Explosion, Flixborough (1974) [Keey 1987] 
A massive explosion occurred on a Saturday afternoon in June 1974, at the 
Flixborough works ofNypro (UK). The force of the explosion was estimated 
to be equivalent to between 15 and 45 tonnes of TNT. On site, 28 people were 
killed and 36 injured; off-site injuries and damage was widespread, but no-one 
was killed. 
The cause of the explosion was the rapid escape of cyclohexane under pressure 
and at a temperature of 155°C. Key concerns to come out of the resulting 
inquiry were inadequate quality management, and the excessive storage of 
cyclohexane on the site. 
4.2.3 Chemical Warehouse Fire, Allied Colloids Plant, Bradford (1992) [Philip 
1995] 
A fire broke out in an oxidising store within a raw materials warehouse in the 
afternoon of 21 July 1992, at the Allied Colloids Plant, Bradford, U.K.. The 
warehouse contained almost 1000 tonnes of 225 different packaged substances. 
The resulting fire spread to drums stored outside and containers immediately 
adjacent to the warehouse. Eighteen million litres of water were used in 
controlling the fire. 
By the end of the afternoon the warehouse had been completely destroyed and 
polluted fire fighting water was causing damage to the local river system. 
Fallout from the smoke plume was reported and confirmed up to four miles 
away. The entire workforce had been evacuated along with a small number of 
local residents. 
Once the containment tanlcs at the sewage works became full, the run-off water 
had to be released into the river system. This resulted in fish kills as far 
downstream as 30 miles. About 20,000 fish are thought to have been killed 
over a period of several days, probably by deoxygenation of the water. 
Fortunately the biological regenerative capacity of the rivers remained intact 
and the system was able to return to a balanced existence. 
The major environmental impact was this release of water run-off into the 
waterways. The effects of the smoke were minimal, although local residents 
were advised to not eat garden produce until two months after the event. 
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4.2.4 Chemical Warehouse Fh·e, Schweizerhalle (1986) [Holemann] 
On the 1st November 1986 a fire burnt down a warehouse for chemicals in 
Schweizerhalle near the city of Basel, Switzerland. A major environmental 
incident resulted from the chemicals mixing with the extinguishing water and 
discharging into the Rhine River. Approximately 20 million litres of water 
mixed with pesticides and a toxic water soluble mercury compound. 
In the upper reaches of the Rhine, all eels and many micro-organisms died, and 
water-works that took their water from the Rhine had to temporarily cease 
withdrawal. This incident set back an otherwise successful programme of 
controlling pollutants into the Rhine and its tributaries, and recovering the 
waterways. 
4.2.5 Summary 
Problems highlighted with these chemical warehouse fires include [Prosser 
1991]: 
• Building Design - no internal compartmentation. This not only 
creates a substantial fire load, but also allows spilled chemicals to 
mlX. 
• Pollution Control - no bund walls, interceptors or water run-off 
catchment basins. 
• Fire Protection - no automatic suppression or detection systems. 
• Emergency Procedure - inadequate information available for the 
responding emergency services, including the absence of a company 
chemicals adviser (Schweizerhalle fire). 
• Fire Fighting Tactics - uncontrolled application of water, and 
inadequate attempts to contain water run-off. 
4.3 Mandatory Requirements 
4.3.1 Legislation 
Resource Management Act 
The New Zealand Resource Management Act 1991, requires any development 
proposals to assess the effect that the development would have on the 
environment [NZ Government 1991]. Section 3 of the Act defines the meaning 
of 'effect' and includes "any potential effect oflow probability which has a high 
potential impact". This can involve a wide range of possible events, such as 
radioactive or toxic release due to a process accident, or the discharge of 
contaminants into waterways and the air as a result of fire. 
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The N.Z. Resource Management Act (Section 341) does provide the means to 
defend an offence, on the grounds that the particular event was beyond the 
control of the defendant, and: 
• The event could not reasonably have been foreseen or been provided 
against; and 
• The effects of the event were adequately mitigated or remedied by the 
defendant after it occurred. 
This implies that the owner of an industrial plant, where a fire resulted in 
significant pollution to neighbouring waterways, could defend prosecution 
under the Act by arguing that the event could not be foreseen. In fact, the 
purpose of this section is to highlight the due care required by owners -
particularly those involved in the use of hazardous substances - to ensure all 
possible effects on the environment are considered so as to either eliminate, 
isolate or control the risk. If the owner can not prove that due care was carried 
out to minimise the effect of an event, then a prosecution is possible. 
This is reinforced by the Fourth Schedule in the Act, dealing with assessment of 
effects on the environment. One area listed for particular consideration is the 
risk to the environment through natural hazards or the use of hazardous 
substances or hazardous installations. 
Building Act 1991 
The Building Act 1991 also places a responsibility on a building owner to 
protect the environment from any event originating within a building operation. 
The Regulations to the Act: also known as the N.Z. Building Code [BIA, 
1991 ], states in Clause F 1: Hazardous Agents on Site that an objective is to 
'safeguard people from injury or illness caused by hazardous agents or 
contaminants on a site'. Clause C3: Spread of Fire states that an objective is to 
'safeguard the environment from the adverse effects of fire'. 
Clause C3 also includes functional and performance requirements pertaining to 
the environment: 
• [Functional Requirement - C3 .2] 'Buildings shall be provided with 
safeguards against fire spread so that . . . significant quantities of 
hazardous substances are not released to the environment during 
fire.' 
• [Performance Requirement - C3.3.10] 'Environmental protection 
systems shall ensure a low probability of hazardous substances 
being released to: 
a) Soils, vegetation or natural waters 
b) The atmosphere, and 
c) Sewers or public drains. 
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This applies only to bui !dings where significant quantities of 
hazardous substances are stored or processed.' 
Most industrial operations store and use hazardous substances. A moot point is 
when does this quantity becomes 'significant' (this term is not defined). 
The definition for hazardous substance is given in the Fire Service Act [NZ 
Government, 1975]: 
"Hazardous substance means: 
a) Any dangerous good (as defined by the Dangerous Goods Act 
1974); and 
b) Any toxic substances (as defined by the Toxic Substances Act 
1979); and 
c) Any other flammable, toxic, explosive, infectious, radioactive, 
or other substance that may impair human, animal, or plant 
health." 
4.3.2 Acceptable Solutions 
The N.Z. Building Code does not currently provide an acceptable solution to 
achieve the performance requirement stated in clause C3.3.10. For major 
processing plants, and hazardous stores, a detailed investigation including risk 
assessment should be carried out as described in section 4.4. 
For simple industrial buildings storing or processing significant quantities of 
hazardous materials, the Territorial Authority is required to ensure that the 
performance requirement is met. 
In most cases this can simply be achieved by: 
a) Installing an automatic sprinkler system, and/or 
b) Providing bunding to contain spillage's and fire fighting water 
In summary, it is considered that the NZ Building Act and Code give 
insufficient guidance and emphasis to the control of environmental damage. 
4.4 Industrial Plant Design 
The requirement to safeguard the environment from fires' adverse effects is 
now part of New Zealand legislation, and is in line with design procedures in 
European countries. The most appropriate time to establish management 
systems to overcome potential environmental effects is during the plant design 
period. 
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4.4.1 Risl\: Assessment 
An important part of the design process is consideration of the use and effects 
of hazardous substances. The first step is identifying the risk, and planning 
effective controls [Chivers 1988]. This involves: 
• establishing the intended industrial process. 
• assessing the risk (HAZOP studies). 
• locating plant sites to suit the risk. 
• ensuring effective safety features are incorporated. 
• establishing effective company safety policies, including inspection 
procedures, emergency procedures, and an incident reporting and 
review system. 
A risk assessment should determine the appropriate level of fire protection and 
process control. Factors such as the method of containment, quantity of 
dangerous goods, type of dangerous goods, and expected effect on the 
environment, all combine to establish the hazard category [Holemann 1994]. 
The method of active fire protection, and level of emergency plan, is designed 
to suit. Risk assessment computer models are currently being developed to 
assist in this process [McQuaid 1992]. 
A typical risk assessment approach is [Hodge 1995]: 
1. Identification of the hazards 
2. Assessment of the possible extent of damage and the probability of 
occurrence. 
3. Formulation of protection objectives. 
4. Selection of an appropriate protection plan and appraisal of the degree 
of safety. 
This exercise will then determine the appropriate level of fire protection: 
1. Structural - small fire compartments only. 
2. Surveillance - fire compattments and automatic detection systems. 
3. Surveillance plus permanent company fire brigade. 
4. Extinguishing system. 
5. Extinguishing system plus permanent fire brigade. 
and also determine necessary construction features to eliminate, control or 
minimise environmental effects. 
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4.4.2 Plant Design 
In the advent of a fire the ideal outcome is to contain or extinguish the fire 
before any pollution occurs. This is extremely difficult to guarantee although 
systems can be put in place that approach this ideal. An automatic extinguishing 
system such as sprinkler protection can effectively control a fire once it has 
reached a detectable level. The development of Early Suppression Fast 
Response systems improve on this position by provide a probable suppression 
outcome [Allard, 1994]. 
Plant design can include features such as sprinkler protection and a waste water 
containment system to minimise the effect to the environment and to the 
business operation. 
Areas that should be considered with the overall plant design are [Chivers 
1988]: 
• minimal storage and use of hazardous goods on site. 
• adequate storing and containment of hazardous goods, including 
the separation of compounds that will result in adverse reactions if 
mixed. 
• safety devices to complement fail-safe procedures, and to monitor 
temperature and pressure conditions. 
• fire protection and detection devices, including communication 
systems to emergency services. 
• emergency containment and separation facilities. 
• emergency and contingency plans, vetted by relevant emergency 
services. This includes environmental monitoring facilities available 
during an emergency, and a plan to cope with the aftermath. 
• familiarisation exercises by emergency personnel, including site 
staff. 
4.4.3 Containment 
A clear responsibility is to contain any polluted liquid waste to the affected site. 
The simplest methods to achieve this are by either bunding around hazardous 
areas or providing containment reservoirs. 
Bunding should take the form of an impervious raised area around a plant item 
such as an oil tank. The height of the bund would provide sufficient volume to 
contain all of the contents of the plant item plus the quantity of fire fighting 
medium expected to be applied, as agreed by the Fire Service. For transformers 
protected by sprinklers this is equivalent to 20 minutes sprinkler operation. The 
bund should also have outlets at the lowest points to allow removal of the 
waste to waste cartage operators. 
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Containment reservoirs are usually underground to take advantage of gravity 
feed. They can act as intermediary separation tanks for normal stormwater 
purposes, but include main shutoff valves to ensure isolation during an 
emergency. As with the bunding systems, they have to be sized to cope with 
worst scenarios, and include drainage facilities for transfer of the contaminated 
product. 
The capacity of these systems increases markedly if no sprinklers are installed 
over the risk areas. Control of a fire is then reliant on manual fire fighting and 
can involve around five times the quantity of water [Peet, 1993]. 
4.4.4 Emergency Plan 
The emergency plan and supporting communication system are very important 
in minimising damage to both property and the environment. If there is a risk of 
environmental contamination, then water, drainage and health authorities need 
to become involved at a very early stage. This is in accord with the Resource 
Management Act expecting effective action by the company after an 
'offending' event has occurred. 
Provision should be made for rapid air and ground analysis to take place during 
an incident if possible. Otherwise plume toxicity information should be 
established to help predict the possible environmental effects. An emergency 
plan should also consider the after-effects in terms of coping with the media, 
residents, business commitments and restoration of the environment. 
Exercises should be conducted regularly, including trial incidents, and visits by 
outside authorities. External reviews should also be undertaken on a regular 
basis, to ensure a minimum safety standard is maintained. 
There is a clear responsibility by all parties involved in minimising pollution 
during an industrial spillage, leakage or fire,. This includes regulatory 
authorities and emergency personnel, but most of all the business owners. 
4.5 Conclusions 
1. The Resource Management Act places an expectation on owners of 
industrial plant to exercise due care in the design, construction, 
maintenance and operation of the plant, to ensure the development does 
not have an adverse effect on the environment. The owner is therefore 
expected to either eliminate, isolate or control all environmental risks 
including those resulting from fire. 
2. The Building Act regulations state as an objective that the environment is 
to be safeguarded from the effects of fire. How this is to be achieved is not 
addressed in the Acceptable Solutions to the regulations. 
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3. There is a clear need to provide acceptance criteria for hazardous 
processes and their containment under fire conditions to safeguard the 
environment. 
4. Plant design for sites containing 'significant' hazardous substances should 
include risk assessment and result in safety controls to suit the risk. 
5. The ideal solution is to control or extinguish the fire before any pollution 
occurs. Automatic extinguishment systems such as sprinklers protection 
can assist in minimising both air and water pollution. 
6. Bunding or containment reservoirs are an important environmental safety 
feature for sites with hazardous goods. The sizing is dependant on the 
quantity of goods held and the volume of fire fighting water expected to be 
applied. 
7. Auditing, trial emergency procedures, and familiarisation by outside 
authorities need to become part of the industry culture. The scale of an 
industrial fire is often underestimated. 
FIRE DESIGN OF SINGLE STOREY INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS 
PART 2 : FIRE SAFETY DESIGN 
CONTENTS: 
5.0 Fil'e Design Pl'ocedul'e 
6.0 Life Safety 
7.0 Detection and Spl'inldel' Systems 
8.0 Roof Venting 
9.0 Stl'uctuml Pel'fol'mance 
10.0 Fil'e Sei'Vice Intei'Vention 
11.0 Fil'e Fighting Design 
12.0 Conclusions and Recommendations 
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5.0 FIRE DESIGN PROCEDURE 
Fire safety design involves a wide range of design features such as means of escape, 
fire resistant construction, and fire fighting facilities. The design process becomes 
complicated when buildings containing high risk combustibles, such as single storey 
industrial buildings, are involved. This usually requires specific fire engineering 
design where potential fire scenarios need to be modelled to determine the 
minimum fire protection necessary. 
5.1 Objective 
The aim of this section is to provide a suitable fire design procedure for a fire 
within a single storey industrial building. Suitable protection strategies to achieve 
the minimum required fire safety levels (based on the design fire) are discussed in 
following sections. These include automatic suppression and detection systems, 
roof venting, and building construction. 
The intent of developing a fire design procedure is to assist in the following 
1. Prediction of the likely outcome of a fire, based on fuel description and 
building layout. 
2. Determination ofthe risk offire spread to neighbouring property. 
3. Assessment of the benefits of enhanced active and passive fire protection 
to minimise the identified risks. 
5.2 Fire Development 
A typical graph for a simplified fire development sequence is shown in Figure 5 .1. 
This shows the main stages of fire development in an unprotected single storey 
industrial building: 
• fire growth; this can continue until a flashover condition occurs, or until he 
maximum fuel surface is burning. 
• steady state condition; this can be ventilation or fuel controlled depending 
on the whether the burning rate of the involved fuel is greater or less than 
the relative burning rate possible due to available ventilation openings. The 
melting of skylights and roof collapse increases the available ventilation 
and can alter the heat release rate (ie. allow more fuel to burn). 
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• fire decay; the decrease in heat release rate occurs once the available fuel 
surface area decreases due to depletion, or smothering. 
Heat Release Rate (MW) 
(r Roof C""''" 
Decay of Fire 
Time (s) 
Figure 5.1 : Typical Fire Development Profile for Single Storey Building 
Typical Fire Scenarios 
Figures 5.2 to 5.4 show the fire development process as time snapshots based on 
three scenarios. These diagrams compare the expected outcome of a fire in an 
industrial building based on different protection systems. Reference is also made to 
life safety: 
Fig. 5.2: No Automatic Protection Systems- the design fire is able to develop 
and spread without any restrictions, until the possible melting of 
translucent roof panels. Occupants are not aware of the fire until 
someone notices smoke or flames, and raises the alarm. This delayed 
response can result in insufficient time being available for successful 
escape before untenable conditions occur. The fire is likely to 
flashover and cause total destruction of the building and contents. 
Fig. 5.3: Smoke Venting System- the design fire is expected to develop until 
an automatic detector senses the fire and initiates the roof 
ventilators. These can be in the form of fan assisted or natural 
ventilators, and they should be designed to extract enough smoke to 
keep the upper smoke layer above the occupants and combustible 
product for a minimum time period. This time period may be based 
on the expected escape times or Fire Service response times. The 
fire is still expected to spread throughout the building if there is no 
fire fighting water applied. 
1 
* 
Total loss of 
* 
~ 1 2 
TIME:- 1 minute: Initial fire growth 
No alarm 
TIME:- 3 minutes : Developing fire 
TIME:- 10 minutes : Fully involved rack 
- Possible fire spread 
High hot 
1111\-....n.'t- upper gas layer 
temperatures 
Full compartment involvement 
TIME:- 30 minutes: Structural failure 
Figure 5.2 Fire development with no protection system 
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\..!J . vents trn:iJ 
TIME:- 1 minute : Initial fire growth 
-
TIME:- 3 minutes : Developing fire 
TIME: - 10 minutes : Fully involved rack 
- Possible fire spread 
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from rack to rack 
TIME:- 30 minutes: Structural failure 
Figure 5.3 Fire development with automatic roof vents 
~ 
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TIME:- 3 minutes: Developing fire 
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until manual shutdown 
TIME: - 20 minutes : Controlled fire 
Figure 5.4 Fire development with sprinkler system 
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Fig. 5. 4: Sprinkler Activation - this is the only effective means of controlling a 
typical industrial fire. The activation of the sprinklers also provides a 
means of alerting the occupants and the Fire Service. Smoke from 
the fire is expected to continue to form below the ceiling and then 
lose buoyancy as a result of the sprinkler action. Unless there is 
effective smoke venting, extensive smoke damage is expected to 
occur, but otherwise the building and stock are left relatively 
undamaged. 
5.3 Fire Design Procedure 
Figure 5. 5 shows the fire development process, from fire initiation to full 
involvement for a fire within an industrial complex. A parallel time line highlights 
the expected response times of detection equipment and the Fire Service, although 
the effect of these events is not reflected in the flow chart. Other factors that could 
affect the fire development such as fire barriers or sprinkler systems are also 
ignored. The intent is to present the effect of a full involvement fire without any 
restrictions. This is seen to be the worst case scenario. 
Afire design procedure should identify the variables that can affect the outcome of 
a fire, ranging from fuel layout to Fire Service response. A general procedure is 
represented in a series of flow charts (Figures 5.6, 5.9 and 5.10). There are some 
conditional events as well as alternative outcomes, with the procedure following 
the main stages of fire development: 
• Fire growth 
• Fire spread within the firecell 
• Open air burning following roof collapse 
• Boundary exposure 
The use of computer models and equations to predict fire behaviour in large 
compartments is considered to be crude, largely due to these relationships being 
based on correlations applicable to small compartments. The results however tend 
to be conservative with fire spread assumed to occur easily, minimal heat loss 
expected out of the compartment, and the steady state condition being unimpeded 
by changing fuel profiles. 
TIME UNE (NZFS INVOLVEMENT) 
Fire lgnltlon 
Smoke Detection 
Heat Detection 
Sptlnklera 
NZFSAnlvll 
(Smoke Detect.) 
NZFSAITI'Ie 
(Sprinklers & 
Heat Detect.) 
NZFSAITI'Ie 
(No Autom.tlc 
Detection) 
Oaeconda 
45 
Fig. 5.5 : Fire Development : Single Storey Industrial Buildings 
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5.4 Fire Growth 
Ref. 
Figure 5. 6 represents the growth and steady state phases of fire development to a 
point where the fire spreads to external exposures. For fire growth, a recommended 
design procedure is: 
1. Establish a schedule ofthe products within the compartment: 
Description Quantity Surface Calorific Fire Load Burn Rate Peak Heat Growth 
(kg) 1\rea (m2) Value Energy Level (gls.m2) Release Rate Rate 
(MJ/k_g) (MJ) (MW/mz) 
Note the following publications can be referred to for material data: 
• NFP A 92B (peak HRR, growth rates) [NFP A, 1991] 
• SFPE Handbook (calorific values, burn rates) [Tewarson, 1992; 
Babrauskas, 1992] 
• Fire Engineering Design Guide (FLED's, burn rates) [Buchanan, 1994] 
• Fire Dynamics, D. Drysdale (burn rates) [1985] 
2. Determine the Fire Load Energy Density (FLED - MJ/m2) for the compartment 
floor area and compare to averaged values for the general use. Review the 
schedule if these values differ markedly. 
3. Provide a floor plan showing the layout of the fuel, including separation 
distances and cross reference to the initial schedule. 
4. Use FPETOOL "Formula" to establish a fire growth profile for each fuel item. 
Simulate the fire growth rate for the fuel by applying the "t-squared" 
approximation. References such as NFP A 92B [ 1991] lists various fuel items in 
terms of slow, medium, fast or ultra-fast fires, where these classifications are 
based on the time required for a fire to grow to a rate of heat release equal to 
1.055 MW. 
n..t•m•lna Spread 01' Flre.on lteni: 
• . ~stlm~te Fire Growih:Rate · ', .· 
· • Cateurate,Heat Relea~tt Rate 
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_______________ J 
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Fig. 5.6 :Fire Design Procedure- Fire Growth and Spread 
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5.5 Fire Spread 
Figure 5.6 continues the fire growth phase into fire spread onto adjacent fuel items 
and then full involvement within the compartment. The important conclusion is a 
tirne!HRR graph for use in determining fire resistance and the effect of Fire Service 
response. Discussing each step in turn: 
5. For a given ignition location, use FPETOOL "Freeburn" to simulate fire 
spread between fuel items, based on radiation. Otherwise an 
approximation can be achieved by assuming that all fuel has one standard 
growth rate. The maximum heat release rate can be assumed to be 
ventilation controlled as follows: 
Qv =fib ha I 60 (kW) 
Qv = ventilation controlled HRR (MW) 
ha = calorific value of fuel (MJikg) 
rnb = burning rate (based on wood) 
[5.1] 
= 5.5 Av Hoy, (kg/s) [5.2] 
[rnb = IDair I r; (rwood ~ 5.7 kg/kg)- ref. eqn 5.7] 
The time to reach this heat release rate (tg) is: 
[5.3] 
ts =standard fire growth time to reach 1.055 MW (s) 
The energy released (E) to reach the peak heat release rate is: 
(MJ) [5.4] 
6. If this programme indicates that due to separation distances, fire spread 
will not occur, then simulate a compartment fire with FPETOOL "Fire 
Simulator" or CF AST based on the most hazardous fuel load item. This 
will indicate whether fire spread will occur between fuel items due to 
flashover (compartment temperature exceeding 600°C). Amend the fire 
growth files to reflect this outcome if valid. Carry out manual calculations 
to verify results in broad terms. 
7. Cross-check the flashover condition by applying Thomas's flashover 
correlation [Walton/Thomas, 1992]: 
Qpo = 0.0078 AT+ 0.378 Av~H [5.5] 
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AT = internal surface area of compartment (m2) 
Av = area of vertical openings (m2) 
H = average height of openings (m) 
Qpo = minimum HRR for flashover (MW) 
Qpo can be compared to the maximum heat release rate expected before a 
flashover condition. 
8. If flashover or full involvement does not occur then the fire duration is 
based on the burning rate for the fuel over the exposed surface area acting 
on the mass of fuel identified as burning: 
[5.6] 
tB = time for burning in steady state ( s) 
MF = mass of fuel (kg) 
msF = specific burn rate of fuel (kg/s.m2) [ref. 
Tewarson, 1992] 
As =specific surface area of fuel (m2) [refer Fire 
Engineering Design Guide- Buchanan, 1994] 
This time (tB) should only apply to the steady state condition, although it 
often includes the decay stage. The growth phase is added to this time. 
9. If flashover does occur, then for a fully developed fire, a check can be 
made to establish whether it is ventilation or fuel controlled. The following 
relationship holds true for ventilation controlled fires [Drysdale, 1985]: 
mp > mair/ rp [5.7] 
mp =burning rate of fuel (kg/s) 
mair =burning rate for ventilation controlled fires (kg/s) 
rp = stoichiometric air/fuel ratio [ref. Drysdale, 1985] 
mair = 0.52Awlfoy, [5.8] 
Aw =area of ventilation openings (m2) 
Ho = height of openings (m) 
10. If the roof is likely to remain in place, equivalent fire severity times can 
then be calculated based on the ventilation or fuel controlled regimes 
[Buchanan, 1994]: 
i) Ventilation Controlled 
~'Ape (J/m2Ks';,) 
<720 
720 to 2500 
> 2500 
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te =equivalent fire severity (min.) 
et = fire load (MJ/m2) 
Wf = ventilation factor 
kb = conversion factor: 
TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION kb (min. m2·3fMJ) 
Insulating material 0.080 
Concrete or plasterboard 0.055 
Thin steel 0.045 
'A = thermal conductivity (W /mK.) 
p = density (kg/m3) 
c = specific heat (J/kg K) 
The ventilation factor is given by: 
0.3 
Wf = [ ~~ J [ 0.62 + 90(0.4- av)4 J > 0.5 
1 + bvah 
(m-0'3) [5.10] 
where av=Av/Af 
a,l = AJ./Af 
bv = 12.5 (1 + 10 Uv- a/) 
Af = firecell floor area (m2) 
0.05 ~ Uv ~ 0.25 [5.11] 
[5.12] 
[5.13] 
Av = area of vertical window and door openings (m2) 
AJ.~ = area of horizontal openings in the roof ( m2) 
Hf = height of firecell ( m) 
ii) Fuel Controlled - refer equation [ 5. 6] for tB 
11. Compartment temperatures (T) can be calculated for ventilation controlled 
fires, using the following relationship from Lie [1992]: 
0 l/F0.3 2 [ 600 J 0.5 
T = 250(10F) · e-F t[3(1-e-0·6t)- (1-e-3t) + 4(1-e-12t)] + C F [5.14] 
F = opening factor (my,) = Av Ho0'5 I AT 
t =burn time (hrs), where the relationship is valid for: 
t ~ (0.08 /F) +1 and 0.01~F ~ 0.15 
C = 1 for light materials (p <1600 kg/m2) and 0 for 
heavy materials (p ~1600 kg/m2). 
Otherwise refer to time-temperature curves for various fuel loads and 
opening factors. These are shown in 'An Introduction to Fire Dynamics' 
(Figure 10.19, Drysdale, 1985) 
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12. In the event of roof collapse, the duration of an open air fire can be 
determined using equation 5. 6 or through relating remaining fuel energy 
levels to the estimated heat release rate ofthe fuel [Buchanan, 1994]: 
tB =time for burning in steady state (s) 
E = energy in unburnt fuel (MJ) 
Qr = heat release rate of fire (MW) 
[5.15] 
13. The various time versus heat release rate relationships can be used at 
different stages of fire development for example: 
• Fire growth; refer to the output from 'Freeburn', or apply the 
relationships given in equations 5.1 to 5.4. 
• Steady state condition; enclosed compartment - the equivalent fire 
severity times can be based on the ventilation openings, and possibly 
allowing for the reduction in fuel burnt during the growth stage. Refer 
equation 5. 5 for calculating te, and equation 5.14 for the energy 
released at the end of the growth stage. 
The compartment temperature should be monitored against time to 
determine whether other ventilation openings will occur, such as 
skylights melting or windows breaking. These events will affect the 
fire severity, and they can be mapped on a time versus HRR chart as 
an increase in the heat release rate. Equation 5. 5 should be reapplied 
for the new ventilation factor. 
• Steady state condition; roof collapse - the fire can now be modelled 
as an open air fire, with the time for burn out based on the burning 
rate ofthe fuel, or the remaining energy levels (refer equations 5.6 or 
5.15). Roof collapse is expected to occur when the roof support 
structure fails. This will be due to either wooden purlins burning to an 
extent where they cannot continue to support the roof cover, or steel 
portals (or rafters) are heated to a point where they lose their design 
strength and collapse under the roof weight. 
• Decay phase - this period of fire development is recognised as being 
very difficult to model [Lie, 1992]. Unpredictable parameters such as 
wind, water, debris, and remaining fuel load result in a chaotic 
conclusion to a fire. However, the influence of the decay period to the 
overall fire severity is not considered significant so approximations are 
adequate. 
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5.6 Worked Example : Manual Calculations 
E 
~ 
Consider a warehouse storing PVC bottles as shown in Fig. 5. 7. The objective is to 
establish a time versus HRR profile for a fully involved fire, assuming a fire starts in 
a single rack when both doors are open. 
50m--------------------------~ 
16 off Racks 
PVC Bottles 
8Lx1.6Wx5H 
Fig. 5.7: Warehouse Storing PVC Bottles 
1. Complete schedule of fuel : 
• Description: PVC Bottles occupying 16 racks@ 8 m long x 1.6 m 
wide x 5 m high. 
• Mass: 1 Rack= (8x5x1.6) x 100 kg/m3 (est.) 
= 6400 kg per rack. 
• Surface Area : 1 Rack= (8x5x2) + (1.6x5x2) + (1.6x8) 
= 108.8 m2 per rack. 
• Calorific Value: CV = 17.8 MJ/kg 
• Total Energy: 1 Rack= 17.8 x 6400 = 114,000 MJ 
Total Load= 114,000 x 16 = 1,824,000 MJ 
• Peak HRR : Qr= 2.84 MW/m2 [NFPA 92B] 
• Peak HRR per rack: Qr= 2.84 x (8x1.6) = 36.4 MW 
• Growth Rate : ts = 7 5 s ( vety fast) 
• Time to peak HRR [5 .3] : tg = (36.4t·5. 75 = 452 s 
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2. Building Geometry 
• Vertical Vents = 2 openings measuring 4 x 4 m 
=32m2 
• Horizontal Vents = 8 skylights x 24 m x 2 m wide 
=384m2 
• Floor Area = 1200 m2 
• Firecell Height = 8 m 
3. Calculate fire load energy density: 
FLED = (114,000 MJ x 16 racks) I 1200 m2 
= 1520 MJim2 
this figure is typical of a warehouse type occupancy. 
4. Spread of Fire to Neighbouring Racks :From the program 'Radiation Ignition 
of an Adjacent Fuel' in FIRECALC, an estimation can be made of the 
minimum heat flux required to ignite neighbouring racks. 
Rack separation = 4 m - 1m (flame projection) 
=3m 
If the minimum radiation flux to ignite a neighbouring rack is 20 kWim2, 
FIRECALC shows that 524 l\:W 1m2 irradiation is required from the 
burning object. 
From Drysdale [1985] an estimate can be established for net emissive 
power from one face of a burning object. Using the formula: 
E = 1/2 (0.3m"LfficAr/lD) 
E = net emissive power 
m" = mass burn rate 
[5.16] 
ilHc =heat of combustion (17.8 MJikg) 
Ar= surface area of fuel (108.8 m2) 
1 =flame height (5 m [estimated]) 
D =width of fuel face (8 m) 
Firstly calculating the mass burn rate: 
m" = (Qr I Ar) I Lffic 
= (36.4 MW I 108.8 m2) I 17.8 MJikg 
= 0.019 kg/s.m2 
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:. E = 1/2x(0.3x0.019x17.8A103x108.8) I (5x8) 
Net emissive power from example rack= 138 1\:W 1m2 
This implies that fire spread is not expected before total involvement of the 
rack. Once the design rack is fully involved (ie. after 452 s), there is the 
possibility of fuel collapse on to neighbouring racks. 
5. Check compartment temperature after 452 s (refer eqn. 5.14]: 
t =0.125hrs 
F = AvHo0'51Ar = 0.053 mYz; 0.01 :::; F:::; 0.15 so OK. 
(0.08 I F)+ 1 = 2.5 hrs; and t < 2.5 hrs so OK. 
Applying equation [5.14] results in T = 646 °C, and this implies that 
flashover occurs around the time of full involvement of a r~ck, although 
this relationship is for ventilation controlled fires. 
6. Check whether the fire is ventilation controlled before flashover occurs: 
applying eqn. [5.1]: Qv = ffib ha I 60 
mb = 5.5 . Av. Ho0'5 = 352 kg/s 
Qv= 104MW 
this implies that a fire will only become ventilation controlled, given that 
vertical openings= 32m2, if the HRR is 104 MW. The HRR at the end of the 
growth stage is therefore 36.4 MW. 
7. Recheck whether there is sufficient heat output for flashover, applying 
equation 5. 5: 
Qpo = 0.0078 Ar + 0.378 Av Jtl·5 
= 33.5MW 
=>flashover is expected to occur once the fire has grown to 3 3. 5 MW (ie. after 
435 s). The approximation of 450 sis therefore considered adequate. 
8. At the time of flashover it is expected that the skylights will melt out and roof 
venting will occur. Calculating the equivalent fire severity (eqn. [5.9]): 
te = kb erwr 
.'. te = 0.055 X 1520 X 0.832 
= 69.5 min. 
Uv = Av I Ar= 0.027: let= 0.05 
ah = AH I Ar= 0.32: let= 0.20 
bv = 12.5 (1+10av-a}) = 18.7 
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· - 0 832 m-0.3 
.. wr- . 
9. The equivalent rate of heat release is: 
Qe = 1,824,000 I (69.5 X 60) = 437 MW 
10. Assume roof collapse occurs after 25 minutes (refer to the FEDG [Buchanan, 
1994] for calculations for determining failure of steel structures): 
Energy burnt after 25 minutes = 43 7 MW x 25 min. x 60 s 
= 655,500MJ 
:. Energy left= 1,168,500 MJ 
Open air heat release rate= 36.4 MWirack x 16 racks 
=582MW 
=>Burn Time for an Open Air Fire: 
11. Total burn time: 
= 1,168,500 MJ I 582 MW 
= 2008 s (33.5 min) 
tr = 452 s (growth phase)+ 1048 s (ventilation controlled steady state 
phase)+ 2008 s (open air steady state and decay). 
3508 s (58.5 mins => 60 minute fire rating is adequate) 
12. Resulting time versus HRR chart: 
Heat Release 
Rate(MW) 
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300 
200 
100 
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\_ VenUiaUon C~ntrolled 
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/'"Roof Collapse 
40 50 
Fig. 5.8: Time versus Heat Release Rate for Worked Example 
58.5 
60 llme (mlns.) 
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5. 7 Boundary Exposures and Radiation 
The following flow charts (Figs. 5.9 and 5.11) show the next steps in the fire design 
procedure for determining boundary exposure. Attention is given to the role of the 
Fire Service and fire detection/suppression systems in controlling this risk; where 
these design issues are discussed in sections 7 and 10 and the problem of equating 
water usage to heat output (and emitted radiation) is evaluated in section 11 . 
No 
Fig. 5.9 : Fire Design Procedure- Radiation Exposure 
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5.7.1 Radiation to Neighbouring Risl{ 
A fire within a building can spread to a neighbouring property by either radiation or 
'flying brands'. Fire spread by 'flying brands' is subject to wind directions and the 
nature of the burning product. The more probable method of fire spread is by 
radiation. 
(a) Roof in place 
(b) Roof collapses 
(c) Exterior walls collapse 
Figure 5.10 : Fire Spread by Radiation 
5. 7.2 Critical Radiation Intensity 
A key factor with radiative fire spread is the critical ignition intensity of the 
receiving surface. Table 5.1 summarises values taken from a variety of sources 
[Lie, 1972; SANZ, 1988; Buchanan, 1994]. 
The values usually adopted are for the pilot ignition scenario. This coincides with 
the fire spread risk of flying brands. It follows that if the received radiation on a 
surface is above the critical radiation intensity, then ignition is expected to occur. 
This outcome depends on separation distance, material (combustible or non-
combustible), and whether any prewetting of the received surface is occurring. 
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Critical Intensity (kW/m2) 
Material Pilot Spontaneous 
Ignition Ignition 
Wood 14.6 29.3 
Wood with common paint 16.7 23-50 
Fibre insulating board 6.3 -
Fibre insulating board - fire 
retardant treated 8-42 -
Bitumen Roof - -
Aluminium Roof 
- -
Cotton Fabric 13 25 
Non-combustible wall with 
non-fire resistant glazing 20 -
Non-combustible wall fitted 
with fire rated glazing 50 -
Table 5.1 : Critical Radiation Intensities for Various Materials 
5.7.3 Calculation of Radiant Heat Flux 
The effects of radiation from a fire within an industrial building on a neighbouring 
building can be calculated under the following circumstances: 
• Through unprotected openings; refer equation 11.3. CSIRO [1991] states 
that a typical value for a fire compartment temperature, as required in this 
equation, is around 1000°C. 
• Flame exposure above wall line or through collapse of the external wall. 
Drysdale [1985] provided relationships for radiant heat flux received from 
a flame assuming a point source and rectangular source: 
i) Point Source- QR = (0.3 QT cos cp)/ 4.n.R2 (kW/m2) [5.17] 
QT total design heat load (kW) 
q> = angle between the receiver 
and the flame point source. 
R = distance from the point 
source to the receiver (m) 
ii) Rectangular Source- QR = 0.15 ~ QT I (l Dr) (kW/m2) [5.18] 
~ = configuration factor 
1 = flame height (m) 
D = width of flame (m) 
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Note: Flame height (1) = 0.23 Q?5 - 1.02 Df (m) [5.19] 
Qc =convective heat (R~ 0. 7 Qr) 
• Receiving surface has a critical radiation intensity based on pilot ignition, 
below the radiant heat flux. 
Examples showing application of these equations and the cooling power of water 
to control the effects of radiation, are given in Section 11.0 'Fire Fighting Design'. 
5.8 Fire Control Measures 
Figure 5.11 shows the design procedure for determining the necessary fire control 
measures. A key factor in this evaluation is the level of exposure risk. If the 
estimated radiation to neighbouring boundaries under worst case scenarios does not 
result in an exposure risk, then the emphasis on fire control may be reduced. 
Where water application is necessary to ensure the fire is contained, then the fire 
safety design must prove the capabilities of either a sprinkler system or Fire Service 
response. These design areas are discussed further in sections 7. 0 and 11.0. 
5. 9 Conclusions 
1. The aim of this section is to provide a suitable fire design procedure for single 
storey industrial buildings. The minimum fire safety goals are life safety, 
protection of neighbouring property and safety of Fire Service personnel. 
2. A fire design procedure assists in the evaluation of: 
• fire growth 
• fire spread within the firecell 
• open air burning following roof collapse 
• boundary exposure 
3. The effect of active and passive fire protection systems on a design fire can be 
also be evaluated to identify benefits. 
4. An important component in modelling fire development is a time/HRR graph 
to determine boundary exposure, and the effect of Fire Service response. 
5. Radiant heat flux calculations can be performed to assess whether fire fighting 
water is required to control fire spread to neighbouring property. 
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Fig. 5.11 : Fire Design Procedure - Fire Control Measures 
61 
6.0 LIFE SAFETY 
6.1 Objectives 
A primary aim in fire engineering is ensuring people are safeguarded from injury or 
illness in the event of a fire. This applies to any occupancy, although the methods 
employed will differ for a warehouse as opposed to a prison or a shopping mall. 
There are five key occupancy factors influencing life safety design [Sime, 1994 a]: 
• numbers 
• familiarity 
• sleeping risk 
• mobility 
• response to fire alarm 
The objective in life safety design is to ensure that building occupants either 
escape, are rescued or find a place of refuge before untenable conditions occur. 
This is clearly stated in the New Zealand Building Code Clause C2 : Means of 
Escape [BIA, 1991]: 
• [Clause C2.1(a) - Objective] 'to safeguard people from injury or 
illness from afire while escaping to a safe place' 
• [Clause C2.2(a) - Functional Requirement] 'Buildings shall be 
provided with escape routes which give people adequate time to 
reach a safe place without being overcome by the effects of fire' 
Obviously the preferred outcome is escape, but factors may necessitate rescue or 
refuge, such as building layout, building use (hospital, high security), or the 
disability of occupants. For industrial buildings the occupants are expected to be 
alert, active and mobile, and the evacuation procedure is based on people escaping. 
The NZ Building Code also places an emphasis on protection of fire service 
personnel during rescue operations, where this is reflected in the use of safe paths 
plus selected fire ratings for firecells. 
6.2 Escape Behaviour 
In designing an acceptable escape system the following occupancy variables need 
to be ascertained [Sime, 1994 a]: 
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1. Role in occupancy (staff versus public; sleeping versus non-sleeping). 
2. Escape route familiarity and building layout. 
3. Site evacuation schemes and training. 
4. Group dynamics and attachments. 
5. Characteristics such as age, infirmity and disability. 
6. Location and proximity to exit. 
7. Information and communication on fire in progress. 
8. Smoke obscuration (visibility, irritancy and toxicity). 
9. Fire characteristics (heat and smell). 
10. Exit signs. 
11. Light levels and light sources. 
These factors collectively determine the escape time to a safe place. Establishing 
values for some factors such as the worth of a site evacuation scheme, or the 
influence of age, is very difficult. A design method is provided in section 6.3 that 
attempts to integrate behavioural and deterministic 'values'. 
6.3 Design Process 
Figure 6.1 shows a flow chart summarising the process in determining whether a 
designed escape system is adequate. This process places an emphasis on the 
following factors: 
• Type of alarm and time to detection of fire. 
• Fire growth and time to untenable conditions. 
• Occupant response, preparation and avoidance time. 
The evacuation process is shown on the flow chart to involve a number of stages. 
These are reflected in the following relationship: 
where tE = (tp+ta)/e [6.2] 
(also refer section 6.5) 
T ae = total evacuation time (s) 
tt~ =detection time (s) 
tr =response time (s) 
tE =escape time (s) 
tp =preparation time (s) 
ta =avoidance time (s) 
e = avoidance efficiency 
Response time for occupants varies according to factors such as the cue received 
to evacuate, group dynamics, training and commitment to duties. Preparation time 
involves actions taken before evacuating such as investigating the fire, rescuing, 
fighting the fire, and retrieving property. These variables are discussed further in 
section 6.5. 
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Fig. 6.1 : Flow Chart, Design ofEscape Route Systems 
Note that a safety factor is not used as recommended in the Fire Engineering 
Design Guide [Buchanan, 1994]. A safety factor would be necessary if the 
calculated evacuation time and untenability time were both at their most likely 
values in the event of a typical fire. However, the evacuation time calculated using 
the technique in this paper is considered to be at the high end of the expected range 
of evacuation times, and the time to untenability is considered to be at the low end 
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(rapid fire growth end) of expected untenability times. This means that the tails of 
the distributions are being compared (not a comparison of mean or expected 
values) so an additional safety factor is not necessary. 
6.4 Prescriptive Solutions 
Prescriptive design methods such as the New Zealand Building Code Acceptable 
Solutions, are based on movement theory and have limited reference to behavioural 
features. Sime [1994 a] defines this approach as the 'Model A' method which is 
based on the following assumptions: 
1. People's safety cannot be guaranteed due to potential pamc and 
unpredictable escape behaviour. 
2. Individuals start to move as soon as they hear an alarm. 
3. Floor clearance is primarily dependant on the time it takes to move to 
and through an exit. 
4. Movement in fires is characterised by the aim of escaping. 
5. People are most likely to move towards the exit to which they are 
nearest. 
6. Fire exit signs ensure people find a safe escape route. 
7. People are unlikely to use a smoke filled escape route. 
8. All the people present are equally capable of physically moving to an 
exit. 
This prescriptive approach is often conservative in determining acceptable travel 
speeds, available exits, and limits on vertical travel. The assumed time for 
untenable conditions is usually 2.5 minutes [Pauls, 1992; Buchanan, 1994]. Even 
with this approach, the level of risk is indeterminate and the relative level of safety 
is unclear. 
6.5 Behavioural Solution 
The alternate design method is referred to as 'Model B' or the behavioural solution 
[Sime, 1994 a]. This approach acknowledges the unique behaviour of people in an 
emergency [Pauls, 1992]: 
1. People do not often panic; behaviour tends to be altruistic and 
reasonable. Any panic is more likely to be caused by delays in people 
receiving relevant information. 
2. A central motivation and activity in fires is to seek information 
including news on the fire itself and how other people are coping. 
3. Evacuation, and response to fire generally, is often a social response. 
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4. Fire alarm sirens cannot always be relied upon to prompt people to 
move immediately to safety 
5. As long as an exit is not obstructed, people tend to move in a familiar 
direction, even if further away, rather than use an unfamiliar fire escape 
route. 
6. Fire exit signs are not always noticed and may not always overcome 
difficulties in orientation and wayfinding imposed on escapes by the 
architectural layout and design of an escape route. 
7. People are often prepared, if necessary, to move through smoke. 
8. People's ability to move towards an exit may vary considerably, 
depending on age, mobility, confidence etc. 
Evacuation Stages 
Methods have been developed to try and quantify this wide range of behaviour. 
The proposed escape time process is expressed in Figure 6.1, and Equations 6.1 
and 6.2. The total evacuation time calculated has to be compared to the 
untenability time for the design space, as discussed in section 6.6. 
Detection time (td) is reasonably easy to determine if automatic alarms are present. 
A computer programme such as DETACT [FPETOOL, 1994] can determine this 
time given that the design fire is known as well as the characteristics of the 
detectors. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, very few industrial complexes involved in fires have 
automatic alarms. The Australian Draft National Building Fire Safety Systems 
Code [BRRTF, 1991] provides criteria to determine the estimated time for 
detection based on people acting as the sensors: 
Either 1. Visual and olfactory - time at which ·the upper layer in the 
relevant enclosure equals 0.95 X room height. 
or 2. Auditory (ie. sound of a fire) inside enclosure of fire origin- time 
at which the upper layer in the enclosure of fire origin equals 0.95 
x room height. 
or 3. Auditory outside enclosure of fire origin - time at which the 
temperature in the upper layer in the enclosure of fire origin equals 
450°C 
Again this depends on the design fire and its behaviour over time. 
In determining response time (tr), Sime [1994 b] has developed a matrix relating 
different behavioural features with the expected action for a given occupancy: 
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ALERTNESS MOBILITY SOCIAL ROLE POSITION COMMITMENT FOCAL POINT FAMILIARITY 
AFFILIATION 
asleep low group public lying high none unfamiliar 
. . . . . . . . 
.. .. .. .. sitting .. .. . . 
... ... ... . .. . .. 
*** 
. .. ... 
**** **** 
.... 
**** standing **"'1r .... **** 
***** 
..... *1r*** ***** 111*111*• 111:111'i1'1f#r ..... ..... 
awake high alone staff moving low focussed familiar 
Fig. 6.2: Matrix of Factors Influencing Response Time 
In this method each category is assessed for the given situation and each 'score' 
given by the number of stars in Figure 6.2, is summed to give a total. This total is 
averaged over the 8 categories and a Wetrvalue is determined by: 
Wetr = 5 I Average 
The response time is calculated by multiplying this Wetr value by a factor 
representing the form of alerting device: 
Tr = Wetr * w(1,2,3) w 1 = 3 (alarm bell) 
w2 = 2 (non-directional public address) 
w3 = 1 (directive public address) 
Example: Determine the response time for occupants in a warehouse when alerted 
by alarm bells. 
Total of behavioural factors= 33 
Average= 33 I 8 = 4.125 
Wetr= 5 I 4.125 = 1.2 
w1 = 3 (alarm bells) 
:. Tr = 3.6 minutes 
Limited information is available on determining the preparation time (tv). This is a 
measure of time associated with investigation and alternative actions to evacuation. 
The Fire Engineering Design Guide [Buchanan, 1994] recommends that a 
minimum of30 seconds is allocated to this variable. 
The avoidance time (ta) is simply the travel time. A computer program such as 
EVACNET+ [1984], or 'Egress Times' [FIRECALC, 1993] can calculate this 
time. Alternatively manual calculations based on the effective-width model can be 
applied [Nelson and MacLennan, 1992]. 
The Australian Draft National Building Fire Safety Systems Code [BRRTF, 1991] 
also provides a quantitative solution for determining response time, as well as 
preparation and avoidance time. An avoidance efficiency is applied to the sum of 
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the preparation and avoidance time. The following Table shows typical efficiency 
values from this Code: 
BUILDING USE RESPONSE AVOIDANCE 
CLASSIFICATION EFFICIENCY Re EFFICIENCY e 
Museum, library, courtroom 0.5 0.5 
Primary school 0.4 0.4 
Secondary school 0.5 0.52 
Tertiary school 0.65 0.62 
Rest home - asleep & supervised 0.2 0.35 
Rest home - awake & supervised 0.4 0.5 
Hotels, motels - asleep & unsupervised 0.2 0.24 
Hotels, motels - awake & unsupervised 0.5 0.46 
Retail shop 0.5 0.6 
Offices - procedures 0.7 0.8 
Offices - no procedures 0.4 0.4 
Industrial operations (incl. utility, defense) 0.66 0.72 
Manufacturing and warehouse 0.66 0.72 
Table 6.1: Occupant Efficiency Values Based on Occupancy Use 
Example: Determine the preparation and avoidance time in a warehouse where 
the avoidance time has been calculated to be 64 seconds using the deterministic 
escape model EVACNET+. 
Escape Time (tp + ta) = 30 (est.)+ 64 s 
= 94 s 
Avoidance Efficiency (e) = 0.72 (from Table 6.1) 
. ·. Actual Avoidance Time = 94 I 0. 72 
= 130 s 
6.6 Untenability 
Total evacuation time (Tae) must be less than the time for untenable conditions to 
occur within the design enclosure. The measurement of time is taken from the 
initiation of the fire, and the anticipated fire behaviour is mapped through growth 
and steady state conditions as a function of time. Fire simulation programmes such 
as CFAST are used to model design fires. 
A design fire is based on the physical dimensions of the enclosure being studied (ie. 
a warehouse) and the combustible product expected to be located within. The 
nature of the product determines the growth rate and fire size; the enclosure layout 
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and construction determines smoke development and temperature profiles (also 
refer Sections 1 and 5). 
The following Table summarises untenability criteria from two references [BRRTF, 
1991; Buchanan, 1994]: 
REFERENCE SOURCE UNTENABILITY CONDITIONS 
1. 'Microeconomic Reform : Fire Regulation' Smouldering Fire - 2500 ppm CO @ 1 .9m above floor 
BRRTF, 1991. Flaming Fire - 100 deg C upper layer temp. @ 1 .9m 
above floor. 
2. 'Fire Engineering Design Guide' The following criteria apply to the lower gas layer 
Buchanan, 1994. unless the layer height is less or equal to 1 .5m : 
Convective Heat > 65 deg C 
Smoke Obscuration < 2m 
Toxicity: CO> 1400 ppm; HCN > 80 ppm; 02 > 12% 
C02>5% 
Radiative Heat - the radiative heat from the upper 
to the lower layer> 2.5 kW/sq m. 
Table 6.2: Tenability Limits 
Example: The following graphs show design fire behaviour for an 8m high 
warehouse with heat detection but no sprinkler protection. The total escape time is 
calculated at 346 s. Is the escape system acceptable? 
The graphs below show that at 346 s the upper layer temperature is 
approximately 130 °C and the smoke layer height is 3.2 m. Since the smoke 
layer height is not down to 1.5 m, the temperature of > 100 °C after 346 s 
does not affect the egress behaviour. Therefore the escape system Is 
acceptable (assuming the other tenability factors are also within limits). 
~ !il ~ 
Tlme(s) Tlme(s) 
If the escape route design process concludes that the time to escape is greater than 
the time to untenable conditions, then either the escape route design has to be 
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altered or the control of the fire risk has to be improved. Areas that could be 
modified include: 
A) Escape route design: 
i) new exit providing an alternative route. 
ii) reorganising escape routes to shorten travel distances. 
iii) faster detection system. 
iv) creation of smoke-stop or fire resistant escape path. 
B) Control of fire risk: 
i) inclusion of active protection system. 
ii) subdivision of spaces into firecells. 
iii) reduction of fire load energy density in design area. 
iv) reorganise combustible loads to minimise rate of fire spread. 
v) improve fire venting options. 
vi) improve emergency response facilities. 
Improvements should continue until the maximum escape time IS below the 
minimum time to untenable conditions. 
6. 7 Industrial Occupancy 
Industrial buildings generally have occupancy and fire safety characteristics that 
significantly affect a life safety analysis. A life safety system can be designed 
considering the following points: 
1. Occupancy Classification : Occupants in industrial buildings are usually 
employees and are expected to be awake, alert and mobile. High risk 
occupancy groups (children, infirm people, members of the public, people 
under detention and sleeping occupants etc.) are not expected to be 
present in industrial buildings. 
Disabled employees requiring assistance during an evacuation should be 
managed under an evacuation scheme. 
2. Evacuation Schemes : the Fire Safety and Evacuation of Buildings 
Regulations 1992 [NZ Government, 1992] requires any unsprinklered 
place of employment containing more than 10 employees to have a 
registered evacuation scheme with the NZ Fire Service. If the premises 
has 10 or less employees and/or is sprinklered then an evacuation 
procedure is necessary. This is effectively the same as an evacuation 
scheme except it does not require policing by the Fire Service. 
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This legal requirement ensures that there is a functional evacuation system 
in all industrial complexes. The occupants are expected to understand 
their roles through training plus trial evacuations. This process should 
reduce the 'response' and 'preparation' times. 
3. Occupancy Numbers : Generally the occupancy numbers for industrial 
buildings are low in comparison to occupancies such as commercial 
offices, retail shops or educational buildings. Occupant densities less than 
0.54 persons per square meter allow maximum travel speed during 
evacuation [Nelson and MacLennan, 1992]. Industrial buildings are 
usually less than 0.2 persons per square meter, with warehouses at around 
0.03 persons per square meter [BIA, 1992]. 
This reduces concerns with queuing and limited travel speeds in industrial 
buildings. The NZ Building Code Acceptable Solutions recognises this 
fact by increasing the allowable travel distance for an open or protected 
path by 100% if the occupancy density is not greater than 0.05 
persons/m2. The net effect is a reduced avoidance time and greater 
spacing of exit points. 
Table A1 of the NZBC Acceptable Solutions Fire Safety Annex [BIA, 
1992] gives the following occupant densities for 'industrial' buildings. 
Also included are corresponding values sourced from the equivalent U.K. 
Building Regulations Acceptable Solutions [Dept. of the Environment and 
the Welsh Office, 1992]. 
OCCUPANT DENSITY (persons/sq. m) 
OCCUPANCY DESCRIPTION {based on ross floor area) 
NZBC Acceptable Solutions UK Acceptable Solutions 
Office & Staffrooms 0.1 0.2 
Workshops 0.2 0.2 
Manufacturino & Process Rooms Staff Rooms 0.1 0.2 
Warehouse Storage 0.03 0.03 
Heavv lndustrv 0.03 ? 
Bulk Storage 0.01 0.03 
Plant Rooms 0.03 ? 
Table 6.3: Occupant Densities 
Note that Table A1 [BIA, 1992] states that for factory space 'in which 
layout and normal use of fixed equipment or plant determines the number 
of persons using it in working hours', the design occupancy can be based 
on actual expected staff numbers. 
4. Building Features industrial buildings are invariably large 
compartments with relatively high ceilings (> 5m). Typical construction 
details are steel portal frames with either concrete or iron clad walls, and 
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iron clad roof There may be mezzanine floors in a portion of the building, 
plus partitioned office ares but generally the structures are single storey 
with exits leading directly to outside. 
As a result there are large compartment volumes, and untenable 
conditions take longer to occur than for smaller compartments such as 
sleeping occupancies or commercial buildings. This allows a greater time 
period for people to escape from the space, although industrial buildings 
often require large travel distances to reach a final exit. Escaping direct to 
outside on the same level also avoids delays associated with stairs. 
5. Building Contents : industrial buildings generally have high Fire Load 
Energy Densities (FLED's) with storage facilities usually exceeding 1500 
MJ/m2 [Buchanan, 1994]. This implies that the design fires may reach 
much greater heat output levels than other occupancies such as 
accommodation and commercial buildings. 
This often results in rapid fire growth rates, large radiation levels, high 
smoke production rates, and rapid spread of fire. This can negate the 
advantages of large volume compartments and emphasises the importance 
of using an accurate fire simulation model, both in terms of input and 
software. 
6. Active Protection Systems : as discussed in Section 2.0 - 'Statistical 
Analysis', most major recorded fires within industrial buildings occur in 
buildings without active protection systems. This has a serious effect not 
only on fire control but also the detection time for occupants. 
The NZ Building Code Acceptable Solutions [BIA, 1992] do not require 
a detection system for a high risk industrial building unless more than 100 
people are expected within. A manual call point system is only required if 
more than 50 people occupy the building. This can be at variance to the 
Fire Safety and Evacuation of Buildings Regulations [NZ Government, 
1992], which require an acceptable means of notifying all occupants in an 
emergency. Unless the open compartment is very small this means that 
manual call points and sounders are required. 
A major concern is the absence of automatic detection systems in 
industrial buildings, as highlighted in the statistics. A method was given in 
Section 6.5 for equating expected detection time based on people acting 
as sensors. This is one area of design that can be improved if the proposed 
escape features are inadequate for safe evacuation. 
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Support Features 
Acceptable support features of an escape system such as: 
• s1gns 
• exit doors 
• control of obstructions 
• smoke and flame spread control 
can be determined through reference to the NZBC Acceptable Solutions [BIA, 
1992] or an equivalent document such as the UK Acceptable Solutions [Dept. of 
the Environment & The Welsh Office, 1992] or NFPA 101 - Life Safety Code 
[National Fire Protection Assoc., 1991]. 
6.8 Summary 
The objective in life safety design is to ensure that building occupants either escape 
to a safe place, are rescued, or find a place of refuge before untenable conditions 
occur. The time required to achieve this objective is influenced by a variety of 
occupancy factors, such as type of occupancy, layout of exit routes, and group 
dynamics. Two approaches can be used to design a suitable escape system: a 
prescriptive or behavioural solution. 
Prescriptive solutions are based on movement theory and have limited reference to 
behavioural features. These solutions are not clear in the level of risk provided, and 
are generally considered conservative. 
Behavioural solutions consider the unique behaviour of people in an emergency. 
Aspects such as response and preparation for evacuating are heavily influenced by 
varying human behaviour. Detection times and actual escape times are considered 
to be non-behavioural, deterministic values. A recommended design process for 
calculating the expected escape times is the addition of detection, response, 
preparation and avoidance times. 
The total escape times are then compared to the time for untenable conditions to 
occur. The untenability time is taken from the initiation of the fire and mapped 
through fire growth and steady state conditions using computer models. If the 
calculated escape time is greater than the time until untenable conditions then the 
escape route design will clearly not work. Improvements to the design can be made 
either through altering the escape route features or improving the control of the 
fire risk. 
In industrial occupancies there are features that differ from other occupancies and 
influence means of escape analysis. Occupants are expected to be alert, active and 
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mobile, and be trained in evacuation procedure. Manual alarms are usually present, 
but not automatic detection systems. Occupancy numbers are low in comparison to 
other facilities such as schools, shops, and offices, although the combustible risk is 
usually high (fire load energy density> 1500 MJ/m2). The building construction is 
expected to comprise large open spaces with high ceilings, extending untenability 
times but resulting in larger escape route distances. 
6. 9 Conclusions 
1. Occupants within industrial occupancies are expected to be alert, active and 
mobile, plus familiar with their surroundings. 
2. One method of designing a suitable escape system is applying a prescriptive 
solution. These are based on conservative travel speeds, exit configurations 
and untenability conditions. 
3. The recommended design method uses deterministic and behavioural models 
to compare estimated evacuation time (Tae) against the untenability time (Tu). 
The escape route design must prove that T ae is less than T u, otherwise 
improvements are required. 
4. Automatic detection/suppression systems reduce evacuation times as well as 
improving the likelihood of controlling the fire. They are recommended for 
inclusion in industrial buildings. 
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7.0 DETECTION AND SPRINKLER SYSTEMS 
Sprinkler and detection systems form an integral part of a buildings fire safety 
strategy. Inclusion of these systems in single storey industrial buildings usually 
exceeds the minimum Building Code requirements of manual call point systems 
only. 
The aim of this section is to promote the advantages of automatic fire protection 
and outline appropriate systems for single storey industrial buildings. Emphasis is 
given to firstly establishing a fire safety strategy, then designing systems to suit. 
7.1 Fire Safety Strategy 
A fire safety strategy needs to focus on an overall objective. Schifiliti [1992] 
defined the three predominant objectives: 
1. Life safety. 
2. Property protection. 
3. Business protection. 
7.1.1 Life Safety 
Designing a life safety system requires early warning of a fire condition. While the 
ideal option is for automatic detection (such as smoke detectors), the NZBC 
Acceptable Solutions [ 1991] only require a manual call point system for single 
storey industrial buildings. This is on the following provisions and applies to most 
industrial buildings: 
• Occupant numbers are less than 250 people for low to medium hazard 
activities, and less than 100 people for high hazard activities. 
• The buildings are single storey, or contain mezzanine levels that total 
less than one third of the ground floor space. 
• Occupancy is limited to working use. 
• Escape routes comply with the exit widths and allowable travel distances 
to exits. 
No fire protection is required ifthere are less than 50 people in a single storey (low 
to medium hazard) building. This can be at variance to the Fire Safety and 
Evacuation of Buildings Regulations [ 1991 ], which require an adequate means of 
alerting all occupants during an emergency. The UK Building Regulations 
Approved Document B [1992] also expect at the least an effective alarm system: 
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'Although there is no requirement under the building regulations to provide 
a means of giving warning in case of fire, the provision of an appropriate 
warning system is an essential element in the overall strategy for fire safety 
in an occupied building. ' 
Inclusion of automatic detection or suppression systems enhances life safety, and 
should be incorporated in building design wherever possible. Operation of these 
systems will not only provide early warning but also initiate ancillary systems that 
facilitate safe escape, such as smoke extraction or closing of fire doors. 
7.1.2 Property Protection 
The NZ Building Code requires external property protection where there is risk of 
a fire spreading to neighbouring properties or to buildings containing certain 
occupancies. Section 4.0 also discussed the need to minimise environmental 
damage in the advent of a fire. Further to this a building owner may decide that the 
complete property, including contents, requires enhanced fire protection and this is 
included in the site fire safety strategy. 
To achieve effective property protection requires at least a detection system. A fire 
needs to be discovered early enough to allow manual or automatic extinguishment 
before exceeding unacceptable damage levels. Active fire protection systems can 
be supplemented with passive systems such as compartmentation and fire 
resistance rating of the structural components. 
In terms of minimum prescriptive requirements, fire compartmentation may 
become necessary if the NZBC Acceptable Solutions [1991] are applied and there 
is no sprinkler protection. The Acceptable Solutions place firecell floor area 
restrictions on different hazard categories: 
Clause C3/ASJ/3. 7.1 Firecell Floor Area Limits 
. . . the floor area of an unsprinklered fire cell to which an S rating applies, 
shall not exceed the maximum firecell floor area given in the following 
table. 
Fire hazard category 
(ref. Table A1, App. A) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Maximum firecell 
floor area (m2) 
5000 
2500 
1500 
Specific fire engineering 
design required 
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Clause C3/ASJ/3. 7.2 
In an unsprinklered single floor building where the building elements 
supporting the roof are not fire rated, the firecell floor area may be 
unlimited provided that no less than 15% of the roof area (distributed 
evenly throughout the firecell) is designed for effective fire venting. 
The emphasis with these clauses is on boundary exposure. The firecell floor area 
can be unlimited if there is no requirement for an S rating. The reference to 
wavering the floor area limitation for a boundary risk if the roof structure is 
designed for effective venting, recognises the advantages of releasing heat through 
the roof and reducing compartment temperatures. 
In terms of controlling property damage within a site, compartmentation is very 
effective for reducing flame, water and smoke damage. The emphasis again returns 
to effective fire detection and extinguishment to ensure the compartment fire 
separations remain intact. 
7.1.3 Business Protection 
Principles adopted for business protection are similar to property protection 
although maximum acceptable loss may be viewed differently. The aim is to 
minimise the effect of fire loss to business operations. The intent is to be able to 
continue trading after a fire, where this may require not only adequate active and 
passive fire protection, but also the organisation of the business to ensure sufficient 
operational resources remain available assuming the worst fire scenario. 
There can be advantages to provide active fire protection systems beyond 
enhanced property and business protection. Construction and insurance costs can 
be reduced through the combination of active and passive systems. To determine 
the most cost effective fire safety strategy a site risk assessment should be included 
as part of the design process. 
7.2 Detection Systems 
Ramachandran [1981] conducted a study comparing average historical property 
loss for the textile industry with no detection systems, versus the same fire 
scenarios with detection systems. He concluded that the fire damage would have 
reduced by 63% if non-monitored detection systems were included, and 72% if 
monitored systems were included. 
The advantage of a detection system was largely attributable to the earlier response 
time of the fire service during the growth stages of the fire. The time required for 
the fire service to travel to the fire scene was the same for protected and non-
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protected buildings, however the detection time and the time required to control 
the fire were less. Also detection systems directly connected to the fire service 
provided a much lower notification time. 
This study highlights the advantage of a detection system for property protection. 
Sprinklers are a form of detection system but they have the added advantage of 
actively controlling the fire. It is widely noted that sprinkler protection represents 
the only probable method of controlling a fire within an industrial complex [Davis 
& Moore, 1991; Gibson, 1992; Hansell, 1993]. Gibson states: 
.. . there can be little doubt that the only reliable method of providing fire 
protection with a reasonable chance of controlling a fire in a warehouse is 
by installing sprinklers. 
The ability of the fire service to successfully attack and suppress a fire is subject to 
too many variables to expect this as a probable outcome. However, this possibility 
can be improved by selecting an automatic detection system to suit the risk. 
7 .2.1 Types of Detection Systems 
Fire detection systems fall into four broad categories listed in NFPA 72E [1990]: 
• Gas sampling 
• Smoke detection 
• Flame detection 
• Heat detection 
Each category has different advantages in cost, maintenance, and effectiveness. 
Figure 7.1 shows the difference in expected activation times during fire growth. 
t= 0 
Smouldering 
Region 
Flaming 
Region 
2 I 3 4 
Q(kW) 
1 = gas sampling 
2 = smoke detection 
3 = flame detection 
4 = heat detection 
Tlme (s) 
Fig. 7.1 : Relative comparison of detection times between types of detectors 
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7 .2.2 Gas Sampling 
These detectors sense gases produced by burning substances. The rapid response 
shown in Figure 7. 1 is based on aspirators drawing sample air into a central 
analyser unit. Point type fire-gas detectors are usually located at the ceiling and 
have the same limitation as point type smoke or heat detectors, in that response 
time is dependant on the buoyancy and ceiling jet plumes driving the fire gases to 
the unit. 
The gas sampling detection system is not common, and is intended for unusual 
environmental conditions such as extreme ambient temperatures and humidity, air 
velocity variations, vibration, and electrical interference. NFP A 72E [1990] 
provides design rules for selection, location and special considerations. 
7.2.3 Smol{e Detection 
There are four common types of smoke detectors: 
1. Ionisation point detector. 
2. Photo electric point detector 
3. Beam detector. 
4. Aspirating smoke detector. 
The point type detectors are affected by the time required for the smoke particles 
to be driven to the detector heads, as for gas sampling detectors. This problem of 
transport time lag and high ceilings as normally encountered in industrial buildings 
is discussed further in section 7.5.2. 
Ionisation point detectors are suited to a flaming fire with smaller, drier smoke 
particles. These are more able to enter the ionisation chamber and disrupt the 
electrical sensing current. Photoelectric point detectors are suited to larger smoke 
particles from smouldering fires, due to their increased ability to diffract the light 
from the emission source. 
Beam detectors operate on the same principle as the photoelectric point detector, 
except the emitter and receiver can be up to 100 m apart. This has the advantage 
of reducing the number of point detectors, plus allows the smoke detection to take 
place at a lesser height. This form of detection is very susceptible to obstructions, 
and is generally only used in open compartment areas. They should be suited to 
industrial occupancies except they are also susceptible to the following: 
• vibrations; optical alignment must be stable(± Y2 °). 
• interference from industrial operations, and any birds or insects. 
• false alarms from water vapour, refractive obstructions and dust clouds. 
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Aspirating detectors draw air into a sampling chamber where a photoelectric or 
similar light source illuminates any small particles present and the light is scattered 
onto a receiving cell. These systems are very sensitive due to the forced aspiration 
mechanism and the sampling technique. VESDA is the more common variety, and 
uses a Xenon tube as the illuminating source, and would be expected to have a 
response time similar to gas sampling detector systems. 
7.2.4 Flame Detection 
Flame detectors respond to electromagnetic radiation in the ultraviolet (UV), 
visible and infra-red (IR) spectrums emitted from a burning flame [Wek, 1995]. 
UV flame detectors respond to a limited ultraviolet band of 185 to 260 
nanometres, while IR detectors respond to a narrow band of infrared radiation 
centred at 4.35 micrometers. Flames produced by hydrocarbon fuels such as 
methane, petrol, oils and wood emit a large amount of IR radiation due to the 
emission band of C02. Flame detectors are particularly suited to the protection of 
flammable liquids, due to the fast response characteristics required for rapid fire 
growth behaviour. 
UV detectors provide the faster response and high sensitivity, whereas IR 
detectors are less susceptible to malfunctions due to contaminated optics, plus they 
can detect flames through dense smoke. Flame detectors are commonly used in 
industrial facilities such as hydrocarbon installations, aircraft hangars, and 
warehouses. They are suitable within large spaces but rely on line of sight and are 
not suitable for combustible products that are likely to smoulder extensively, such 
as within electrical installations and the bulk storage of raw products. 
7 .2.5 Heat Detection 
Heat detection is the most common form of detection, largely due to lower system 
costs. There are many types of heat detectors that all rely on the ability for the fire 
to drive convective heat currents past the detector element and trigger the element 
set point. The response time is dependant on the mass, area and specific heat of the 
detector element [ Schifiliti, 1991]. This is reflected in the relationship for response 
time index (RTI): 
RTI = 't:.Uy. (m/s)y. [7.1] 
1: = m.c I hc.Ae [7.2] 
u =gas velocity past detector (m/s) 
m = lumped mass of detector (kg) 
c = specific heat of element (kJ/kg. °C) 
he = convective heat transfer co-eff. 
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- constant value (kJ/m2°C) 
~ = area of element being heated (m2) 
. 1 1 Y2 y, Typ1ca va ues for RTI are 30 (m/s) for fast response elements, and 190 (m/s) , 
for standard response [Buchanan, 1994]. The elements can also have different 
temperature ratings to vary the detection time. Incorporating the RTI value, the 
following relationship can be used to determine the response time of the detector, 
assuming no transport time lag (refer section 7.5.1): 
Y2 tr = RTI. In [(Tg- Ta)/(Tg- T • .)] I u (s) 
tr = time for detector to respond (s) 
T g = gas temperature (K) 
T a = ambient temperature (K) 
Tr = rated temperature of detector (K) 
[7.3] 
The use of this lumped mass relationship may not be applicable for rate-of-rise heat 
detectors [Schifiliti, 1991]. 
Point type heat detectors can commonly use eutectic, bimetallic or liquid bulb 
elements, while linear detectors use nylon or thermoplastic materials. A larger fire 
is usually required to activate heat detectors in comparison to other detectors, 
although they generally require lower maintenance and are considered more 
reliable. Care needs to be taken when selecting temperature and RTI ratings to 
ensure they match the building environment (ie. high ambient temperatures) and 
the hazard. 
7.3 Sprinkler Systems 
The most effective form of heat detection is the sprinkler because of the dual 
detection and fire fighting capabilities. As previously discussed, sprinklers are 
thought to be the only effective way of controlling an industrial fire. Sprinkler 
systems take many forms, but the basic principle is to automatically discharge 
water over a fire. The activation of a sprinkler system also provides a general alarm 
for evacuation, activation for ancillary fire safety devices, and signalling for the fire 
service. 
7.3.1 Piping Systems 
The usual type of sprinkler pipe system is a wet pipe system. The reticulation pipes 
are precharged with water and the sprinkler heads open once the quartzoid liquid 
bulbs expand and fracture under the heat of the fire. For cold environments 
antifreeze is used or the pipe network is gas pressurised and water is released into 
the pipes only when a sprinkler head activates. 
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Deluge systems are used in high hazard areas, such as aircraft hangars, to provide 
widespread coverage as soon as possible. For areas where there is a concern over 
false alarms, pre-action or double knocking systems are used. Water is only 
admitted into the pipework if a secondary detection system senses a fire condition, 
releasing a deluge valve. 
7.3.2 Storage Protection 
The normal system to be used in an industrial application is the wet pipe system. 
For warehouse racking situations this may require pipework and heads within the 
racks. It is usually a compromise between greater head coverage and design water 
capacity from the roof only, or introducing sprinkler coverage into the racks and 
reducing the design density discharge. The different design requirements are clearly 
covered in design standards such as NZS 4541: Automatic Sprinkler Systems 
[SANZ, 1987]. 
The advantage with in-rack protection is activation of heads near to the seat of the 
fire. The disadvantage is the perceived restrictions on building operations. There is 
a continual fear that forklifts could accidentally break a head and cause disruptions 
and damage. Also, future flexibility is seen to be restricted once in-rack heads have 
been installed. 
7 .3.3 Types of Sprinlder Heads 
Roof mounted sprinkler heads have potential problems with activation delays due 
to gas transport and RTI time lags (refer sections 7.2.5 and 7.5.2). There are also 
problems with sprinkler water droplets reaching the seat of the fire. This may be 
caused by the concealment of the fire source, or the inability of the water droplets 
to penetrate past the hot fire plumes. Alternative solutions include the use of large 
drop sprinkler heads [Gibson, 1992]. These discharge 40% more water than 
normal 20 mm heads, creating larger and heavier drops that can penetrate the 
upward convective currents. 
A recent development is the Early Suppression Fast Response (ESFR) sprinlder 
head. This has the ability to respond faster than other heads, while delivering large 
quantities of water per head. These systems are intended to suppress the fire rather 
than just control and do not require as many heads to operate when compared to a 
standard roof sprinkler system. The development has allowed increases in the 
limits for storage height and hazard classification for roof only protection. Within 
New Zealand approval of the ESFR systems is job specific and no general design 
standard is currently available. 
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7 .3.4 Hazard Classification 
The most difficult task in designing a sprinkler system is establishing the correct 
hazard classification. Once a sprinkler system is installed it becomes difficult to 
upgrade if storage heights increase or the industrial process involves a higher 
hazard. Questions that should be asked during the design stage are: 
• What combustible products are intended to stored or processed? 
• Is there significant plastic encapsulation or containment to raise the 
classification? 
• Is there any intention to increase storage heights or layouts in the future? 
• Is there any intention to change the processing operation? 
• Are other hazards present that may affect the design, such as 
environmental dangers, or storage/work areas that are particularly 
difficult to control? 
Owners should complete storage declaration forms during the design to underline 
the liability the owner faces if these limits are exceeded. 
7.4 Other Suppression Systems 
Sprinklers are the most popular of active protection systems, largely due to the 
effectiveness of water as an extinguishing medium, its availability, and the relative 
cost compared to alternative systems. 
Other suppression systems can be considered for special applications. Options 
include: 
• Water mist: this is still in the developmental stage but has potential as an 
extinguishing agent for electrical, nautical and general applications. The 
advantages include less water requirements, greater heat absorption, and 
more effective smothering of the fire than conventional water systems. 
• Foam : particularly effective for flammable liquid fires in smothering and 
cooling the fire source. Fire fighting foam can be introduced into 
sprinkler water supplies to combine the best qualities of the two systems, 
as detailed in NFPA 16, 1991 [Whiteley, 1993]. Foam monitors are 
sometimes used to supplement other fire protection systems, such as in 
an aircraft hangars and detailed in NFP A 409. 
Gas : Inert gas mixtures such as Inergen™, halocarbons such as FM 
200™, and carbon dioxide systems can be used as alternative 
extinguishing mediums. They are impractical for large compartment 
areas such as industrial buildings due to the expense involved in 
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providing material for complete cover, and the difficulty in containing 
the discharged product. 
Dry Chemical : this system usually consists of compressed nitrogen 
cylinders that pressurise a large powder vessel, allowing dry powder to 
be discharged through fixed nozzles [Buchanan, 1994]. As for the gas 
systems, this form of fire protection is usually impractical for large open 
industrial buildings unless there is a target application. Dry chemical has 
the advantage of not dispersing once applied, assuming there are 
insignificant air currents. 
Explosion protection requires different design techniques to fire suppression. A 
typical design should include compartmentation to segregate the explosion risk 
area, explosion reliefvents to release pressure build-up of pressure, and a chemical 
suppressant such as C02 over the risk area linked to a rapid detection system. This 
should form part of an ongoing explosion risk control programme. 
7.5 Design of Fire Protection Systems 
The design, installation, testing and maintenance of detection and suppress10n 
systems is provided by a range of design standards, including: 
• NZS 4512: Fire Alarm Systems 
• NZS 4541 : Automatic Fire Sprinkler Systems 
• NFPA 12 : Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems 
• NFPA 16: Foam-Water Sprinkler and Spray Systems 
• NFP A 17 : Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems 
• NFP A 69 : Explosion Prevention Systems 
• NFP A 72E : Automatic Fire Detectors 
The prescriptive sizing and spacing design requirements of these standards can be 
used, or specific system design can be undertaken to meet certain minimum 
performance criteria. For example, the sprinkler design standard places design 
water density discharge and pressure requirements, and through applying hydraulic 
design techniques the pipework network and sprinlder head detail can be 
established. 
7.5.1 Detection Times 
Often the inclusion of either detection or suppression systems is used to validate 
the overall fire safety strategy for the building. An argument can be used that has 
the detection/suppression equipment activating at a certain time during the design 
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ftfe, resulting-· in effective evacuation and fire control: The key· variable in this 
equation is the time to detection - td. 
Variables that effect td include: 
a) fire growth rate and maximum heat release rate. 
b) ceiling height. 
c) separation distances between detectors. 
d) detector type and setting. 
e) obstacles and venting. 
t) fire plume and ceiling jet. 
The time to detection is often miscalculated as only being the response time of the 
detector assuming steady state gas flow behaviour, and utilising the detectors 
known RTI and activation temperature. In reality detectors are expected to 
activate during the growth stages of the fire, and not the steady state phase. 
Consideration should therefore be given for the transport time lag, or the delay for 
fire gases to travel up to the ceiling and across to the detector. Obviously in a high 
compartment such as a single storey industrial building, this time will be significant. 
7 .5.2 Transport Time Lag 
Mowrer [1990] highlighted that the DETACT-QS program in FPETOOL and 
FIRECALC does not allow for a transport time lag. In a growing fire the heat 
release rate being sensed at a detector can lag the actual heat release rate by a 
significant margin. This difference continues to grow as long as the fire continues 
to grow. Newman [Mowrer, 1990] provided an expression that calculates this time 
delay based on a t2 growth fire: 
t1 =transport time lag (s) 
r =radial distance from fire axis to detector (m) 
H =height above plume source (m) 
Ak = g I ( c Po To) 
= 0.028 m2/kg 
<Xt =power law growth co-efficient (kW/s2) 
Example: Calculate the transport time lag and total detection time for a heat 
detector rated at 57 oc and 30 (m/s)Yt RTI, lo~ated on a 10 m ceiling and at the 
following radial distances away from the fire axis: 
a) r = 3 rn 
b) r= 10m 
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Fire growth rate is medium, <Xt = 0.01172 kWis2. 
a) r = 3 m: t1 = (1.4 x 3 + 0.2 x 10) I (0.028 x 0.01172 x 10)115 
= 19.5 s 
fromFPETOOLDETACT: tr = 391 s 
,', td = 410 s 
calculating HRR @ tr (391 s) = <Xt. t/ 
= 1792 kW 
@ td (410 s) = <Xt. ti 
= 1970 kW 
b) r =10m: t1 = (1.4 x 10 + 0.2 x 10) I (0.028 x 0.01172 x 10)115 
= 50.2 s 
from FPETOOL DETACT : tr = 721 s 
,', td = 771 s 
calculating HRR @ tr (721 s) = <Xt • tr2 
= 6093 kW 
@ td (771 s) = <Xt. tl 
= 6971 kW 
This example shows that the heat release rate (HRR) can be significantly different 
based on the t1. For instance the second example indicates that the HRR at the 
response (tr) time of 721s is 6093 kW, whereas the actual heat release rate based 
on the detection time (td) of771s is 6971 kW. This is a 14% difference where the 
underestimation of HRR could affect the life safety design or the ability of the 
suppression to control the fire. 
It should be noted that DE TACT -QS has other limitations to only considering 
steady state fire conditions. The program also assumes [Deal, 1994]: 
1. unconfined ceiling profile. 
2. flaming fire. 
3. flame height is not a factor. 
4. detectors are fixed temperature devices. 
5. detectors are exposed to the maximum ceiling jet velocity and 
temperature. 
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7 .5.3 Smol"e Detectors 
The response of smoke detectors can be approximated using the same method as 
applied for heat detectors. The following parameters are usually used for inputting 
into DETACT [FPETOOL, 1994]: 
• RTI 
.1T 
Y:z 
= 0.005 (m/s) , or as close to 0 as possible. 
• = 13 °C between ambient and detector activation temperature . 
The temperature difference approximation is based on the theory that the 
concentration of particles to which the detector responds is proportional to the 
temperature rise of the fire gases. The adoption of 13 °C as the reference 
temperature rise is based on a most likely outcome from limited experimental tests 
[Heskestad, 1991]. 
7.6 Ancillary Systems 
The activation of a detection system should not only result in the sounding of 
alarms, but also the activation of ancillary fire protection devices. This signalling is 
through a central alarm control panel, with possible ancillary control actions being: 
• Fire service notification. 
• Smoke extract and management systems. 
• Remote indicator panels. 
• Security over-rides. 
• Plant shut-down. 
• Release of magnetic door holders, and closing of fire and smoke-stop 
doors. 
• Emergency lighting. 
• Activation of special suppression systems. 
• Return of lifts (if any) to the ground floor. 
Figure 8. 5 shows a typical interactive system. The ability to complement fire safety 
features to maximise the potential protection of a building forms a key part of the 
complete fire safety strategy. 
7. 7 Conclusions 
1. System goals for a site fire safety strategy can be placed in three categories: 
life safety, property protection, and business protection. 
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2. To determine the most effective fire safety strategy in terms of cost and 
performance, a site fire risk assessment should be completed as part of the 
design process. 
3. The minimum level of fire protection expected for a single storey industrial 
building is a manual call point and alarm system, for life safety purposes. 
Inclusion of automatic detection or suppression systems enhances life safety, 
and should be incorporated in building design wherever possible. 
4. Fire safety designs relying on detector performance, must account for the 
detector RTI, activation temperature, and the transport time lag. 
5. Activation of detection systems should not only sound alarms, but also initiate 
ancillary devices such as remote indicator panels, fire service attendance, and 
smoke management systems. 
6. Sprinklers are the only expected method of controlling a fire within a typical 
industrial complex. The fire service can not be expected to attack and suppress 
a fire from receiving an alarm call without sprinkler support. 
7. A critical part of sprinkler design is establishing the correct hazard 
classification. This evaluation should form part of the initial site risk 
assessment. 
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8.0 ROOF VENTING 
8.1 Objective 
This section aims to provide a design method for the sizing and operation of either 
natural or mechanically operated roof vents in industrial buildings. The discussion 
emphasises that smoke control forms only part of an overall fire design strategy, 
and can not be treated as the sole solution to effective fire management. 
The question of whether roof vents should be included in a sprinklered environment 
is also addressed. This section concludes that the two fire control systems should 
be integrated where possible, with careful attention given to their combined 
operation. 
8.2 Introduction 
A developing fire in an industrial building results in buoyant, hot gases rising 
vertically from the combustion zone and then flowing horizontally below the roof 
until blocked by a vertical barrier (a wall or draft curtain). This initiates the 
formation of a deepening hot layer of gases below the roof 
If this process continues, the deepening smoke layer radiates heat to unburnt 
combustible surfaces until a minimum radiation intensity causes spontaneous 
ignition. This is known as flashover, and results in a fully involved fire. Flashover is 
expected to occur when the hot upper layer temperature exceeds 600°C, or 
radiative heat flux from the hot upper layer to combustible items exceeds 20 
kW/m2. 
Benefits of Venting 
Avoiding a flashover condition should be an objective in the design of single storey 
industrial buildings with high fire loads. Venting the upper smoke layer from the 
compartment is not expected to prevent flashover, but it is expected to delay the 
event. 
Venting not only releases convective heat to outside, but also provides the 
following advantages: 
• facilitates a safe means of escape 
• aids fire fighters in accessing the seat of the fire. 
• reduces property and contents damage due to smoke and hot gases. 
• lowers the risk of explosion due to build-up ofunburnt gases. 
• limits the number of sprinlders activating (if present). 
• allows purging of smoke after the fire is under control. 
Avoiding a flashover condition or controlling the smoke behaviour does not 
guarantee that the fire will not spread throughout the compartment. A developing 
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fire has the ability to spread by direct radiation or flame transfer. If it is apparent 
that a fire would engulf the whole building, then it must be accepted that a smoke 
control system will only be effective during the early stages of a fire. 
Hansell [ 1993] considers that flashover is likely to occur in high rack storage areas, 
regardless of the presence of smoke extraction. This is based on the theory that 
storage products are very close to, or within, the upper smoke layer. He considers 
sprinklers to be essential for effective property protection in this circumstance. 
Fire Design Strategy 
A roof venting system should form part of a fire safety design strategy, depending 
on the fire safety objectives. Careful consideration is needed to determine the best 
combination of fire safety options for the level of risk and acceptable fire outcome. 
This could result in a timber warehouse being protected by automatic detectors, 
sprinklers and roof vents. Section 7.0 discusses this selection process further, and 
outlines the method for developing a fire design strategy. 
This Section concentrates on the use of roof vents. It presents methods for 
calculating smoke production rates for design fires, and then designing vents to 
suit. A number of related issues are also discussed, including: 
• design differences between natural venting and mechanical venting 
• venting limitations for growing fires 
• providing replacement air 
• the use of smoke curtains 
• controlling the operation of vents 
• interaction of roof vents and sprinklers 
A worked example at the end of this chapter demonstrates the use of the 
calculation methods. 
8.3 Smoke Development 
To control the heat and smoke within a compartment, there first must be an 
understanding of the design fire and the constraining features of the affected 
building (ie. compartment size, vent locations etc.). 
For a large space smoke generated from a fire is expected to rise up underneath the 
roof, and then spread radially outwards as a ceiling jet. Between 60 % and 90 % of 
the fires heat output is transferred to this smoke layer [Pagella and Faveri, 1993]. 
The resulting depth of smoke becomes a function of: 
• type of burning product (ie. plastics versus wood products). 
• fire growth and rate of smoke generation. 
• area of reservoir beneath the roof - external walls or smoke curtains may 
define the reservoir boundaries. 
• presence and effect of sprinklers and smoke vents. 
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The driving mechanism for the smoke is the release of convective heat currents and 
hot volatile vapours. The difference in densities between the ambient air and the hot 
gases results in an upward movement, with surrounding air becoming entrained into 
the vertical smoke plume. 
Two methods are available to estimate the rate of smoke production. The first is 
limited to fires in the early growth stages, and is dependant on the fire dimensions, 
smoke clearance heights and smoke temperature. The second method is based on 
heat output and smoke clearance heights, and has a modified form to account for 
large fires . 
8.3.1 Smol{e Clearance Heights 
A key component in these formulae is the "smoke clearance height" (y), which is 
the distance from the floor to the underside of the hot smoky upper layer. This can 
be determined in an iterative process involving the following variables: 
1) fire initiation, assuming the smoke clearance height to be the ceiling 
height. 
2) the compartment filling with smoke as the fire continues to grow. The 
smoke clearance height reduces as this smoke layer deepens. This 
increases the rate of smoke production and smoke temperature. 
3) the effects of smoke extraction through venting systems. This increases the 
smoke clearance height. 
(mean) 
h y 
P = flra perimeter 
Fig. 8.1 :Nomenclature Used for Developing Fires 
NFP A 92B provides formulae to determine the smoke clearance height at any time 
in an unvented space. These formulae depend on whether the fire is steady state or 
non-steady state, and assume an axisymmetric plume: 
1) Steady State: 
y/h = 1.11 - 0.28ln [(t Qr113/ h413)/(A/h2)] [8.1] 
2) Non-Steady State: 
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[8.2] 
h = height of compartment (m) 
t = time from fire initiation (s) 
Qr = heat output of fire (kW) 
A = area of compartment (m2) 
ts = time at which the heat output is 
1.055 MW (s) 
An alternative to undertaldng this manual exercise, is to use a computer based fire 
simulation programme such as FPETOOL or CF AST. These programmes can give 
smoke clearance heights as a function of time for a given fire scenario taking into 
account all the above variables (also refer Section 5). If an extract system is 
operating, the smoke clearance height will be affected by the performance of both 
the extract system and the smoke generation rate. The results from the above 
relationships need to be placed into a spreadsheet and adjusted to account for: 
• when the extraction system begins operation 
• the rate of extraction 
This becomes an iterative process involving the mass flow rate equations given in 
Sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.4. The success ofthe extraction system is usually based on 
keeping the smoke above a minimum height for the design period. 
This minimum height may be influenced by the need to keep the design fire below a 
minimum heat output value. A formula is given in NFP A 204M that determines the 
heat output before gas temperatures exceed 540°C. Exceeding this value may either 
result in flashover or failure of unprotected steelwork. The formula is based on 
curtained compartments where the curtain depth exceeds 20% of the ceiling height: 
(kW) [8.3] 
Qmax = maximum heat output of fire before 
the gas temperature exceeds 540°C 
8.3.2 Smoh:e Temperatures 
Two forms of smoke temperature are referred to in the text: 
• Smoke plume temperature 
• Upper layer smoke temperature 
The notation is the same ( 11 T s-a, T s ), but the difference is given in the key reference 
alongside each formula. 
92 
The temperature of the smoke plume can be estimated by the following relationship 
[Hinkley, 1992]: 
[8.4] 
1:1 T s-a = smoke plume temperature above 
ambient CC) 
Qc convective output of fire (kW) 
Cv = specific heat of air at constant 
pressure (kJ/kg K). 
M = smoke production rate (kg/s) 
The upper layer smoke temperature can either be determined through using 
ASETBX in the FIRECALC suite of fire design procedures, or applying the 
compartment temperature relationship established by Foote, Pagni and Alvares 
[Walton and Thomas, 1992]. The ASETBX routine applies to non-vented 
compartments, while the Foote et al procedure applies to forced ventilation fires.: 
[8.5] 
11Ts-a = Smoke layer temp. above 
ambient (K) 
Ta = Ambient temp. (K) 
Qr = Heat output of fire (kW) 
MF Mass flow from fan (kg/s) 
hk = Heat transfer coefficient 
(kW/m2 K) 
AT = Total area of compartment 
enclosing surfaces (m2). 
8.3.3 Method 1 : Mass Flow Rate Based on Fire Size 
Compared with the total volume of air entrained by the fire, the volume of the fuel 
gases and unburnt decomposition matter is relatively small. One method to 
determine the rate of smoke production is therefore based on the rate of air 
entrainment. This rate is dependant on the perimeter of the fire, the heat output and 
the effective height of the column of gases. It also assumes that there is no 
restriction on the supply of air, and that the fire is fuel controlled. The following 
relationship estimates the rate of air entrainment [Butcher and Parnell, 1979]: 
M = 0.096 P Po y312 (g Ta1Ts) 112 (kg/s) [8.6] 
P = Perimeter of fire (m) 
y = Smoke clearance height (m) 
Po = Density of ambient air (kg/m3) 
T a = Absolute temperature of 
ambient air (K). 
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T s = Absolute temperature of smoke 
plume (K). 
Based on standard air at l7°C, and Ts = 1100 K, the expression for smoke 
production reduces to: 
M = 0.188 P l 12 [8.7] 
This relationship shows clearly that the rate of smoke production is directly 
proportional to the size of the fire (P) and dependant upon the smoke clearance 
height (y) above it. 
Fire size (P) can be adequately predicted using three cases: 
1) during the early growth stages of a fire, or 
2) where sprinklers are present, or 
3) if the fire source is constrained (ie. a pool fire). 
The Smoke Ventilation Association (1990) tabulates recommended maximum fire 
sizes for designing smoke ventilation systems, and states that fire sizes above these 
values should not be considered. This is a prescriptive approach, and may be 
relevant for controlled fires, such as with sprinkler operation and pool fires. For a 
sprinkler controlled fire, the fire size is set on a 3m x 3m square, or 12m perimeter 
for an occupancy with a medium fire load (500 - 1500 MJ/m2) [Butcher and 
Parnell, 1979]. The NZ Building Code states that a 12m perimeter fire has a heat 
output of 5 MW [BIA, 1991]. 
For uncontrolled fires the maximum size of the fire should be based on the time 
needed to achieve the fire safety objectives. This may be based on when flashover is 
expected to occur, or the minimum time for safe evacuation. The need to develop a 
fire design strategy is discussed further in Section 7 .1. 
8.3.4 Method 2 : Mass Flow Rate Based on Heat Output 
NFP A 204M provides formulae that are not based on fire size, but on heat output. 
For fires with high heat outputs, it is considered that the use of the fire size 
formulae gives mass flow rates that are too low [Hinldey, 1992]. The NFPA 204M 
formulae, as initially proposed by Heskestad [Pagella and De Faveri, 1993], define 
a small and large fire based on a critical heat output. 
(W) Small Fire: Qc< Qcrit 
Large Fire: Qc > Qcrit 
The mass flow rates are determined by the following formulae: 
[8.8] 
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Large Fire: M = 5.3x10"4 y Q0315 (kg/s) [8.10] 
Qc = Convective heat output of fire (W) 
y = Smoke clearance height (m) 
The conversion of the mass rate of production of smoke to a volume rate can be 
made by dividing by the density appropriate to the smoke temperature (also refer 
Section 8.4.2). An expression for density is: 
[ 
290 J pr= 1.22 x L kg/m3 [Based on T a = 290 K] [8. 11] 
Pr = Density of air at temperature T (kg/m3) 
Ts = Absolute temperature of smoke plume (K) 
8.4 Roof Vents 
A roof ventilation system is intended to expel smoke so as to provide the following 
advantages [Hansell, 1993]: 
• facilitate safe means of escape. 
• aid fire fighters in accessing the seat of the fire. 
• reduce damage due to smoke and hot gases (if the fire can be controlled) 
• lower the risk of total roof collapse. 
• lower the risk of flashover by reduction of compartment temperatures. 
• lower the risk of explosion due to build-up ofunburnt gases. 
• limit the number of sprinklers activating. 
• allow purging of smoke from a building after the fire is under control. 
If the venting system is adequately sized, it will expel smoke at the same rate that is 
being produced by the fire. The usual design criterion is to maintain a 2.5m high 
clear zone from the floor, primarily for the limiting the effects of smoke on 
evacuees and firefighters. The Smoke Ventilation Association (1990) also 
recommend that a clear layer of 500 mm is kept above stacked goods if 
spontaneous ignition is considered a risk. 
Key design parameters are the expected fire growth and steady state conditions, 
plus the smoke development rates. It should be noted that vents do not draw smoke 
through their openings, rather the buoyancy of the hot smoke provides the driving 
force (refer equation [8.24]). If the extraction rate exceeds the mass flow rate 
attributable to the buoyancy force then cool air is drawn from the lower layer. 
Roof venting can be provided by natural vents or mechanical extraction. Skylights 
can also be expected to perform as roof vents, but only at elevated temperatures. 
For example 'Durolite', a common skylight product and manufactured by Dimond 
Industries, has a decomposition temperature of 350°C. Systems that are designed 
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specifically for venting are usually automatically controlled through detectors or 
fusible links, so as to begin operation at much lower temperatures. 
The following sections provide calculation techniques for natural and mechanical 
venting systems, and discuss associated issues such as vent control and replacement 
air. The methods for sizing vents however rely on this clear knowledge of the 
system's maximum expected operating condition. 
8.4.1 Natural Ventilation 
The required vent area is calculated by equating the mass rate of flow through 
vents with the mass rate of smoke production [Hinkley, 1992]. The following 
equation is based on a 'large' fire with the smoke production being dependant on 
fire size: 
[8.12] 
NFP A 204M gives an equivalent equation based on heat output, for small fires ( Qc 
< Qcrit): 
For 'large' fires where Qc > 0.2 Qcrit (ie. there is some overlap with small fires): 
[8.14] 
Qf = Convective heat output of fire (W) 
Vent Area for Growing Fires 
NFPA 204M [Hinkley, 1992] provides a design method for growing fires, based on 
achieving an 'intervention' time. This is the time in which the venting system is 
expected to remain effective, and again is related to the fire design strategy. The 
formula assumes a square law increase in heat output with time, and does not 
account for a steady state condition. For this reason it should only be used for 
growing fires. 
[8.15] 
td =vent 'detection' time (s) 
ti = 'intervention' (or design) 
time (s) 
ts = time at which the heat 
output is 1.055 MW (s) 
[refer section 5. 3] 
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Figure 8.2 shows a range of typical fire growth curves, and overlays events as a 
function of time during a fire. 
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NFP A 204M provides a quick reference table that relates fire growth, design time, 
ceiling height and vent spacing. Factors are included that compensate for design 
parameters outside the listed values. 
Maximum Vent Size 
There is a maximum vent size that ensures air from beneath the layer of hot gases is 
not drawn into the vents. This is related to a maximum rate of extract that depends 
on the Froude number, Fe, and must not exceed a critical value determined by 
[Hinkley, 1992]: 
Fe= Vv I [(g ~Ts·a I Ta)112 (h-y)512] [8.16] 
V v = volume rate of flow 
through a single orifice. 
Accepted working figures for Fe are: 
1. Vents near the side of a smoke reservoir: Fe= 2.0 
2. Vents near the center of a smoke reservoir: Fe= 2.5 
The critical vent size is determined from the following relationship: 
(Av)crit =0.707 Fe (h-y)2 I Cd [8.17] 
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cd = coefficient of discharge 
(usually taken as 0. 6). 
For a vent near the center of a reservoir, this simplifies to: 
(Av)crit = 2.94 (h-yf [8.18] 
Note that the recommended maximum spacing for natural vents is 20 m apart 
[Smoke Ventilation Association, 1990]. NFPA 204M requires that on a plan view 
of the building, the distance between any point on the floor and the nearest vent 
does not exceed 2. 8 x (building) height. 
8.4.2 Mechanical Extraction 
The general design of a mechanical system is similar to that of a natural venting 
system. Care is required with determining the duty and number of fans required. 
The mass flow extraction rate will vary according to smoke layer temperature. 
Based on a known compartment temperature, the volumetric exhaust rate is 
[Hansell and Morgan, 1994]: 
Vp= MTs 
Po Ta 
Number of Extraction Outlets 
[8.19] 
VF =volumetric exhaust rate (m3/s) 
Ts =smoke layer temperature (K) 
M =smoke production rate (kg/s) 
T a = ambient air temperature (K) 
To avoid drawing air from beneath the smoke layer, and creating a 'plug holing' 
effect, a minimum number of extraction outlets are required. This is similar to 
providing a minimum vent size for natural ventilation. The critical exhaust rate is 
based on the following equation [Hansell and Morgan, 1994]: 
(kg/s) [8.20] 
[p = coefficient: 1. 3 for a vent near a wall; 1. 8 for a central vent] 
The required number of extract vents (N) is then given by: 
N;:::: _M_ [8.21] 
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Effects from Temperature Variations 
Fan performance can be affected by changes in compartment temperature: 
1. Increase in Temperature: given that the mass flow rate of smoke 
remains constant, an increase in upper layer temperature would increase 
the volume rate of smoke required to be extracted by the fan(s). Unless 
the speed or performance of the fan(s) can also be increased, the smoke 
layer will deepen and exacerbate the problem. 
2. Decrease in Temperature: The critical exhaust rate is expected to 
decrease, based on the equation given above for Merit· Reduction in the 
critical exhaust rate indicates that either the number of vents should be 
increased, or the designed system will draw air from below the smoke 
layer. 
8.4.3 Pressure Effects 
Venting systems can be ineffective if the smoke buoyancy pressure is overcome by 
inlet and wind pressures. 
Inlet Pressure 
The 'inlet' pressure drop takes two forms, depending on whether it is natural or 
mechanical venting being considered. For natural ventilation Hinkley provides a 
formula that accounts for pressure rise due to constraints on expansion. This is only 
of any significance if both the ratio of inlet area to compartment area is very small 
(est. < 0. 01%) and the rate of rise of temperature in the compartment is nominally 
greater than 2 K/s-1. If a natural vent system is sized correctly this factor can 
usually be ignored. 
For mechanical venting systems, there is a pressure drop across the inlet into the 
extract fan. This is a function of mass flow rate, coefficient of discharge, inlet area 
and temperatures. The coefficient of discharge can vary according to the inlet 
profile, and is usually taken as 0.6 for standard systems. The equation provided by 
Hinldey [1992] is: 
_ tM ] 2 (Ta + l1Ts-a) 
PI- C A (Pa) 
d (2Ta Po) 
[8.22] 
PI = pressure drop across fan 
inlet (Pa) 
M = Smoke flow rate (kg/s) 
cd = coefficient of discharge 
(usually taken as 0. 6) 
AI = area of opening (m2) 
l1Ts-a= smoke layer temperature 
above ambient (K) 
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Wind Pressure 
Wind pressures can have a marked effect on the ability for smoke to ventilate. The 
following equation gives the wind pressure resulting from wind velocity [Hinkley, 
1992]: 
Pw = Cp Po (V w )2 I 2 (Pa) [8.23] 
Pw = pressure increase due to wind 
above the undistributed free 
wind stream (Pa). 
Cp =pressure coefficient (typically 
-0.8 for a flat roof, but + ve 
for the windward side of 
pitched roofs). 
Vw =velocity of free wind stream (m/s). 
For industrial buildings the roof pitch is usually low, and the preferred location of 
vents is on the roof. This means that any wind will aid smoke venting due to the 
probable negative (suction) pressure. Attention needs to be given as to where the 
smoke is likely to go in a prevailing wind. There should be no possibility of smoke 
re-entering the building. 
Buoyancy Pressure 
The buoyancy pressure is the driving force for smoke movement, and can be 
expressed [Hinkley, 1992]: 
PB =gPo LlTs-a d I (Ta + 8) 
Combining Pressures 
[8.24] 
PB = buoyancy pressure (Pa) 
d = depth of smoke layer (m) 
T a = absolute ambient temperature (K) 
Ll T s-a = (T-T a) temperature of 
smoke above ambient 
8 = temp of gases above ambient (K) 
The following equation equates the contributing pressures [Hinkley, 1992]: 
(Pa) 
PR = resultant pressure 
PB = buoyancy pressure 
[8.25] 
Pw = anticipated maximum adverse 
wind pressure 
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PI = pressure drop across inlet 
If the vent system can not overcome constraining pressure forces the smoke layer 
will drop, resulting in an increase in buoyancy pressure. This assists in driving the 
gases out of the vents. A venting system becomes ineffective ifthe smoke layer falls 
below the minimum allowable height in the fire design. Options available to 
overcome this are: 
• alterations to the building design to minimise the effect of the external 
pressures. 
• increase the vent sizes to reduce inlet pressures. 
• increase the performance of the mechanical extract fans. 
8.4.4 Replacement Air 
An important feature in an effective smoke ventilation system is replacement air (or 
'make-up' air). Ideally, replacement air should be introduced at low level from all 
directions, and at low velocity (recommended maximum velocity is 5 rn/sec 
[Buchanan, 1994]). High level intakes can be used if smoke curtains or screens 
have been fitted, although care has to be taken to avoid turbulence of the smoke. 
The quantity of replacement air needs to match the maximum extract volume, with 
consideration for the change in air densities at elevated temperatures. The location 
of the inlets need to allow for the effects of the wind. Ideally, inlets should be 
evenly distributed around the building, plus there should be no risk of smoke 
recirculating back into the building through inlets. 
The ratio of inlet and outlet vent areas, can greatly affect the effective outlet area 
[Hinkley, 1992]. If the capacity of the venting system is to be within 90% of its 
computed value, then this inlet and outlet vent ratio must be unity if the layer of hot 
gases has a temperature of 800°C above ambient. If the layer is anticipated to be at 
a low temperature, then the ratio must be over 2. The effective vent area is 
determined by the following formula: 
1/Av*2 = (1/Ai) + (1/A/)[To/ (To+ 8)] [8.26] 
Av * = effective area of 
outlet vents (m2). 
AI = area of inlets (m2) 
To = ambient temp. (K) 
8 = upper layer temp (K) 
Refer Sections 8.4.3 for determination of the pressure drop across inlets, and the 
effect this has on the performance on the extraction system. 
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8.4.5 Vent Control 
The method of control for a smoke extract system is critical to its success. The 
opening of natural ventilators can either occur through operation of an automatic 
fire alarm signal, or through a fusible link. The former method would usually 
provide the quicker response in an emergency. 
Latching mechanisms need to be jam-proof, corrosion resistant, and resistant to 
pressure differentials arising from windstorms, process operations, overhead doors, 
or traffic vibrations. 
Mechanical syst.ems are usually started by a fire alarm signal or manual operation. 
Again an automatic signal is the most effective, especially during unmanned 
periods. The recommended form of automatic detection is zoned smoke detectors; 
they are expected to provide the quickest response to a fire. Figure 8.3 shows a 
typical schematic diagram for the interfacing of automatic alarms and mechanical 
systems. 
Inlet Vents & Doors Smoke Curtains 
Telephone Signal 
to Fire Service .-------. 
.... .----1 
FlreAiann 
Panel 
Sounders ....._ ____ ....... 
Natural VenUiatlon Mechanical ExtracUon 
Smoke Detectors 
Sprinklers 
Manual Call Points 
Fig. 8.3 : Schematic Diagram for Typical Fire Alann and Control System 
102 
The control requirement stipulated in the Building Code of Australia 1990 for 
smoke extract fans is [Buchanan, 1994]: 
"All smoke extract fans must start sequentially and be activated by the 
operation in the area served by the fan of: 
a) a sprinkler system 
b) a fire detection and alarm system complying with NZS 4512 
c) a detector system comprising -
i) smoke detectors spaced not more than 30m apart and 
15 m from any draught curtain, bulkhead or wall and 
not less than one detector for each 500m2 of floor area; 
or 
ii) rate of rise detectors spaced not more than 15 m apart 
and 7. 5 m from any draught curtain, bulkhead or wall 
and with not less than one detector for each 250 m2 of 
floor area; and 
iii) not less than 2 detectors located on opposite sides of 
each fan inlet." 
The NZ Building Code Acceptable Solutions also include the following features for 
mechanical extraction systems: 
• manual control available for operation by the Fire Service 
• independent control and power systems protected by the effects of fire 
for at least 60 minutes. 
• fan system rated for a maximum operating temperature of 200°C, and 
continuous operation in a temperature of 40 °C for no less than 60 
minutes. 
An extraction system relies on replacement air and these systems need to interact 
with the vent controls. A common method is to open automatic doors or motorised 
wall vents through a signal at the alarm panel. If replacement air is provided 
through the roof, zoning of roof units, fire detectors and smoke curtains may be 
required. The design of powered system controls should always ensure a fail safe 
condition, resulting in the fans operating and natural ventilators being in the open 
position 
8.5 Worked Example - Roof Venting Design 
The same warehouse as described in Section 5.4 is required to have either natural 
or mechanical roof venting to limit smoke layer height to avoid flashover, assuming 
one rack of goods becomes fully involved in a fire. The layout and characteristics of 
the fuel are as follows; the only difference to the example in Section 5.4 is the 
deletion of roof skylights: 
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~-------------------- 50m--------------------------~ 
i 
'E 
·e 
~ I I 
16 off Racks j• 4 m ~~ PVC Bottles 
8Lx1.8Wx5H 
I I I I I I I I 
Fig. 8.4: Warehouse Storing PVC Bottles 
1. Complete schedule offuel: 
• Description: PVC Bottles occupying 16 racks@ 8 m long x 1.6 m 
wide x 5 m high. 
• Mass: 1 Rack= (8x5x1.6) x 100 kg/m3 (est.) 
= 6400 kg per rack. 
• Surface Area: 1 Rack= (8x5x2) + (1.6x5x2) + (1.6x8) 
= 108.8 m2 per rack. 
• Calorific Value : CV = 17.8 MJ/kg 
• Total Energy: 1 Rack= 17.8 x 6400 = 114,000 MJ 
Total Load= 114,000 x 16 = 1,824,000 MJ 
• Burn Rate : mF = 0.016 kg/s.m2 
• Peak HRR: Qr= 2.84 MW/m2 [NFPA 92B] 
• Peak HRR per rack : Qr= 2.84 x (8x1.6) = 36.4 MW 
• Growth Rate: ts = 75 s (very fast) 
• Time to max HRR [5 .12] : t8 = (36.4)0·5• 75 = 452 s 
• Vertical Vents = 2 off openings measuring 4 x 4 m 
=32m2 
• Floor Area = 1200 m2 
• Firecell Height = 8 m 
2. Design Stmtegy - to design a smoke management system to cope with a 
growing fire limited to 1 rack only. Once the fire spreads beyond 1 rack the 
smoke management system is considered ineffective. As stated in Section 5.4, 
fire spread is not expected before total involvement of the rack. Once the rack 
is fully involved there is the possibility of fuel collapse onto neighbouring 
racks. 
3. Limiting Smoke Layer Height to prevent flashover or failure of unprotected 
steelwork: 
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[8°3] Qmax = 36.4 X 103 kW = 1.3 X 103 0 y512 
=> Yc = 3o8m (critical smoke clearance height) 
40 No Venting : the time that it would take for the smoke layer to drop below 
the critical smoke clearance height with no venting is: 
[802] ylh = 0091 [ tl (ts2/sh4ts (A/h2itsrL4s 
=> o.475 = oo91 [ t 1 11203 rl.4S 
=> t = 26908 s (405 minutes) 
y =308m 
h=8m 
ts = 75 S 
A= 1200 m2 
50 Mass Flow (based on heat output and limiting smoke height to the height of 
the goods): 
[808] Qcrit = 203 X 105 y512 
,', Qcrit = 12.8 MW 
actual fire size = 3 6.4 MW; 
assume convective heat output= 100% Qr => Qc = 36.4 MW 
=> large fire 
[8.10] M = 5.3 X 10"4 y Qc315 
= 503 X 10"4 X 5.0 X (36.4 X 106)006 
= 91.2 kg/s 
60 Natural Vent Area, to keep the smoke layer above the height of the goods for 
36.4 MW fire: 
[8°14] Av = 1.94 X 10"4 Qc315 y I d112 
= 1.94 X 10"4 X (36.4 X 106)006 X 5.0 I 300112 
= 1903 m2 
70 Maximum Vent Size (Natural) : 
[8.18] (Av)crit = 2.94 (h-y? 
= 2094 X 3002 
= 26.5 m2 
The required vent size = 19 0 3 m2 which is less than maximum vent size. 
8. Area oflnlets : equating area ofinlet openings to effective area ofoutletso 
[8026] 11Av*2 = (1/Al) + (11Al) (To I (To+ 8)) 
let Ar = 2 main doors @ 16 m2 each 
Av = 21 m2 ( 6 natural roof mounted smoke vents) 
8 = 6007 oc (ASETBX upper layer gas temperature 
for a very fast fire after 452s) 
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To= 293 K 
=> 1/Av*2 = (1/21 2) + (1/322) (293 I 333.7) 
=> 11 Av *2 = 3 .13 x 10"3 
=> Av*= 17.9m2 
By providing an additional 14m2 inlet area, the effective outlet area= 19.3 m2, 
and therefore maintains the design 3. 0 m smoke layer depth. This additional 
inlet area can be included as fresh air vents above the main doors. 
9. Control of Venting System 
1) Vents on motorised dampers; activated by infra-red and/or ultra-
violet flame detectors linked to alarm panel. 
2) Two main doors would open automatically on receipt of a fire 
signal via the alarm panel. 
3) The natural vents above the doors would be held open. 
10. Pressure Effects : 
[8.25] PR = (PB - Pw- Pr) PB = buoyancy pressure 
Pw = wind pressure 
P1 = inlet (expansion) pressure 
[8.24] PB = gPo LlTs-a d / (Ta + 8) 
= (9.81 X 1.2 X 47.3 X 3.0) I (333.7) 
= 5.0 Pa 
[8.23] Pw = Cp Po (Vw)2 I 2 
= ( -0.8 X 1.2 X 102) I 2 
= -48 Pa 
Vw = 10 m/s (assume) 
Cp = -0.8 (flat roof) 
Pr = (assumed) negligible due to low rate of rise of 
compartment temperature . 
.. PR = 5.0- (-48)- OPa 
=53 Pa 
. ·. resultant pressure is positive and the smoke will discharge from the 
warehouse. This result is largely due to the suction pressure provided by the 
flat roof If vents were on the windward side of the building this would result 
in a negative exhaust pressure and cause the natural ventilation system to be 
ineffective. 
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A possible roof vent layout would therefore be: 
Natural Smoke Ventilators @ 3.5 sq m ea. 
~ (Total area= 21 sq m) 
~ ~ ~ 
-- ---- -- - - ---- - - - ---- ~- - ----- - -- --- - - ----- - ----- - -- --- ------ ---- ----
E 
0 
r-1 -
.... 
25m 25m 25m 
-- ---- ----------------· -~· ------------ -·~ -- ------------- -·~· ~~- ---------------- ----
Fig. 8.5 :Proposed Smoke Ventilator Layout 
11. Mechanical Extraction 
1. Number ofExtraction Outlets 
Merit= critical flow rate through one outlet to prevent 'plugholing' 
[8.20] Merit = f3 (g d5 Ta b.Ts-a I T/)112 (f3 = 1.8) 
= 1.8 (9.81 X 3.05 X 293 X 47.3 I 333.72) 112 
= 31.0 kg/s 
[8.21] N ~ M I Merit N =Number of extract outlets 
N ~ 91.3 I 31.0 
~ N ~ 3 outlets 
2. Volume Extract Rate: based on a smoke layer constantly maintained 
at 3.0 m, a mass flow of 91.3 kg/s, and a smoke layer temperature of 
333.7 K, the volume flow rate for the smoke is: 
[8.11] Pr = (1.22 x 290) I 333.7 
= 1.06 kg/m3 
~ VF = 91.3 kg/s I 1.06 m31s 
= 86.1 m31s 
A spreadsheet analysis can also be used to equate the effect of a fan operating at a 
constant extraction rate during the growth stages of a fire. 
Time(s) 
0 
30 
60· 
90 
120 
150 
180 
210 
240 
270 
300 
330 
360 
390 
420 
450 
480 
510 
540 
570 
600 
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EXAMPLE WAREHOUSE FIRE: MECHANICAL EXTRACTION 
HeatOJtput Smoke Clearance O.itical Heat M1SsFimv Temperatw·e Cumulative Cwnulative N>wSmoke Con-ected 
(M.W) 1-kight(m) Oitput (M.W) Rate(kgis) of Smoke L1yer Mass Smoke M1SsFan Clearance Smoke 
[unvented] [Eqn4.8] [Eqns4.9 above Ambient Flmv (totme) @65 cwnecs 1-kight (m) Clearance 
[Eqn4.2] &4.10] [E<~t4.5] (totme) Hlight(m) 
0.00 8.00 41.63 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.00 8.00 
0.16 8.00 41.63 12.6 1.6 0.4 0.0 7.74 7.74 
0.64 7.74 38.33 19.7 3.8 1.0 0.0 7.33 7.33 
1.44 7.33 33.44 24.8 6.3 1.7 2.3 8.00 8.00 
2.56 8.00 41.63 35.8 8.3 2.8 4.6 8.00 8.00 
4.00 8.00 41.63 43.4 10.7 4.1 6.9 8.00 8.00 
5.76 8.00 41.63 51.4 13.1 5.6 9.2 8.00 8.00 
7.84 8.00 41.63 59.6 15.5 7.4 11.5 8.00 8.00 
10.24 8.00 41.63 68.2 17.9 9.5 13.7 8.00 8.00 
12.00 8.00 41.63 77.3 20.2 11.8 15.9 8.00 8.00 
16.00 8.00 41.63 86.8 22.6 14.4 18.2 8.00 8.00 
19.36 8.00 41.63 00.7 24.9 17.3 20.3 8.00 8.00 
23.04 8.00 41.63 107.2 27.2 20.5 22.5 8.00 8.00 
27.04 8.00 41.63 118.1 29.5 24.1 24.7 8.00 8.00 
31.36 8.00 41.63 129.5 31.7 27.9 26.8 7.16 7.16 
36.00 7.16 31.66 129.7 35.0 31.8 29.0 5.80 5.80 
36.40 5.80 18.64 105.8 38.0 35.0 31.1 4.00 4.96 
36.40 4.96 12.58 90.4 40.2 37.7 33.2 4.45 4.45 
36.40 4.45 9.63 81.2 41.8 40.2 35.2 4.16 4.16 
36.40 4.16 8.12 75.9 42.8 42.4 37.3 3.99 3.99 
36.40 3.99 7.32 72.8 43.5 44.6 39.4 3.90 3.90 
This spreadsheet involves correcting the smoke layer heights to account for the 
smoke extracted. The resulting fan capacity of 65 m3 Is is determined by looking at 
the cumulative extract smoke at 450 seconds and ensuring that there is at least a 
smoke clearance height of 3.0 m. After 450 seconds it is assumed that the single 
rack reaches its maximum heat output and the fire spreads to neighbouring racks 
and is uncontrollable. This allows only 7. 5 minutes for complete evacuation and any 
internal fire fighting. 
In conclusion, it is considered that for this example the location of natural roof 
ventilators is more economic than mechanical ventilation. The effect of roof 
skylights was not considered due to the low upper layer temperatures at this stage 
of the fire growth. 
8.6 Smoke Curtains 
Smoke curtains are sometimes employed to limit horizontal travel of smoke, and to 
limit excessive cooling of the smoke layer. Cooling can lead to reduced efficiency 
of the venting system and mixing of the smoke between the upper and lower layers. 
If designed in conjunction with a smoke ventilation system, the fires can 
theoretically be controlled to one zone of the compartment. Smoke curtains can be 
permanently in place or can be dropped upon signal from the fire detection system. 
Also, smoke curtains of different depths can be installed to direct the smoke 
overflow away from critical areas [Patterson, 1986]. 
The recommended maximum distance between screens is eight times the ceiling 
height, and a minimum distance of twice the ceiling height (ceiling height is 
measured to the center ofthe vent). The maximum recommended area is 2000 m2 
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for storage buildings [Hinkley, 1992]. The trummum depth for flat ceiling 
compartments is recommended at (h/5), with the curtains terminating 500 mm 
below the design smoke layer base [Smoke Ventilation Association, 1990]. Smoke 
curtains should be constructed from substantial, non-combustible materials that will 
resist the passage of smoke. 
B. 7 Interaction of Roof Ventilation and Sprinkler Systems 
The interaction between smoke ventilation and sprinkler systems has been a matter 
of some contention. There has been a concern that smoke venting delays sprinkler 
operation, and therefore allows a fire to spread unnecessarily. The opposing 
viewpoint is that sprinkler operation reduces smoke temperatures and buoyancy, 
and can undermine the effectiveness of the venting system [Hansell, 1993]. 
Smoke venting has distinct advantages in lowering compartment temperatures, and 
reducing the effects of smoke obscurity and damage. If expected to operate in 
conjunction with a sprinkler system, consideration needs to be given to the likely 
reduction in buoyancy, and a recommended increase in extraction volumes. Also, 
there needs to be adequate protection of any fusible links on roof vents from 
possible sprinkler spraying. 
8.7.1 Cooling Effect of Sprinlders and Vents 
Heselden [ 1984] provided a relationship that assesses the cooling effect of the 
smoke layer due to convection, radiation, sprinklers and venting: 
t1 T = t1 T (2M Cp - Me A Cp - AU - 880 y Mw) 
v-a s-a (2M Cp - Me A Cp + AU) (K) [8.27] 
L1Tv-a = temperature above ambient ofvented smoke 
t1 Ts-a = temperature above ambient of smoke entering 
upper layer 
M = mass flow rate of smoke into layer (kg/s) 
Cp = specific heat of air at 8 + To [J/kg K] 
Me = mass extraction rate of venting, per unit area of 
ceiling (kg/m2s) 
A = horizontal area of ceiling being considered (m2) 
U = heat transfer coefficient of roofing material (W/m2K) 
y = smoke layer depth (m) 
Mw = total downfall of water over the ceiling area being 
considered (kg/s) 
This can be used to determine the effect sprinkler and venting action has on a 
design fire, especially in terms of fire spread and possible flashover. The equation is 
based on standard spacings for sprinklers at roof level, assuming a square area of 
operation (instead of radial) and uniform heat transfer. 
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8. 7.2 Control of Roof Vents in Sprinldered Environments 
It is generally recommended that sprinklers should operate before roof vents 
[Heselden, 1984]. This ensures maximum benefit is made of the sprinkler operation, 
rather than delay operation through lowered temperatures. 
This can be easily achieved through careful selection of operating temperatures and 
use of automatic controls. If fusible links are the means of operation of natural 
vents, then the release temperature should be slightly above the sprinkler head 
temperature rating. The preferred control mechanism is for a sprinkler flow switch 
to provide a signal that causes extract fans or vent shutter motors (throughout the 
zone) to switch to the 'operating' position. A 'fail-safe' condition should also be 
provided that ensures the vents open on a mechanical or electrical malfunction. 
Given that the main benefit of a smoke ventilation system in this circumstance is to 
aid fire fighting operations (due to the sprinklers controlling the effects of the fire), 
it is important to provide manual over-ride control of motorised equipment at the 
Fire Service panel. 
Tests undertaken by the Factory Mutual Research Corporation in 1974 [Heselden, 
1984], showed that operating vents in conjunction with sprinlders increased water 
demand and fuel consumption, but improved visibility conditions. This has been 
substantiated by Fire Service incident records reviewed by Heselden [1984]. No 
cases were reported where venting appeared to have an adverse effect on the fire. 
A typical case example was a fire in a sprinklered foam-rubber factory in Port 
Elizabeth, South Africa, on 22 September 1973. The roof vents greatly assisted the 
firemen in locating and controlling the fire. 
8. 7.3 Are Roof Vents Necessary in Sprinldered Environments? 
The final question is how essential are smoke vents if the sprinlder system is 
expected to control and ultimately extinguish the fire? High rack storage facilities 
that are protected by in-rack sprinklers, are considered to have adequate protection 
without roof vents. 
Without roof vents however, there is expected to be significant smoke damage. The 
resultant smoke will lose buoyancy due to the sprinkler action, and is normally 
expected to envelop the compartment area. Roof vents provide a means of 
releasing generated smoke that has risen to the underside of the roof Translucent 
skylight panels can not be relied upon to act as natural smoke ventilators. The 
action of the sprinklers ensure that the upper layer smoke temperatures never reach 
the expected melting temperature of around 300 - 350 °C. 
It is recommended that roof venting is included in a sprinklered industrial building 
because of the following benefits: 
• minimise smoke damage. 
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• aid fire service operations. 
• limit the number of sprinklers operating. 
• allow purging of smoke once the fire is under control. 
8.7.4 Are Sprinlders Necessary in a Vented Environment? 
Sprinlders are recognised as being the only effective way in controlling a warehouse 
fire [Davis & Moore, 1991; Hansell, 1993]. Sprinlders combine the advantages of 
both a detection and suppression system. Detection systems, such as flame 
detectors or a VESDA system, could be installed to provide an early fire warning, 
but the detected fire can only be controlled if there is rapid and effective human 
intervention and this is not usually possible. The potential conflict of roof vents 
operating and delaying the activation of sprinlders can be avoided with careful 
design, as discussed in Section 8.7.2 .. 
8.8 · Conclusions 
1. Roof vents provide smoke control within a compartment, and therefore assist 
with escape systems, fire fighter operations, and limitation of damage during 
the initial stages of a fire. 
2. Roof vents can be provided by natural vents or mechanical extraction. Both 
techniques rely on the buoyancy pressure of the fire to drive the smoke 
outside. 
3. A roof venting system should form part of a fire design strategy. It is not a 
substitute for sprinlders or other extinguishing systems. 
4. Sprinlders operating without roof vents are expected to control the fire, but 
cause greater smoke and water damage. 
5. Sprinlders and roof vents should be integrated where possible. Sprinlders are 
recommended to operate first, with roof vents minimising smoke damage and 
assisting Fire Service operations. 
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9.0 STRUCTURAL PERFORMANCE 
The primary objectives in fire safety design is to ensure that occupants can 
evacuate safely from a burning building and to control the spread of fire. The NZ 
Building Code explains the need for controlling fire spread in clause C3.2 [BIA, 
1992]: 
Buildings shall be provided with safeguards against fire spread so that: 
a) Occupants have time to escape to a safe place without being 
overcome by the effects of the fire, 
b) Firefighters may undertake rescue operations and protect property, 
c) Adjacent household units and other property are protected from 
damage, and 
d) Significant quantities of hazardous substances are not released to 
the environment during fire. 
The Fire Service are considered to play an important role in meeting this criteria, 
as discussed in Sections 10 and 11. The likelihood of fire spread is also strongly 
influenced by active fire protection systems and fire rated· building systems. For 
limiting fire spread to adjacent properties, boundary walls become the most 
important structural feature, where these in turn are dependant on the primary 
support structures. 
Industrial Buildings 
Most single storey industrial buildings consist of a concrete floor slab with roof 
and walls supported by steel portal frames. The roof is usually thin corrugated steel 
sheeting supported on purlins with 5% to 15% of the roof area in translucent 
·plastic skylights. Most older buildings have timber purlins whereas new buildings 
are expected to have cold-rolled steel purlins. Exterior boundary walls are often 
precast tilt-up reinforced concrete panels, otherwise reinforced concrete masonry. 
Walls remote from boundaries are usually thin corrugated steel sheeting supported 
on timber or steel girts. 
Walls near boundaries are required to have fire resistance, including lateral stability 
in the after-fire condition when the roof has collapsed. For this reason, it is 
common to encase all or part of the steel portal frame column leg with concrete, or 
to use a reinforced concrete column for the lower part of the portal fi·ame leg. 
There are usually very few interior walls, where these are expected to be light 
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partitions with sheet lining on light timber framing, unless fire resisting interior 
walls are provided for compartmentation. 
Objective 
The objective of this section is to recommend a suitable technique for designing 
external boundary walls, with due regard to the 'S' rating system, suitable primary 
support design, and the preferred failure mechanism. This section also endeavours 
to establish a limit on the maximum fire rating necessary for a boundary wall. 
9.1 Prescriptive Solutions 
9.1.1 Code Summary 
Comparative prescriptive requirements within other countries' building codes is 
made by O'Meagher et al [1991], as shown in Table 9.1: 
Overseas Fire Rating Requirements 
Codes Steel Column External Walls Steel Roof 
(if present) 
BCA No FRL requirements 90 minutes FRL required No FRL requirements 
BOCA 3 hr fire-rating required 3 hr fire-rating required No fire-rating requirement 
UBC 1 hr fire-rating required 1 hr fire-rating required No fire-rating requirement 
NBCC 2 hr fire-rating required 2 hr fire-rating required No fire-rating requirement 
SBC No fire-rating requirement 2-3 hr fire rating required No fire-rating requirement 
BBR Yl-2 hr fire rating required Yl-2 hr fire rating required No fire-rating requirement 
depending on area depending on area 
SBR No fire-rating requirement Nominal fire rating required No fire-rating requirement 
Table 9.1 : Code Requirements - Single-storey Buildings Located Close to Site Boundary 
[O'Meagher et al, 1991] 
Abbreviations used in the table: 
BCA - Building Code of Australia, Australia Uniform Building Regulations Co-
ordinating Council, 1990 
BOCA - Building Officials Conference of America, National Building Code, 
Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc., Country 
Club Hills, Illinois, USA. 
UBC - Uniform Building Code, International Conference of Building Officials, 
Whittier, California, USA, 1988. 
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NBCC - National Building Code of Canada, Associate Committee on the National 
Research Council of Canada, Ottawa, Canada, 1985. 
SBC -Swedish Building Code, SBN 1980. 
BBR - British Building Regulations, 1985, Approved Document B. 
SBR -Swiss Building Regulations. 
The maximum fire rating required for external walls and steel supporting columns 
from this Table for any Code is 3 hours only. 
9.1.2 British Regulations 
Expanding on one code: the British Building Regulations, Approved Document B, 
shows that for single storey industrial buildings the minimum required fire 
resistance rating is dependant on building height and type of use. This document 
also includes minimum separation distances beyond which fire ratings do not have 
to be applied. 
Purpose Group Minimum Period of Fire Resistance (Min) 
Use Sprinklered? BHnot> 5m BHnot> 20m BHnot> 30m BH> 30m 
Industrial no 60 90 120 not permitted 
" 
............. .Y..~~ ............. 60 60 90 120 ........................... 
······································ ······································· ········································ 
.................................... 
Storage no 60 90 120 not permitted 
" yes 60 60 90 120 
Note: BH = Bwldmg He1ght 
Table 9.2: Minimum Periods of Fire Resistance [British Building Regulations, Approved 
Document B] 
For example, an 8 m high single storey industrial building without sprinlder 
protection requires a minimum 90 minute boundary fire resistance rating. This is 
regardless of fire load or ventilation characteristics. 
9.1.3 NZ Building Code 
The NZ Building Code Acceptable Solutions include a table for determining the 
fire rating for a building's external walls based on fire loading and ventilation 
characteristics. The table presents an equivalent fire severity (te,) that is then 
modified by a factor of 0. 5 or 1. 0 depending on whether there is sprinkler 
protection or no sprinlder protection (respectively). The following table is an 
abbreviated form, and includes an example to highlight the determination process. 
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FLED = 400 MJ/m2 FLED = 800 MJ/m2 FLED = 1200 MJ/m2 
Av!Ar At/Ar At/Ar At/Ar 
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.20 
0.05 or less 65 36 30 130 72 60 195 108 
0.10 45 27 24 89 55 49 134 82 
0.15 32 23 22 64 47 44 91 70 
0.20 25 21 21 50 43 42 76 64 
0.25 or 22 21 21 44 41 41 66 62 
greater 
Table 9.3 : Values oft, for Calculating'S' Values [BIA, 1991]- (Av =Area of vertical 
openings; Ar= Area of floor; Ah =Area ofhorizontal openings; FLED= Fire 
Load Energy Density). 
Example: An industrial building protected by sprinklers, has an assessed FLED of 
1200 MJ/m2 within a single fire compartment, plus the following area 
characteristics: 
Floor Area (Ar) = 1000 m2 
Area ofVertical Openings in external walls (Av) =50m2 
Area of Horizontal Openings in Roof(~) = 80 m2 
AviAr= 0.08 
Interpolating from Table 9.3 results in te = 120 minutes. 
'S' Rating = te x k k = 0. 5 for sprinklered firecells 
:. 'S' Rating= 120 x 0.5 = 60 minutes. 
This means that any external walls causing an exposure risk to neighbouring 
property must have a fire rating of at least 60 minutes. 
Eurocode Formula 
Table 9.3 (extracted from BIA [1991] ) has been produced using the "Eurocode 
formula" for time equivalence given by equation 5. 9: 
[5.9] 
It is important that users of Table 9.3 or equation 5.9 be aware of the derivation, 
significance and limitations: 
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73 
66 
63 
62 
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1. The equivalent fire severity te is the equivalent time of exposure to the 
standard fire that would produce the same maximum temperature in a 
protected structural steel member given a complete burnout of the firecell. 
The method was developed for protected steel members, but it is 
considered reasonable for materials other than steel [Buchanan, 1994]. 
The value of te is therefore an equivalent time for comparing real fires 
with the standard fire. It is not an estimate of fire duration. 
2. Equation 5.9 is based on a quoted and widely used formula developed 
twenty years ago by Margaret Law [CIB, 1986]. However, the ventilation 
factor 'wr' is not the same as the original, as it has been modified to allow 
for ceiling height and horizontal openings. Their derivation has never been 
published, and it is believed to be an empirical estimation from a number 
of tests. 
3. The time equivalent formula was developed from tests on small rooms. 
Recent tests on a compartment 6 m wide by 20 m long by 3 m high show 
that it is not conservative for large compartments [Kirby et al]. No 
validation is known of in compartments with a ceiling height greater than 
3m. 
4. The time equivalent formula applies to compartments where the roof and 
walls remain intact (other than ventilation openings) for a complete 
burnout. The formula cannot be used for buildings when the roof 
collapses during the fire. 
From this information it can be seen that the time equivalent formula (equation 5.9 
or Table 9.3) is totally inappropriate for single storey industrial buildings. 
However, in view of the lack of better design tools, the equivalent time formula is 
probably a conservative estimate of required fire resistance. 
Benefits of Sprink/ering 
The concession for sprinklers of halving the required fire resistance rating is 
considered conservative. Sprinklers are expected to at least control the fire to the 
growth area at the time of activation. This is achieved by a mixture of cooling, 
oxygen depletion, and prewetting of adjacent fuels. In a sprinkler controlled fire 
the compartment temperature is not expected to exceed 3 00 °C, given that most 
sprinkler heads are rated at temperatures ranging from 63 oc to 93 °C, and 
allowing for an activation time delay. 
Also within New Zealand, sprinkler systems are surveyed biannually to ensure that 
are operationally sound, and that the protected risk remains within the design 
limits. For these reasons it is considered that a fire resistance rating of 60 minutes 
for boundary walls would be sufficient. 
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9.1.4 Maximum Fire Resistance Rating 
Traditionally prescriptive codes have not required a maximum fire rating for a 
compartment separation in excess of 4 hours. The NZ building code used before 
the NZ Building Act 1991, was NZS 1900 Chapter 5 [SANZ, 1984].This 
document required 4 hour fire resistance rating for high risk occupancies where the 
structure was less than 4.5 m from the boundary. As seen from Table 9.1, major 
overseas codes do not require greater than 3 hour fire rating, regardless of fire 
loading or severity. 
It is considered that an allowance should be made for Fire Service intervention in 
establishing fire resistance ratings. As discussed further in Section 11 the primary 
objective for the Fire Service once all occupants have been accounted for, is to 
ensure that there is no fire spread to neighbouring property. The quantity of water 
required to achieve this is considerably less than the quantity necessary for full 
· suppression, and an assessment can be made of the effect of the Fire Service once 
factors such as available water supplies and notification times are known. 
9.1.5 Specific Fire Engineering Design 
The NZBC Acceptable Solutions state that for firecells containing combustible 
material with a FLED exceeding 1500 MJ/m2 or burning rates indicating a very fast 
growth rate [refer NFPA, 1991], then specific fire engineering design (SPED) is 
required to determine the appropriate fire rating. 
The basis of specific fire engineering design is scenario analysis, where a large 
number of possible fire scenarios must be investigated (Buchanan, 1994). Such 
design must be carried out (and subsequently reviewed) by suitably qualified 
professional fire engineers. Numerical calculations are available for individual 
components of the process, but the final assessment of safety is by opinion, not 
calculation, because the performance requirements of the code are not quantified. 
This results in a number of different design strategies and solutions, without a 
quantifiable level of safety. 
9.2 Fire Behaviour 
The fire development process is discussed in Section 5. 0. This process is simplistic 
in the following assumptions: 
1. The fire grows constantly until restricted by available ventilation. 
u. Fire spread results in all exposed fuel surfaces burning simultaneously. 
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111. The rate of burning does not diminish during the course of the fire. 
This type of outcome is acceptable for small compartments, but for large 
compartments such as within warehouses, fires often do not develop and spread 
unless there is a suitable mechanism for fire spread, and substantial ventilation is 
available [Thomas and Bennetts, 1992]. Flashover is not expected to occur until a 
substantial local fire has developed possibly resulting in parts of the structural 
frame being exposed to considerable heat. Also the presence of large fuel loads can 
result in charred fuel shielding the fuel below, and slowing down the burning rate. 
If the roof collapses, the fire is no longer ventilation controlled, and the burning 
rate depends on the surface area of fuel available for combustion. Construction 
· materials have some influence on the level of roof collapse, as steel purlins may 
allow the steel roof sheeting to remain more intact, as opposed to timber purlins 
which burn away. Also the failure may be localised depending on the layout of fuel 
and compartment temperature profiles. 
To estimate the time of roof collapse it is necessary to use a fire growth model in 
conjunction with a heat transfer model such as TASEF [Sterner and Wickstrom, 
1990]. The time at which critical temperatures in the steel members are exceeded 
can be determined and thereby implying roof collapse. This process assumes that 
fire fighting will not have any effect on fire development so allowance can be made 
for Fire Service intervention if appropriate. 
After roof collapse, estimation of temperatures adjacent to boundary walls 
becomes difficult to determine. Drysdale [1985] indicates that flame temperatures 
can be expected to range from 950 oc to 1200 °C, depending on the fuel being 
burnt. The lower figure is considered more relevant due to combustion 
inefficiencies. 
All of these factors contribute to making determination of the appropriate fire 
· resistance rating very difficult. The techniques currently used are considered 
conservative, mainly because they ignore the effect of Fire Service intervention, 
and do not account for the diminished effect of the fire on structural systems after 
roof collapse (ie. minimal convective heat transfer). 
It is considered that a maximum fire rating should be established, and a 4 hour fire 
rating is considered a suitable value based on buildings containing goods exceeding 
a fire load energy density of 1500 MJ/m2 and not containing active fire protection. 
This is with reference to the maximum values used in other Codes and the 
expected Fire Service response, as well as the anticipated reduction in fire severity 
once the building roof collapses and the fire is burning in the open air. This value 
should only be reduced if fire engineering design proves that either the design fire, 
separation distance or building design result in a lesser maximum exposure period 
or risk. 
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The alternative (and current) approach of estimating the required fire resistance by 
attempting to equate real fires to standard test fires, is discussed in the following 
sections. This is followed by structural design recommendations to lower the risk 
of fire spread if there is a failure condition. 
9.3 Fire Resistance 
9.3.1 Standard Fire Test 
Fire resistance is the ability of an element of building construction to perform its 
function as a barrier or structural component during the course of a fire. As 
discussed by Buchanan [1994], the fire resistance rating (tr) may be determined 
either by experimentation (ie. to ISO 834) or calculation. Calculation techniques 
are provided in the Fire Engineering Design Guide [Buchanan, 1994] for 
determining whether structural members (ie. steel, concrete, or timber) can 
withstand the design fire loading for the estimated fire severity period. These 
calculations also consider the effects of passive fire protection systems applied 
I • 
over the structural members (1e. such as concrete encasement over steel members). 
Fire resistance rating for a construction system is usually determined by testing a 
full scale sample, possibly under load, to failure as it is exposed to a 'standard fire' 
as defined by the temperature-time variation of a fire in a furnace. The ISO 834 
standard test fire as described below is a common example of a 'standard fire'; 
noting that temperatures are usually held around the 1000 oc level. 
T = 345 logw(8t + 1) +To [9.1] 
t =time (min.) 
To = initial temperature COC) 
9.3.2 Methods of Calculating Required Structural Fire Resistance 
Integrity and Insulation 
The validity of this 'standard fire' test method with respect to current knowledge 
of real fires needs to be questioned. Ventilation and the nature, distribution and 
quantity of fuel all have a significant effect on duration and severity. The 
performance of a structural member or barrier in a 'non-standard' fire can be 
approximated by equivalent fire severities for predicted fire behaviour curves. 
Ingberg hypothesised that if the areas under the time-temperature curves for the 
standard fire and a real fire are equal, then the severities are equal [Drysdale, 
1985]. Summarising the methods available for determining fire severity: 
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1. Equivalence to Standard Fire 
If the actual fire can be considered equivalent to a certain duration of 
exposure to the standard fire (by means of a time equivalent formula -
equation 5. 9 for example), then that equivalent fire severity can be 
compared directly with a fire resistance rating from a standard fire test. 
2. Duration ofBurning 
The total duration of burning can be calculated in the ventilation and fuel 
controlled stages of the fire. This can be compared with a fire resistance 
rating from a standard test. 
3. Real Fire Calculation 
The alternative is to use the time temperature curve for the expected real 
fire directly without reference to the standard fire. 
If the time temperature curve is known, any element of structure can be 
exposed to that fire in a calculation to estimate whether it has sufficient 
fire resistance to carry the imposed loads and contain the fire. 
Of the three methods, method 1 is most suitable for a fire in compartments with no 
roof collapse (i.e. the time equivalent formula is valid) and for materials which 
have extensive fire resistance test data (i.e. light timber frame walls). 
Method 2 is more suitable for unenclosed fires but is very conservative as the 
intensity of the fire is not expected to match the standard test profile for time 
versus temperature. 
Method 3 is appropriate for materials where internal temperatures can be 
calculated without too much difficulty (ie. protected steel or concrete members) 
and for enclosed fires. This method is more difficult to calculate but potentially 
more exact. 
Stability 
Using NZS 4203:1992, the stability requirement can be met by providing resistance 
to a notional face load of0.5 k:Pa in the after-fire condition, with no calculations of 
lateral loading during the fire. This notional load is intended to give the wall 
resistance to being pulled down by collapsing portal frames during the fire, and 
some resistance to wind loads during or after the fire. It is common to encase all or 
part of the steel portal frame column with concrete, or to use a reinforced concrete 
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column for the lower part of the portal frame leg, but it is not possible to do a 
calculation for structural behaviour of a cantilever wall during a fire without 
information on lateral loads, and no loads are given in NZS 4203 , or elsewhere. 
9.4 Structural Behaviour 
The key question posed by O'Meagher et al [1990] was does it matter if there is 
failure of primary structural elements within single storey industrial buildings 
during a fire? If the roof collapses due to failure of the rafters, then the fire 
becomes an open air fire and the exposure temperatures on the boundary walls 
reduce significantly. They are only subjected to radiation from the fire, when 
previously they were affected by both radiation and convection within the 
compartment. 
If the supporting elements for the boundary walls then fail, will this cause an 
. exposure problem for neighbouring properties? Again O'Meagher et al. argue that 
it does not as long as the boundary (concrete) walls are tied together and fall 
inwards. This action will still maintain an adequate separation distance by virtue of 
the resulting horizontal projection being equal to the wall height (usually at least 5 
m). As discussed in Section 5.0 if the neighbouring property is in an industrial zone 
and has a combustible facing wall, it will be at least 3-4 m away from the title 
boundary, giving a total separation of at least 8-9 m. 
Figure 9.1 : Collapse of a Portal Frame Building with Tied Concrete Wall Panels 
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The Australian research concluded that for portal frames with typical restraint at 
the base of the column and assumed heating situations, the inwards collapse mode 
occurs irrespective of whether: 
1. the steel column is fire protected or not, 
2. the frame provides lateral support to a wall or not, 
3. the steel frame is restrained against in-plane lateral movement by the 
cooler parts of the roof or not, and 
4. the entire frame is heated. 
This mechanism is shown in figure 9.1 and figure 9.2. 
Plastic Hinge 
Locations Initial Position 
I 
--... 
Intermediate Position 
Figure 9.2 : Section A-A; Collapse Mode of a Steel Portal Frame [Bennetts, 1990] 
Potter (1994) supports this concept, but emphasises the importance of designing 
the connections between panels and structure to ensure they do not fail in the early 
stages of a fire. As the wall panels are heated they tend to move outwards. The 
pulling of the panels inwards will only occur once the heat load is high enough and 
sustained for a sufficient period. This allows the frame to soften and result in the 
plastic hinge mechanism shown in figure 9.2. 
9.4.1 Building Code of Australia 
The Building Code of Australia included in its Amendment No. 7 issue, a revised 
clause (Cl.ll) titled 'Performance of External Walls in Fire' [AUBRCC, 
1995].The scope for this clause reads: 
'This specification contains measures to minimise in the event of a fire the 
likelihood of external walls covered by Clause 2 collapsing outwards as 
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complete panels and the likelihood of panels separating from supporting 
members' 
It is recommended that this approach is adopted in the design of external boundary 
walls, both for controlling the spread of fire and for the safety of fire fighting 
operations. The listed general requirements are: 
a) Cast-in inserts and fixings must be anchored into the panel with welded 
bars or be fixed to the panel reinforcement. This is to ensure there is 
some attachment for the fixing elements after the concrete shear cone has 
failed. 
b) Cast-in inserts for top connections and fixings acting together must be 
able to resist an ultimate load of two times the larger of the forces 
required to develop-
• the ultimate bending moment capacity of the panel at its base; or 
• the overturning moment at the base of the panel arising from an 
outwards lateral displacement at the top of the panel equal to one 
tenth of the panel height. 
This requirement details the tn1mmum strength capacity for top 
inserts/fixings so that the collapsing framework/roof structure will pull the 
panel inwards. 
c) Top connections of the panel exposed to fire, such as clips and drilled-in 
inserts, acting together must be able to resist an ultimate load of six 
times the larger of the forces required to develop the moment specified in 
(b). It is believed that drilled-in inserts and clips will suffer a greater 
strength loss due to exposure to fire than will cast-in inserts. 
d) Lateral supporting members and their connections must be designed to 
resist the connection forces specified in (b) and (c) and in the case of an 
eaves tie member the force in the member must be determined assuming 
that it deforms in a manner compatible with the lateral displacement of 
the wall panels, and that it acts in tension only. Lateral supporting 
members are usually roof beams or trusses. 
e) External wall panels that span vertically must have at least two upper 
connections per panel to the supporting member, except that where a 
number of panels are designed to act as one unit, (eg. tongue and groove 
hollow-core panels), only two upper connections are required for each 
unit. The emphasis is on involving all of the panels acting together as one 
unit. 
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f) External ·wall panels that span horizontally between columns must have 
at least two connections at each column. 
The New Zealand solution of encasing the portal columns (to a mid-height) with 
concrete assists in this protection of panel connections, but it is considered that the 
protection should also apply to tie members and high level connections points. 
9.5 Conclusions 
1. To reduce the probability of fire spread to neighbouring property from fire in 
unsprinklered buildings with FLED> 1500 MJ/m2, walls close to boundaries 
should be provided with a fire resistance rating of 4 hours. 
2. This rating can be reduced if it is proven that either the design fire, separation 
distance or building design will result in a reduced exposure risk. 
3. If the fire resistance rating provided is less than the severity of the expected 
fire, the assistance of the Fire Service will be required to prevent fire spread to 
neighbouring property. 
4. The use of equivalent time formulae are considered conservative due to no 
allowance for reduced fire severity for open air fires and the effect of Fire 
Service response. 
5. The critical elements in the boundary wall design are the connections between 
the panels and support structure, and between adjacent panels. These need to 
be designed to ensure that the walls function as one unit, and do not collapse 
outwards during a fire. 
124 
10.0 FIRE SERVICE INTERVENTION 
Intervention by the Fire Service is an important consideration in the fire design 
of single storey industrial buildings. The New Zealand Fire Service have a clear 
legislative requirement to make provision in eve1y Fire District for the 
prevention of fire, the suppression and extinction of fires, and the safety of 
persons and property endangered by fire [Fire Service Act 1975, s17o(a)]. 
The following section aims to highlight Fire Service responsibilities and 
capabilities. Reference is made to their dependence on conditional events (ie. 
access to adequate water supplies) to complete a successful fire fighting 
procedure. 
10.1 Legislative Requirements 
The following Acts place a dependence on the Fire Service either directly or 
through being part of the design process. Their role is referenced with 
particular regard to the fire protection of industrial buildings and in preventing 
the spread of fire: 
10.1.1 Building Act 1991 
The NZ Building Act, through its Regulations, states as its objective for 
meeting Spread ofFire requirements [Clause C3.1]to: 
a) Safeguard people from injwy or illness when evacuating a building 
during fire. 
b) Provide protection to Fire Service personnel during fire fighting 
operations. 
c) Protect adjacent household units and other property from the effects 
of fire. 
d) Safeguard the environment from adverse effects of fire. 
The Acceptable Solutions provide passive and active fire protection details to 
achieve these objectives for buildings that do not exceed a Fire Load Energy 
Density of 1500 MJ/m2. Buildings that exceed this value are often industrial 
buildings. They require specific fire engineering design methods to meet the fire 
safety objectives. The involvement of the Fire Service can form part of an 
alternate design method, as outlined in Section 11. 
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10.1.2 Fire Service Act 1975 
The Fire Service have a clear legislative requirement to endeavour by all 
practicable means to extinguish and prevent the spread of the fire [Fire 
Service Act 1975, s28(2)], including the requirement to make provision in 
eve1y Fire District for the prevention of fire, the suppression and extinction of 
fires, and the safety of persons and property endangered by fire [Fire Service 
Act 1975, s17o(a)]. Specific procedures stated in the Act, include: 
1. Issuance of operational instructions to achieve these goals ( s 17N (a) ) . 
2. Publication of a Code of Practice for Fire Fighting Water Supplies 
(s17N (b)). 
3. Provision for cooperation between the Fire Service and territorial 
authorities and regional councils ( s 17 o (d) ) . 
4. Promotion of fire safety throughout New Zealand (s20) 
5. Access onto property for the purposes of pre-incident planning and 
active fire fighting (s28 & s29). 
Section 30(3) of the Act requires the Fire Service to publish a Code of Practice 
for Fire Fighting Water Supplies, and Section 30(2) requires the Fire Service to 
inspect and test hydrants and auxiliary supplies to determine sufficiency for fire 
fighting operations in accordance with the Code of Practice. This has to be 
reported to the Territorial Authority. 
The resulting Water Supply Classification Table is as follows [NZFS, 1992]. 
Risk Minimum Water Flow Max. No. ofHydrants 
Classification NZFS Response Required (lis) from which the Flow 
(Reticulated) Shall be Obtained 
Within a 270m Radius 
A High 200 8 
B Hi_gjl 200 8 
c High - Normal 100 4 
D Normal 50 3 
E Normal- Low 25 2 
Table 10.1 : Water Supply Classification Table 
The classes of fire risk for determining water supply are: 
1. Class A - The central urban areas of Auckland and Wellington presenting a 
serious risk of fire. 
2. Class B - Congested industrial and commercial areas in larger cities. 
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3. Class C- Concentrated built up areas of cities not included in A or B. 
4. Class D- Business and commercial areas not included in A, B, Cor D. 
5. Class E - Any area with a reticulated water supply not included in A, B, C, or D 
(most housing). 
It is implied that if these water supplies are made available by Territorial 
Authorities, the Fire Service should be able to effect its fire fighting obligations. 
Section 43 of the Fire Service Act provides the criteria for limitation of liability. 
Acceptable defence for alleged non-performance includes compliance with the 
standards approved by the Commission under the Act. This means that if the 
Fire Service undertake their duties in accordance with operational instructions, 
then they fulfil their obligations. 
10.1 .. 3 Local Government Act 1974 
The question of guaranteed water supply is covered under the Local 
Government Act 1974 (Section 648) [Buchanan, 1994]. The Territorial 
Authority is required to keep all pipes in which fire hydrants are fixed charged 
with water at all times, excepting unusual circumstances (as listed in the Act). 
10.2 Fire Service Performance 
10.2.1 Role of the Fire Service 
The Fire Service have a clear obligation to make provision in every Fire District 
for: 
• prevention of fire 
• suppression and extinction of fires 
• safety of persons and property endangered by fire 
There is also today an increasing demand for the Fire Service to provide a 
variety of ancillary emergency services, such as: 
• controlling and cleaning chemical spills 
• cutting and. cleaning at vehicular accidents 
• flood relief 
• height rescues 
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An associated concern with this developing role is the demand on resources, 
and the unavailability of sufficient equipment in a major fire. It is assumed that 
attendance to fires remains the highest priority, and contingencies are in place 
to overcome resource limitations. This includes calling in appliances from other 
sectors, and calling in off-duty personnel. 
Bedford [1993] states that "it is the objective of the NZ Fire Service to respond 
to eve1y incident where life or property is endangered by fire with a 
predetermined number of pumping appliances, and to arrive within the time 
set for the various classes of risk which may be present in any fire district'. 
This objective is for properties within urban areas, including small rural towns. 
Obviously a different approach is required for rural areas where an industrial 
site is located, such as Canterbury Timber Products at Sefton, Canterbury, or 
Comalco Aluminium Smelter at Tiwai Point, Southland. 
Attending Fires 
On attending an incident, the Officer-in-Charge is required to assess the state of 
the fire and call for support as required. The first priority at the fireground is 
usually to ensure all occupants have been evacuated from the building. This 
could require firefighters searching the interior of the building for unaccounted 
persons, and involve entry into hazardous areas. 
Fire fighting is usually initiated once all occupants have been cleared, or in 
support of any rescue operations. Defensive or attacking procedures will be 
initiated depending on: 
• water supplies 
• hoses, men and pumps available 
• size of fire 
• access into the building 
• exposure danger 
• spread of fire risk 
The first aim is to contain the fire so that it will not spread. The fire may be 
able to be confined to a firecell, or to the building. It is extremely unusual if it is 
allowed to spread to neighbouring buildings. When the fire is contained, then 
the opportunity to attack could occur. The safety of the crews is a critical 
factor in this decision. 
Crews are usually stood down and the fireground closed once the fire is 
completely extinguished, contents turned over and a standby period completed. 
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10.2.2 Fire Service Performance 
The performance of the Fire Service at a fire incident can be measured in terms 
of events. Listing the time variables for these events: 
t5 = t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 [10.1] 
t 1 = detection time (s) 
t2 =Fire Service notification time (s) 
t3 = travel time to the incident (s) 
t4 = access and search time ( s) 
t5 =attack commences (s) 
An example of applying this relationship is based a single storey industrial 
building on the outskirts of a city's central business district, covered by 
automatic, monitored heat detectors. The alarm occurs during the business day, 
resulting in 30 staff being evacuated. The estimated response times are: 
t1 = 1.6 mins t2 = 0.1 mins t3 = 8 mins t4 = 15 mins 
:. t5 = 24.7 mins 
Detection and Notification Times 
These times can be estimated, especially if the building has an automatic 
detection system that transmits a signal to the Fire Service. A method is given 
in section 6.5 for detection time if people are expected to act as the sensors. 
Travel Time 
The Fire Service can provide estimates for the travel time to an incident. The 
maximum time for attendance to an urban fire in New Zealand is understood to 
be 8 minutes. The following table provides an estimate of response depending 
on risk classification [Bedford, 1993]: 
Risko Initial Response Supporting Appliances 
Classification No. of Attendance No. of Attendanceb 
Appliances Times (mins) Appliances Times (nuns) 
High (1) 3 6-8 6 20 
Normal (2) 2 8 2 20 
Low (3) 1 8 2 30 
Table 10.2 :Predetermined Fire Service Response 
Notes: a: High Risk : 
Normal Risk : 
Low Risk: 
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Buildings, or groups of buildings, located in urban areas which 
because of their size, constmction, contents or processes, present 
a serious risk from fire, such as: 
• high rise or large building complexes 
• concentrated commercial, business and industrial areas 
• large petrochemical processing plants and other hazardous 
areas 
• wharf areas and associated shipping, warehouse and storage 
Buildings within urban areas that are not a high risk, such as: 
• normal commercial, business and industrial areas which do 
not constitute a serious risk from fire 
• detached and semi-detached residential property 
Risks normally associated with small towns with a population of 
less than 1500 in principally rural areas, or sparsely populated 
urban areas on the fringes of large towns and cities. 
b: The attendance time for supporting appliances is from the time of being called. 
Requirements concerning physical access onto a site are covered under the NZ 
Building Code (Clause C3/ AS 1/2.17 ), and include: 
• minimum access road load bearing capacity. 
• all weather surfaces. 
• minimum access route widths and clearances. 
• maximum distances from buildings to access roads. 
• access to Fire Service inlets, fire alarm panels and building entrances. 
Access and Search Times 
Search times should be controlled by most industrial buildings requmng a 
registered evacuation scheme, under the Fire Safety and Evacuation of 
Buildings Regulations (pursuant to s21A of the Fire Service Act). This is based 
on the assumption that most industrial buildings employ more than 10 staff 
and/or hold a dangerous goods licence. 
The access and search times include verification of a fire, confirming that all 
occupants have evacuated and are accounted for, and establishing an attack 
position. Again the Fire Service could provide typical times. A conservative 
estimate for a building less than 10,000 m2 is 15 minutes. 
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Attack of Fire 
The effectiveness of an attack is limited by the available water supply, number 
of fire fighters, and access to the seat of the fire. Section 8 discusses the 
importance of effective smoke venting in limiting heat build-up, and facilitating 
access to the fire. An automatic, monitored alarm system is recommended for 
industrial buildings, and should be zoned in larger buildings to assist in 
identifYing the fires location on the alarm panel. For single storey buildings with 
venting systems, this is can be verified through visual observation of where the 
smoke is issuing from the building. 
The inclusion of an automatic sprinkler system obviously assists fire fighting 
operations through automatic notification, control of fire size, and identification 
of fire location. This form of protection provides the only probable means of 
controlling a fire before major damage can occur (also refer Section 7.2). 
Resources 
For mounting an attack on the fire, the extent of manpower and resources 
available needs to be clarified with the Fire Service during the design stage of a 
building. As discussed in Section 11, this issue is directly related to the size of 
the design fire and availability of water, and not to expected availability ofFire 
Service equipment. The possibility of simultaneous call-outs should not become 
a consideration; the clear expectations provided by the Fire Service Act should 
apply. All Fire Service equipment should be considered fully operational, in 
accordance with the Fire Service Act. 
10.3 Risk Assessment 
The ability for the Fire Service to successfully respond to a fire relies on the 
success of the various conditional events. Reviewing the main events in terms 
of risk assessment [BRRTF, 1991]: 
1. Time and probability of detection and signal to the fire brigade by 
automatic or manual means, 
2. Time and probability of brigade arrival at the building, 
3. Time and probability of brigade set-up, and 
4. Time and probability of successful fire brigade extinguishment. 
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The probability that set-up will be successfully completed and the brigade 
accomplishes extinguishment is the product of the probabilities of the above 
events. 
Each event is influenced by the physical environment and circumstances that 
could occur at the time of a fire. Typical parameters are [Fitzgerald, 1993]: 
a) Detection mechanism- automatic or manual? 
- reliability; maintenance, quality, 
- coverage, location of ignition source. 
b) Transmission signal - automatic system: reliability, type, completeness 
-manual system: human behaviour, location and 
access to telephone, reliability of transmission. 
c) Fire Service response - alarm handling time 
- simultaneous call out 
-travel time: weather, distance, obstacles 
- site access 
d) Fire Service set-up - building access 
- search and rescue time 
- fire location 
- water availability and supply characteristics 
e) Fire fighting - manpower available 
- equipment reliability 
- access to fire 
- fire size and energy 
To account for the possible constraints on the Fire Service in the event of a 
fire, a risk assessment model can be completed. This will provide a probability 
of their successful attendance and extinguishment. 
Arrival and Set-Up Probabilities 
BBRTF [1991] provide estimated probabilities for arrival and set-up times: 
95 %Prob. 50 %Prob. 
Area (tz+t3) [s] 4[s] (tz+t3l [s] 4 fs] 
............. 9.~~Y. ................. 600 1200 300 600 
······································· ······································· ······································· ······································· Country 1200 900 600 450 
Table 10.3 :Minimum Values for Fire Service Arrival and Set-Up 
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Detection Probabilities 
Sections 6.5 and 7.5 provide methods for calculating detection times. 
Maximum probability values for successful operation of automatic detectors are 
given below: 
Probability of Successful Operation 
Component Smouldering Non Flashover Flashover 
.................. §P.!:~*-~~r. ................................... 9.:9.?. ................. ................... Q ... ?..?. ................... ................ 9:.~?. ................ . 
Thermal Detector 0 0.90 0.95 
······························································································································································································· Smoke Detector 0.65 0.75 0.75 
(single point) 
Table 10.4: Maximum Values for Probabilities for Automatic Detection 
A probability of sprinkler activation after flashover suggests that the sprinklers 
would only be good for alarm notification. They would not be expected to 
control the fire. 
For situations where there are no automatic detection systems, the probability 
that occupants will successfully respond to a fire cue and notify the fire service 
is given by the following equation [BRRTF, 1991]: 
P[D] = P[suitable cue for occupants to detect] x P[occupants respond to 
the cue] x P[fire service are successfully notified] 
or P[D] = P[Q] x P[R] x P[FS] 
The following tables summarise the assessed probabilities. Note that P[FS] is 
taken to be 0.7: 
Enclosure P[Q] 
Description Cue Type Smouldering Non-Flashover Flashover P[R] 
Room of Visual/Olfactory 0.95 1.0 N/A 0-0.6 
Origin 
Adjacent Auditory 0.0 0.3 0.4 0-0.6 
Room Olfactory 0.3 0.2 0.4 
Remote Auditory 0.0 0.05 0.2 0-0.3 
Room Olfactory 0.1 0.05 0.2 
Table 10.5 :Maximum Values for Response Probabilities for Building Occupants 
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Note that P[R] = 0 where the occupants are expected to be asleep. This is not 
an expectation within industrial buildings. 
Extinguishment 
The probability of the fire service successfully extinguishing a fire is dependant 
on the comparison between fire size versus the resources of the fire service. As 
discussed in Section 11, available water supplies and how they are applied play 
a major role in this equation. There is no reference on assessed probabilities for 
successful fire fighting action but a value of 0.95 is considered a reasonable 
estimate for the likelihood of the calculation technique being the actual 
outcome. 
Total Outcome 
The probability of a successful fire service action is therefore: 
P[Success] = P[Detect.] x P[Arrival] x P[Set-Up] x P[Ext.] 
The remaining question is what is an acceptable success probability. Kersken-
Bradley [1992] noted that tolerable failure probabilities are generally 
specified by reference to comparable design situations and solutions, which 
are generally recognised as being safe. This causes a problem in the current 
design environment, as there is no acceptable solution to make a comparison 
against. 
The best outcome is to describe the expected fire service action in degrees of 
success, such as a high, medium-high, or low probability. The important point 
to be reiterated is that this design feature forms part of an overall fire safety 
strategy for a building, and the success of fire service action needs to be taken 
in the context of the complete fire protection system. 
This includes achievement of the fire safety objectives, where successful fire 
service action may only be measured by their ability to control spread of fire to 
neighbouring properties. 
1 0.4 Conclusions 
1. The critical factors in meeting New Zealand Building Code objectives is to 
ensure occupants evacuate safely and that the fire does not spread to 
neighbouring propetty. 
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2. The Fire Service has a clear legislative requirement to 'endeavour by all 
practicable means' to extinguish and prevent the spread of fire. 
3. Effective Fire Service response relies on accessibility to adequate water 
supplies. The Fire Service Code of Practice for Fire Fighting Water 
Supplies identifies minimum supply requirements for various risk areas. 
4. The overall performance of the Fire Service is reliant on the success of 
conditional events, such as fire detection and attendance times. These 
series of events can be expressed as probabilities, and Fire Service 
performance measured as a total probable event. There is, however, no 
design standard to gauge whether the predicted response of the Fire 
Service is acceptable. 
5. Fire Service response is only one part of a fire safety strategy, and their 
expected performance needs to be considered in the context of a complete 
fire protection system. 
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11.0 FIRE FIGHTING DESIGN 
Tlus chapter aims to establish design methods that equate fire fighting capabilities 
with design fires withln industrial buildings. Key areas considered are water 
resources, the cooling capacity of water, and the control of fire spread. Radiation 
to neighbouring property, and the benefits of prewetting adjacent buildings is also 
included in this review. 
The section hlghlights the fact that in terms of property protection, the New 
Zealand Building Code only requires protection for neighbouring property. There 
is no requirement to protect owners' property from damage; although life safety 
measures can sometimes help in the restriction of internal fire spread. Section 4 
also hlghlighted the owner's obligations to linlit environmental damage in the event 
of a fire. 
11.1 Cooling Power of Water 
A number of parameters affect the quantity of water available for fire fighting: 
• risk classification for the location of the site [as defined in the Code of 
Practice for Fire Fighting Water Supplies, refer Table 10.1]. 
• number of attending appliances and firefighters 
• hose equipment used on the fire, and the volume of water per hose. 
• application efficiency. 
Bedford [ 1993] provided a table that summarised the resources expected to be 
comnlitted to a fire, according to a fire zone. These zones are based on hose 
numbers and cross referenced to an earlier analysis carried out in the Macbar Fire 
Design Code [NZFPA, 1992]. The cooling capacity is established on the basis that 
1 litre per second of water can absorb 2.605 MW of heat in converting water to 
steam, and that each hose supplies 15 1/s. 
Fire Fire Hoses Manpower WaterFlow Theoretical 
Zone Engines (No.) (No.) (1/s) Cooling Capacity 
(No.) (MW) 
1 3 4 12 60 156 
2 5 8 20 120 312 
3 8 12 32 180 468 
4 10 16 40 240 624 
5 13 20 52 300 780 
6 15 24 60 360 936 
Table 11.1 : Fire Engines and Manpower versus Cooling Capacity 
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Tables 10.2 and 11.1 can be used to assess the expected Fire Service response 
according to the associated risk. For most industrial complexes in urban 
environments, this means that 3 appliances are expected to attend to a fire call 
resulting in a water application rate of 60 Ips, and a maximum cooling capacity of 
156 MW. It should be expected that if attending appliances arrive at the scene of a 
significant fire (ie. where smoke is issuing from the building), then a second alarm 
would be raised and further appliances turned out. 
11.1.1 Water Application Efficiency 
The effectiveness of the fire fighting water on a fire is very dependant on access to 
the fire for the water stream. In a small fire there is expected to be very good 
access that will allow effective wetting of the fuel and extinguishment of the flame 
through cooling and smothering. 
For an established fire in an industrial building, access is usually difficult due to 
operations being based outside of the building. There is usually a lack of wall and 
roof openings (in relation to floor area), and the external walls are often on the site 
boundary with difficult access from the adjoining property. Skylights have begun to 
become a common feature in roof details, providing some opportunity for direct 
application of water into the fire compartment if they melt out. Water can also be 
directed towards neighbouring properties to reduce the risk of fire spread. 
The maximum theoretical cooling capacity given in Table 11.1 does not allow for 
the inefficiency of water application onto a fire. The Macbar Fire Design Code 
[NZFPA, 1992] recommends a value of32% but this assumes that the fire is 50% 
'efficient'. The resulting effective application efficiency is 64%. Peet [1993] 
determined that for a case study involving a fire on the top level of a five storey 
commercial building, the application efficiency was 40% based on a comparison of 
the (estimated) total energy released versus the total cooling energy applied. 
These application efficiency values reflect not only the cooling effect of water 
penetrating into the flaming zone, but also the cooling effect on the convective 
smoke plume and building fabric. The inefficiency occurs where water is 
misdirected or shielded from the fire zone. 
In the calculations that follow, it is recommended that a cooling efficiency of 0.50 
is used for the available water supply unless building features greatly improve the 
effective application of water. Suitable features would be a smoke ventilation 
system (refer Section 8), access from at least three sides, and low fire spread risk 
to neighbouring properties. Under these circumstances a cooling efficiency of 0.65 
could be appropriate. 
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Amending Table 11.1 to account for the cooling efficiency values gives Table 11.2: 
Fire Fire Water Theoretical Cooling Capacity Cooling Capacity 
Zone Engines Flow Cooling Capacity (MW) (MW) 
(No.) (lps) (MW) [eft'.= 0.5] [eft'. = 0.65] 
1 3 60 156 78 100 
2 5 120 312 156 200 
3 8 180 468 234 305 
4 10 240 624 312 405 
5 13 300 780 390 505 
6 15 360 936 468 610 
Table 11.2 :Cooling Capacity Based on Application Efficiency 
Note that these recommended cooling efficiency values are based on limited 
referenced information and highlight the need for more detailed research. 
11.1.2 Water Availability 
If the design methodology for suppressing the fire is continued, the final step once 
the required water volume is calculated (based on design fire size, NZFS attack 
time, and cooling efficiency), is to confirm that this water flow rate is available. 
This returns the process to the responsibilities of the Fire Service under the NZ 
Fire Service Act. 
Referring back to Table 10. 1, the Water Supply Classification Table can be 
adjusted to indicate cooling capacity available according to the Territorial 
Authority's risk classification and assuming a cooling efficiency of0.50. A designer 
should expect this minimum standard of water reticulation in the design area. If the 
actual supply is measured and found to be less, then the Territorial Authority or the 
Fire Service need to be advised. Note that occasionally the Territorial Authority 
has made a deliberate decision to not upgrade a reticulated supply, and a designer 
should not presume a minimum flow rate exists. 
Risk Minimum Water Flow Cooling Capacity 
Classification NZFS Response Required (Ips) Available (assuming 
(Reticulated) cooling eff. = 0.50)MW 
A High 200 260 
B High 200 260 
c High- Normal 100 130 
D Normal 50 65 
E Normal - Low 25 32 
Table 11.3 :Revised Water Supply Classification Table 
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If the available water supply is less than the cooling capacity required to suppress 
the fire and control fire spread to neighbouring property, then design amendments 
are required. Options are: 
1. Install a sprinkler system. 
2. Reduce the heat output by limiting the Fire Load Energy Density or 
reducing the firecell size. 
3. Increase the fire resistance rating on the external walls causing exposure 
problems. 
4. Increase the distance between the external walls causing the exposure 
problem, and the notional boundary. 
5. Provide a reserve water supply. 
11.2 Design Fire 
The design fire for a given industrial building should show a dynamic process. The 
resulting heat output will reflect the various stages of fire development (also refer 
Section 5): 
• growth 
• spread and (possible) flashover 
• steady state, including venting effects 
• decay 
The fire development should involve the complete fuel load within the 
compartment unless its spread is controlled by sprinklers or other physical means 
such as fuel separation distances. Using a computer based fire simulation model 
such as CFAST (1992), an assessment of heat release rate and compartment 
temperatures can be assessed up to the time of roof collapse. 
11.2.1 Heat Loss 
Alternatively, calculations can be applied to estimate the steady state heat release 
rate. Walton and Thomas (1993) viewed the conservation of energy for the upper 
gas layer in a compartment fire, as energy generated by the fire and added to the 
hot upper layer (QF) equalling energy lost from the hot layer through radiation and 
convection plus the energy converted out the compartment openings (QL). The 
following equations provide simplified methods for determining compartment heat 
loss based on boundary surface convection, radiation through unprotected 
openings, and convection from ventilation systems [Walton and Thomas, 1992, 
Drysdale, 1985]. Equations in section 5.0 and 8.0 can be used to establish 
compartment temperatures and smoke mass extraction rates. 
a) Wall Convection 
b) Radiation 
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(kW) [11.1] 
Aw = Area of wall (m2) 
he = Convective heat transfer coefficient 
(kW/m2K) 
Sw = Temperature difference between 
upper gas layer and upper walls (K) 
[11.2] 
As = Area of receiving surface (m2) 
8 = Emissivity (usually= 1.0) 
a = Stephan Boltzmann constant 
[56.7 X 10-12 kW/m2K] 
Tc = Temperature of fire compartment (K) 
Ta = Ambient temperature (K) 
<I> = Configuration factor; as follows 
[SANZ,1988]: 
Configuration factor for a rectangular source 
Configuration factor for a circular source 
K 
<j> = It-.-+ -D. 
c) Ventilation 
W = width of source 
H = height of source 
D = distance between source and receiver 
R = radius of source 
(kW) 
Me = Mass extraction rate (kg/s) 
Cp = Specific heat of air at [Ta+S] 
(kJ/kgK) 
[11.5] 
8 = Temperature difference between upper 
gas layer and ambient (K). 
Note that for a collapsed roof situation the mass extraction rate could equal the 
smoke mass flow rate for the fire. Refer Section 8 for effective mass flow rates 
from natural vents (ie. burnt out skylights). 
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11.3 Water Application versus Heat Output 
Heat within a fire compartment perpetuates pyrolysis and combustion of flammable 
vapour. Applied water slows tllis process through heat transfer, oxygen depletion, 
blocking of re-radiation (smothering), and prewetting of adjacent fuels. These 
mechanisms vary according to the status of the fire (ie. growth stage, or following 
roof collapse), and the method of water application. 
Equating cooling capacity with heat load becomes difficult to assess, given that a 
proportion of fire fighting water is 'nlisdirected' or shielded from the fire. This 
imbalance is reflected in the recommended cooling efficiency value of 0. 5. 
The following charts provide an example of how cooling capacity equates against 
heat output based on the typical heat release rate versus time relationship shown in 
figure 5 .1. This charts show two scenarios: 
a) sufficient cooling water is applied to avoid roof collapse (fig. 11 .1 ). 
b) insufficient cooling water is applied to avoid roof collapse, but the cooling 
lowers the effective heat release rate (fig 11.2). 
Heat Release Rate 
Fire Development Profile Without 
Suppression (ref. Fig. 5.1) 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
I 
Fire Fighting Extinguishment 
Begins llme 
Fig. 11.1 : HRR versus Time Chart Showing Fire Fighting Water Extinguishing a Typical 
Fire Before Roof Collapse. 
1-ia;;:t Rslaane R01t11 {MW) 
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Fire Development Profile Without 
Suppression (ref. Fig. 5.1) 
Roof Collapse ----------------- r 
) 
•I 
:• 
,...... Suppressed Fire ,, 
:• ,, 
:• 
Fire FlghUng Begins Tlme (s) 
Fig. 11.2 : HRR versus Time Chart Showing Fire Fighting Water Extinguishing a Typical 
Fire After Roof Collapse. 
11.3.1 Example 
A warehouse storing PVC bottles has a potential maximum HRR of 450 MW. The 
site is located in a Class B urban area, with a High Risk classification, giving an 
initial Fire Service response of 3 appliances and then 5 supporting appliances. The 
water supply capacity is 200 lps. 
The resulting effective cooling capacity of the water is: 
cooling efficiency = 0. 5 
:. max. cooling capacity available = 200 lps x 2.6 MW/lps x 0.5 
=260MW 
The Fire Service response equates to the following cooling capacity (also refer 
Table 11 .2): 
No. of Appliances WaterFlow Cooling Power (MW) 
(Ips) 0.5 Efficiency 
3 (initial) 60 78 
5 (supporting) 120 156 
8 total 180 234 
The total demand is within the supply available from the street supply. The 
maximum expected cooling power of 234 MW is less than the maximum 
expected heat release rate of 450 MW, and therefore the fire is expected to be 
suppressed but not extinguished. A typical heat release rate versus time chart is 
shown below: 
Heal Output 
(MW) 
300 
200 
100 
Roof Collapses 
Skylights M$1t 
20 1 4o 
Fire Fighting 
Begins 
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60 
Fire Development Profil~ 
Without Suppression · 
80 100 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Fig 11.3 : Suppression of Fire Using Fire Fighting Water - Worked Example 
120 llme (min.) 
Figure 11.3 has assumed a fire development profile, including the onset of roof 
collapse even though there is a reduction in the net heat output due to water 
. cooling. 
If the effective cooling capacity from fire fighting action is greater than the 
effective heat release rate, then the design fire is considered able to be 
extinguished. Alternatively if the analysis concludes that the effective cooling 
capacity is less than the design heat release rate then the fire is considered to only 
be suppressed. 
This approach is quite simplistic and does not adequately represent problems in 
completely extinguishing a major fire, but it does indicate how water can be used 
to effect extinguishment or suppression. 
The NZ Building Code, however, only requires protection for the neighbouring 
property. Less water is necessaty to achieve this objective, although it also follows 
that if extinguishment of the design fire occurs then the fire will not spread to the 
neighbouring property. 
An alternative design approach is to ensure that the Fire Service at least controls 
the spread of fire by cooling boundary walls. On this basis the building contents 
can burn until extinguishment finally occurs or the fuel burns out. 
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11.4 Prewetting Neighbouring Buildings 
The radiation risk to neighbouring buildings can be calculated using equations 
given in Section 5.5. Factors that influence the radiation risk to neighbouring 
properties include separation distance, radiation emission, and the construction of 
the receiving surface 
This last factor is very important as industrial properties are not expected to have 
non-fire rated walls unless they are at least 3-4 m away from the site boundary. As 
shown in Table 5.1 non-combustible walls require at least 50 kW /m2 radiation 
intensity and include fire rated glazing, before possible ignition of the contents 
behind the fire rated glazing, given there is pilot ignition. This is 4 times the 
minimum level for wood surfaces. The NZ Building Code Acceptable Solutions 
(1991) do allow walls to have combustible surface finishes if they are greater than 
1 m away from the boundary, but this is not expected to undermine the 
performance of a fire rated structure, only increase vertical fire spread risk. 
If the Fire Service perceive a spread of fire risk to neighbouring property they will 
douse the facing wall surfaces. This raises the critical radiation intensity 
significantly due to the ability for water to absorb heat. 
The following example highlights a design process for determining expected 
radiation intensity on an adjacent property, using a choice of equations 5.17 - 5.19. 
From applying 1 lis of water over the receiving face an effective total cooling 
power of2.6 MW is provided. This can then be reduced to a kW per m2 figure and 
added to the critical intensity value for the receiving surface, to raise the minimum 
pilot ignition radiation intensity. This simple analysis assumes that there is 
continuous water application over the entire surface. Similarly to water application 
onto the fire, there needs to be an application efficiency to account for erratic 
application; a suggested value is 0.25 given the increased difficulty in directing 
water streams. 
11.4.1 Example 
A 150 MW fire is occurring within a plastics factory. Flames are issuing above the 
wall line and providing a spread of fire risk to a neighbouring building constructed 
from timber. The distance between the flame point source and the neighbouring 
wall (measuring 20m x 3m high), is 6m at an angle of 45°. What is the radiant heat 
flux on the surface, and how does the critical radiation intensity change if 1 lps and 
30 lps water is applied over the entire neighbouring wall surface? 
a) Radiant heat flux- assume a point source [eqn. 11.8] 
QR = (0.3x150.cos 45°)/4.n.62 
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= 70 kW/m2 
Critical radiation intensity (from Table 11.4) = 16.7 kW/m2 
. ·. ignition likely to occur 
b) Cooling power of 1 Ips water over surface= (2.6 MW/ 60 m2) x 0.25 
application efficiency. 
=> 10.8 kW/m2. This would still lead to probable ignition as the net 
heat radiation is [70- 10.8] 59.2 kW/m2 (ie. > 16.7 kW/m2). 
c) Assume 30 lis applied from two hoses (total) over the surface: 
= (2.6 MW x 30 lis) x 0.25 I 60m2 
= 325 kW/m2 cooling power 
=> clearly exceeds the 70 kW/m2 incident radiation, and therefore the 
risk is contained. 
This example highlights how little volume flow of water is required to control 
spread of fire to neighbouring properties. One hose line should be able to provide 
10 -15 Ips water and as long as the complete wall (in the example) could be 
constantly doused there should not be a risk of fire spread. As discussed, 
neighbouring walls of combustible construction in industrial zone areas will have a 
minimal 3-4 m separation distance from the boundary, depending on their facing 
dimensions. This should allow sufficient distance to apply a complete water spray 
in most cases. 
11.5 Conclusions 
1. The NZ Building Code requires protection for neighbouring property only 
There is no requirement to protect owners property from damage although an 
owner may need to control the effects of a fire on the environment to comply 
with the Resource Management Act and Building Act. 
2. If the effective cooling capacity available from fire fighting water is greater 
than the effective heat release rate, then the design fire is considered able to be 
extinguished. Alternatively if the analysis concludes that the effective cooling 
capacity is less, then the fire is considered to only be suppressed. 
3. Suppressing or extinguishing an industrial building fire is dependant on the 
ability to direct water into the fire. The recommended application efficiency is 
0.50, and increased to 0.65 if the building features greatly improve the 
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effective application of water. These values are based on limited reference 
material and this area requires more research. 
4. Fire fighting response is limited by the available water supply. A designer 
needs to confirm the site supply and amend the fire safety design to match 
cooling power against the spread of fire risk. 
5. The quantity of water required to control fire spread to neighbouring property 
is expected to be much less than the quantity required for fire control. 
Prewetting neighbouring property is a very effective method of limiting fire 
spread. 
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12.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
12.1 Introduction 
This document aims to establish a design methodology for meeting basic fire safety 
objectives within single storey industrial buildings using a 'common-sense' 
approach. It is recognised that further research is required to substantiate design 
factors used, and that fire engineering design for single storey industrial buildings 
needs to be treated apart from other building types. Reviewing the main 
conclusions: 
12.2 Statistical Research 
12.2.1 Literature Survey 
A literature survey was completed to assess fire incident trends from other 
countries. The main conclusions were: 
2.1 High fire load incidents typically accounted for 15% of fires studied, and 
50% of the loss. 
2.2 Fire load density is probably the most important factor for the fire growth 
and extent of damage. 
2.3 The likelihood of warehouse fires was considerably higher than fires in the 
process and manufacturing industry. 
2.4 A warehouse fire is likely to occur in a particular warehouse once every 
hundred years [p(reportable fire)= 1.2 x 10"2 year "1] 
2.5 The probability of a 'serious' warehouse fire occurring in a particular 
warehouse, is between 2.5 x 10"3 and 5.5 x 10"3 year"1. A serious fire included 
all fires where roof collapse occurred. 
2.6 Serious warehouse/storage fires not only result in extensive damage to 
structures and contents, but also present a significant risk to the 
environment. 
2.7 The majority of fires (62%) occur between 6pm and 6am, when the premises 
are presumably unmanned or only a minimal number of staff are present. 
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12.2.2 NZFS Incident Records 
A review was carried out on New Zealand Fire Service incident statistics for 
manufacturing and warehousing facilities, between the years 1988 and 1994. The 
aim was to identify high and low risk factors associated with recent fires, and 
recommend improvements to reduce the incidence of serious fires. 
The main recommendations from this review and the literature survey are: 
2.1 Automatic detection systems should be included in industrial buildings, 
especially businesses associated with wood and paper products. 
2.2 To minimise unlawful entry, security systems should form part of the fire 
safety management programme. 
2.3 Periodic risk assessments need to be undertaken to ensure that the correct 
level of protection and hazard management is occurring to suit the risk and 
fire safety strategy. 
The conclusions from the statistical research were used to help develop the 
direction in the overall research project. 
12.3 Fire Safety Management 
The fundamental concept with fire safety management is loss control, or to 
minimise both the chance and consequences of a serious fire. Loss control is not 
only important during a buildings design phase, but also once the business is 
operational. The objective of this section was to highlight appropriate fire safety 
management techniques, and reinforce the need for fire safety to be continually 
reviewed and reinforced. 
12.3.1 Design Process 
The design process begins with ensuring the safety of occupants in the event of a 
fire. A fire engineer needs to also highlight to a property owner, the added risks to 
property and operations. A fire safety strategy can then be developed. Main 
conclusions are: 
3 .1 Current regulatory requirements do not address property and business loss 
control (for the owner); only life safety, spread of fire, and environmental 
protection issues. 
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3.2 Loss control should be reinforced during the design process. This requires 
determination of acceptable loss, and application of risk assessment and 
cost/benefit techniques. 
12.3.2 Existing Operation 
An on-going fire safety management programme should be introduced that 
incorporates: 
• Fire prevention training and audits. 
• Evacuation systems. 
• Pre-incident plans. 
This ensures that fire safety and loss control does not diminish during the use of a 
building. Main conclusions are: 
3. 3 Owners of industrial buildings need to develop a culture that accepts fire 
prevention training and audits as part of the business plan. Exercises should 
be held on an annual basis. 
3.4 An approved evacuation system should be established and maintained for 
occupied buildings in accordance with the Fire Safety and Evacuation of 
Buildings Regulations (1991). 
3. 5 Pre-incident planning should be encouraged to ensure that responding 
personnel can effectively manage incidents with available resources. 
3.6 Contingency plans need to be in place to minimise disruption to the operation 
of the business in an emergency. 
12.4 Environmental Protection 
The design of industrial buildings should not only consider the effects of fire within 
the immediate site area, but also the possible effects to the greater environment. 
The New Zealand Resource Management Act 1991, requires any development 
proposals to assess the effect that the development would have on the 
environment, and to either eliminate, isolate or control possible ha;z;ards. 
The Building Act 1991 also places a responsibility on a building owner to protect 
the environment from any event originating within a building operation. However, 
in contrast to other building control issues, the NZ Building Code gives inadequate 
guidance on acceptable design for controlling environmental hazards. 
The main conclusions from this review are: 
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4.1 There is a clear need to provide acceptance criteria for hazardous processes 
and their containment under fire conditions to safeguard the environment. 
4.2 Plant design for sites containing 'significant' hazardous substances should 
include risk assessment, and result in safety controls to suit the risk. 
4.3 The ideal solution is to control or extinguish the fire before any pollution 
occurs. Automatic extinguishment systems such as sprinklers protection can 
assist in minimising both air and water pollution. 
4.4 Bunding or containment reservoirs are an important environmental safety 
feature. The design is dependant on the quantity of goods held and the 
volume of fire fighting water expected to be applied. 
4.5 Auditing, trial emergency procedures, and familiarisation by outside 
authorities need to become part of the industry culture. The scale of an 
industrial fire is often underestimated. 
12.5 Fire Design Procedure 
A fire design procedure should identify the variables that can affect the outcome of 
a fire, such as fuel layout and Fire Service response, and predict the main stages of 
fire development, including: 
• fire growth 
• fire spread within the firecell 
• open air burning following roof collapse 
• boundary exposure 
The main intent of a fire design procedure and modelling fire behaviour, is to assist 
in the following 
5.1 Determination of the risk to life safety and risk of fire spread to adjacent 
property. 
5.2 Assessment of the benefits of enhanced active and passive fire protection to 
minimise these risks. 
Important features associated with a fire development procedure are: 
5.3 Provision of adequate information on the combustible contents, the building 
design, and the fire protection features. 
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5.4 Development of a time/HRR graph for use in determining structural failure 
conditions, boundary exposure, and the effect ofFire Service response. 
5. 5 Radiant heat flux calculations to assess the risk of fire spread to neighbouring 
property, and determine the effect that prewetting has on lowering the risk. 
If the intended building use is not known then the prescriptive solution in the 
NZBC can be adopted. 
12.6 Life Safety 
The objective in life safety design is to ensure that building occupants either 
escape, are rescued or find a place of refuge before untenable conditions occur, 
and that Fire Service personnel are adequately protected to undertake rescue 
operations. Conclusions from this section are: 
6.1 Occupants within industrial occupancies are expected to be alert, active and 
mobile, plus familiar with their surroundings. 
6.2 One method of designing a suitable escape system is applying a prescriptive 
solution. These are based on conservative travel speeds, exit configurations 
and untenability conditions. 
6.3 The recommended design method uses deterministic and behavioural models 
to compare estimated evacuation time (Tae) against the untenability time (Tu). 
The escape route design must prove that T ae is less than T u, otherwise 
improvements are required. 
6.4 Automatic detection/suppression systems reduce evacuation times as well as 
improving the likelihood of controlling the fire. They are recommended for 
inclusion in industrial buildings. 
12.7 Sprinkler and Detection Systems 
The aim of this section was to promote the advantages of automatic fire protection 
and outline appropriate systems for single storey industrial buildings. Emphasis is 
given to firstly establishing a fire safety strategy, then designing systems to suit. 
Conclusions are: 
7.1 System goals for a site fire safety strategy can be placed in three categories: 
life safety, property protection, and business protection. 
7.2 To determine the most effective fire safety strategy in terms of cost and 
performance, a site fire risk assessment should be completed. 
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7. 3 The minimum level of fire protection expected for a single storey industrial 
building for life safety purposes is a manual call point and alarm system. 
Inclusion of automatic detection or suppression systems enhances life safety, 
and should be incorporated in building design wherever possible. 
7.4 Fire safety designs relying on detector performance, must account for the 
detector RTI, activation temperature, and the transport time lag. 
7.5 Sprinklers are the only expected method of controlling a fire within a typical 
industrial complex. The Fire Service cannot be expected to attack and 
suppress a fire from receiving an alarm call without sprinkler support. 
7. 6 A critical part of sprinkler design is establishing the correct hazard 
classification. This evaluation should form part of the initial risk assessment. 
12.8 Roof Venting 
The objective of this section was to provide a design method for the sizing and 
operation of roof vents in industrial buildings. Roof vents provide smoke control 
within a compartment, and assist with escape systems, fire fighter operations, and 
limitation of damage during the initial stages of a fire. Conclusions are: 
8.1 A roof venting system should form part of a fire design strategy. It is not a 
substitute for sprinklers or other extinguishing systems. 
8.2 Roof vents can be provided by natural vents or mechanical extraction. Both 
forms rely on the buoyancy pressure of the fire to drive the smoke outside. 
8.3 Sprinklers operating without roof vents are expected to control the fire, but 
cause greater smoke and water damage. 
8.4 Sprinklers and roof vents should be integrated where possible. Sprinklers are 
recommended to operate first, with roof vents minimising smoke damage and 
assisting Fire Service operations. 
12.9 Structural Performance 
One of the primary objectives in fire safety design is to control the spread of fire. 
For limiting fire spread to adjacent properties, boundary walls become the most 
important structural feature, where these in turn are dependant on the primary 
support design. The objective of this section was to recommend a suitable 
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technique for designing external boundary walls, with due regard to the 'S' rating 
system, the primary support system, and the preferred failure mechanism. 
9.1 To reduce the probability of fire spread to neighbouring property from fire in 
unsprinklered buildings with FLED > 1500 MJ/m2, walls close to boundaries 
should be provided with a fire resistance rating of 4 hours. 
9.2 This rating can be reduced if it is proven that either the design fire, 
separation distance or building design will result in a reduced exposure risk. 
9.3 Ifthe fire resistance rating provided is less than the severity ofthe expected 
fire, the assistance of the Fire Service will be required to prevent fire spread 
to neighbouring property. 
9.4 Using equivalent time formulae is considered conservative due to no 
allowance for reduced fire severity for open air fires and expected Fire 
Service response. 
9. 5 The critical elements in the boundary wall design are the connections 
between the panels and support structure, and between adjacent panels. 
These need to be designed to ensure that the walls function as one unit, and 
do not collapse outwards during a fire. 
12.1 0 Fire Service Intervention 
The Fire Service has a clear legislative requirement to 'endeavour by all practicable 
·means' to extinguish and prevent the spread of fire. Their success in reaching this 
goal is dependant on conditional events such as attendance times, rescue 
operations, and securing of sufficient water supplies. The aim of this section was to 
highlight Fire Service responsibilities, capabilities and constraints. Conclusions are: 
10.1 The critical factors in meeting NZBC objectives is to ensure occupants 
evacuate safely and that the fire does not spread to neighbouring property. 
10.2 Effective Fire Service response relies on accessibility to adequate water 
supplies. The Fire Service Code of Practice for Fire Fighting Water Supplies 
identifies minimum supply requirements for various risk areas. 
10.3 The overall performance of the Fire Service is reliant on the success of 
conditional events, such as fire detection and attendance times. These events 
can be expressed as probabilities, and Fire Service performance measured as 
a total probable event. There is, however, no design standard to gauge 
whether the predicted response of the Fire Service is acceptable. 
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10.4 Fire Service response needs to be considered as part of the overall fire safety 
strategy for the building. 
12.11 Fire Fighting Design 
The aim of this section was to establish a design method equating fire fighting 
capabilities with design fires for industrial buildings. Important parameters in this 
equation include water resources, the cooling capacity of water, and the control of 
fire spread. Conclusions are: 
11.1 If the effective cooling capacity available from fire fighting water is greater 
than the effective heat release rate, then the design fire is considered able to 
be extinguished. Alternatively if effective cooling capacity is less, then the 
fire is considered to only be suppressed. 
11.2 Fire fighting response is limited by the available water supply. A designer 
needs to confirm the site supply and amend the fire safety design to match 
cooling power against the spread of fire risk. 
11.3 Suppressing or extinguishing an industrial building fire is dependant on the 
ability to direct water into the fire. The recommended application efficiency 
is 0.50, and increased to 0.65 if the building features greatly improve the 
effective application of water. These values are based on limited reference 
material and this area requires more research. 
11.4 The quantity of water required to control · fire spread to neighbouring 
property is expected to be much less than the quantity required for fire 
control. Prewetting neighbouring property is a very effective method of 
limiting fire spread. 
12.12 Future Research 
Recommended areas for future research include: 
12.1 Modelling spread of fire between large combustible surfaces, such as racks. 
· 12.2 Improving the techniques for estimating reaction and preparation times in the 
estimated evacuation (behavioural) time equation. 
12.3 Establishing application efficiencies for fire fighting water on building fires. 
12.4 Determining the effectiveness of prewetting on unburnt combustibles with 
respect to reduction in critical radiation intensity. 
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